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Introduction 
 
Does regional science matter nowadays? Several researchers have tried - and are still 
trying - to answer this question at the light of the fact that fast connections and communication 
technologies allow economic actors to easily interact and do business with global partners. 
Anyhow, the local and global dimensions seem to play a complementary role in influencing 
firms' economic performance and behaviour rather than being substitute factors. In fact, there are 
many cases of excellence among Italian industrial districts, high-tech clusters, and innovative 
milieus which suggest the relevance of the local dimension for firms to grow and compete. 
The analysis of the local economic dimension dates back to the pioneering contribution of 
MARSHALL on the industrial district concept (Principles of Economics, 1890, Macmillan, 
London), which highlights the peculiar advantages for a firm from being located in an 
industrially specialised local system. According to MARSHALL's (1890) analysis, firms 
operating in a spatially bounded - and specialised - area can benefit from both tangible and 
intangible effects. Tangible effects are mainly related to the local availability of inputs' suppliers 
and specialised workers, the reduction of transportation costs, and the emerging of external-scale 
economies. On the contrary, intangible effects are related to the reduction of transaction costs 
(favoured by face-to-face and repeated interactions which increase trust, reputation, and 
reciprocity among the local actors), and the spread of knowledge and (tacit) information flows 
concerning production processes, technologies, and innovation practices. 
Moving from these intuitions, economists started to analyse the role played by local forces 
in influencing the economic performance of regional systems and individual actors (i.e. firms). 
Attention has also been paid to local-based phenomena other than specialised agglomerated 
areas. Among these, the role of urban areas and the advantages related to the location in large 
and industrially diversified cities have been deeply analysed by geographers and regional 
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economists. 
In particular, agglomeration forces concerning - and arising from - the spatial 
concentration of the economic activity received great attention in both the theoretical and the 
empirical literature. The contribution of GLAESER, KALLAL, SCHEINKMAN and SHLEIFER 
("Growth in Cities", Journal of Political Economy, 1992, Vol. 100, No. 6, pp. 1126-1152) 
represented the first attempt to empirically analyse the causal relationship between 
agglomeration externalities and local economic performance, and it began a wide cross-county 
literature on the topic. 
This Thesis moves in this direction and tries to contribute to the debate concerning the 
relationship between spatial agglomeration forces and firms' economic performance. 
Specifically, it comes as a collection of three empirical papers dealing with this topic from very 
different perspectives. 
The first chapter of the Thesis is entitled "Productivity, Credit Constraints and the Role of 
Short-Run Localization Economies: Micro-Evidence from Italy". This chapter is single-authored 
and is forthcoming in Regional Studies (doi:10.1080/00343404.2015.1064883). This paper 
investigates whether Italian manufacturing firms' productivity is affected by credit constraints, 
and whether short-run localisation economies foster productivity both directly and indirectly, 
moderating the negative effects of credit rationing via inter-firm credit relationships. The 
empirical exercise is based on a sample of 12,524 firms observed over the period 1999-2007 and 
drawn from the AIDA databank (Bureau Van Dijk), and it is carried out in three steps. First, 
Total Factor Productivity is estimated at the firm level through the approach proposed by 
WOOLDRIDGE ("On Estimating Firm-Level Production Functions Using Proxy Variables to 
Control for Unobservables", Economics Letters, 2009, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 112-114). Second, 
dynamic investment equations are estimated to investigate whether firms are credit constrained, 
and to test the potential moderation effect of short-run localisation economies on the investment-
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to-cash flow sensitivity. Third, an instrumental-variable approach is employed to test whether 
firms' productivity is negatively affected by credit constraints (i.e. the marginal effect of cash 
flow on investments), and whether short-run localisation economies positively affect 
productivity both directly and indirectly, downsizing the negative effects of credit rationing. The 
results suggest that firms are affected by credit rationing, and that localisation economies 
positively moderate the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity favouring inter-firm trade credit. It 
emerges a negative effect of credit rationing on firms' productivity, while localisation economies 
have both a direct and an indirect positive effect on productivity. In fact, short-run localisation 
economies seem to reduce the negative credit constraints-productivity relationship by about 
4.5%. Finally, the results suggest a complementary effect between localisation economies and 
the local banking structure: the positive moderation effect of localisation economies on both 
firms' investment-to-cash flow sensitivity and the credit constraints-productivity relationship 
increases as the density of bank branches in the local system increases. 
The second chapter is entitled "Industrial Clusters, Organised Crime and Productivity 
Growth in Italian SMEs" and is co-authored with Andrés Rodríguez-Pose (LSE). This paper 
empirically investigates whether organised crime (namely, mafia-type criminality) affects a 
firm's performance (defined in terms of Total Factor Productivity growth) both directly and 
indirectly, downsizing positive externalities arising from the geographic concentration of (intra- 
and inter-industry) market-related firms. Therefore, this paper investigates the simultaneous role 
played by - and the interplay of - market-based agglomeration economies and organised crime in 
influencing manufacturing small and medium sized firms' productivity growth. On the one hand, 
firms operating in a local system characterised by a high density of horizontally- and vertically-
interconnected firms (in terms of input-output relationships) may benefit from both tangible (e.g. 
the reduction of transportation costs, the local availability of inputs' suppliers) and intangible 
(e.g. the reduction of transaction costs) agglomeration externalities which are likely to foster 
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their productivity growth. On the other hand, organised crime is likely to negatively affect both 
the socio-economic environment and firms' performance, for instance imposing protection 
rackets, altering market rules and competition processes. In particular, criminal organisations 
may break established economic networks among firms, for instance imposing to local firms the 
acquisition of inputs from "illicit" firms controlled by the criminal organisation itself. The 
empirical analysis covers a large sample of Italian manufacturing small and medium sized firms 
observed over the period 2008-2011, and it employs a two-step sample-selection model to 
control for firm exit over the three-year growth period. The robustness of the results is tested 
controlling for potential endogeneity of the variables capturing industrial clustering and 
organised crime, as well as using two different approaches to estimate Total Factor Productivity. 
The results suggest a negative direct effect of organised crime on firms' productivity growth, 
while location in a dense local industrial system fosters productivity growth. Moreover, the 
positive effect of industrial clustering on productivity growth decreases as the level of organised 
crime increases in the local system, and that this negative moderation effect of organised crime is 
greater for smaller than for larger firms. Finally, the results suggest that the extortion crime has a 
very strong incidence in weakening a firm's performance. 
The third chapter is entitled "Agglomeration, Heterogeneity and Firm Productivity" and is 
co-authored with Giulio Cainelli (University of Padova). This paper analyses the relationship 
between agglomeration (i.e. localisation- vs. diversification-type) economies and firms' short-run 
productivity growth using Italian manufacturing firm-level data. The analysis deals with two key 
issues. First, it deals with the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) using distance-based 
agglomeration measures computed for each firm in the sample over a continuous space, thus 
avoiding the use of pre-defined spatial units of analysis. Second, it explicitly tests the hypothesis 
of firm heterogeneity in the context of agglomeration phenomena, i.e. it considers the firms 
located within a given geographic area as heterogeneous units which may contribute to the 
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production of the agglomeration externalities in different ways, and with a different intensity, 
according to their specific characteristics (defined in terms of size and Total Factor 
Productivity). This means that firms can be seen both as receivers of the agglomeration 
externalities, and as producers of these externalities. The results suggest that intra-industry (i.e. 
localisation-type) externalities have a positive effect on firms' productivity growth at short 
distances, while a negligible effect at a longer distance (i.e. after 15 km). Moreover, this positive 
effect seems to decrease as the distance increases. On the contrary, inter-industry (i.e. 
diversification-type) externalities have a negative effect on firms' productivity growth at a very 
short distance (i.e. within 5 km), while a positive effect at a longer distance (i.e. after 15 km). 
Therefore, it emerges a sort of substitution effect between intra- and inter-industry externalities 
at different distances. It also emerges that firm heterogeneity (in terms of size and productivity) 
matters in the generation of intra-industry externalities: in fact, the decreasing-with-distance 
pattern characterising their positive effect changes to an increasing-with-distance pattern when 
neighbour firms' characteristics are accounted for. It follows an attenuation of the substitution 
effect between intra- and inter-industry externalities. In fact, they seem to have opposing effects 
at short distances (i.e. within 15 km), while both types of externalities seem to foster firms' 
productivity growth at a longer distance (i.e. after 15 km). Moreover, inter-industry externalities 
seem to have a greater effect on short-run productivity growth than intra-industry externalities. 
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Introduzione 
 
Quanto contano gli studi regionali oggigiorno? Molti ricercatori hanno cercato - e ancora 
cercano - di rispondere a questa domanda alla luce dello sviluppo di mezzi e tecnologie di 
comunicazione che consentono agli attori economici di interagire e condurre affari con partner 
globali. Ad ogni modo, le dimensioni locale e globale sembrano avere ruoli complementari, 
anziché sostitutivi, nell'influenzare la performance e le scelte economiche delle imprese. Ciò 
emerge chiaramente se si considerano casi di successo tra i distretti industriali italiani, i cluster 
high-tech e i sistemi locali innovativi, che evidenziano la rilevanza della dimensione locale nel 
promuovere la crescita e la competitività delle imprese. 
L'analisi della dimensione economica locale trova origine nello studio pioneristico di 
MARSHALL (Principles of Economics, 1890, Macmillan, London) sul concetto di distretto 
industriale, in cui sono messi in evidenza i vantaggi peculiari che un'impresa può trarre 
dall'essere localizzata in un sistema industriale locale altamente specializzato. Nello specifico, 
MARSHALL (1890) sottolinea come un'impresa che operi in una località geograficamente 
delimitata - e specializzata in termini di produzione industriale - possa trarre beneficio sia da 
fattori tangibili, sia da fattori intangibili. I primi riguardano la disponibilità "locale" di fornitori e 
lavoratori altamente specializzati, la riduzione dei costi di trasporto, e l'emergere di economie di 
scala esterne. I secondi, al contrario, riguardano la riduzione dei costi di transazione, che risulta 
facilitata da interazioni dirette e ripetute (tali da accrescere il livello di fiducia, reputazione e 
reciprocità) tra gli attori economici locali, e la diffusione di conoscenza e flussi di informazioni 
(tacite) riguardanti processi produttivi, tecnologie e pratiche innovative. 
L'analisi di MARSHALL (1890) ha spinto molti economisti ad analizzare la relazione tra 
fattori legati alla dimensione locale e performance economica, sia a livello di sistemi regionali 
che di imprese. Nel tempo, diverse tipologie di "forze" locali sono state oggetto di studio, oltre ai 
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conglomerati produttivi altamente specializzati. Ad esempio, economisti regionali e geografi 
hanno rivolto la loro attenzione verso la dimensione urbana e i vantaggi legati alla localizzazione 
in città caratterizzate da un'ampia diversificazione della struttura industriale. 
In particolare, numerosi contributi teorici ed empirici hanno sottolineato la rilevanza di 
esternalità agglomerative legate alla concentrazione spaziale delle attività economiche. Il 
contributo di GLAESER, KALLAL, SCHEINKMAN and SHLEIFER ("Growth in Cities", 
Journal of Political Economy, 1992, Vol. 100, No. 6, pp. 1126-1152) è stato il primo tentativo di 
analizzare empiricamente la relazione di causalità tra esternalità agglomerative e performance 
economica locale, dando il via ad un'ampia letteratura sul tema. 
Il presente elaborato (Tesi) si basa su questa letteratura, e cerca di contribuire al dibattito 
avente ad oggetto la relazione tra forze legate all'agglomerazione spaziale delle attività 
economiche e performance delle imprese. Nello specifico, questa Tesi è costituita da tre capitoli 
(papers) che analizzano la suddetta relazione da punti di vista molti differenti. 
Il primo capitolo della Tesi è intitolato "Productivity, Credit Constraints and the Role of 
Short-Run Localization Economies: Micro-Evidence from Italy". Questo capitolo è a firma 
singola, ed è stato accettato per pubblicazione dalla rivista Regional Studies 
(doi:10.1080/00343404.2015.1064883). Questo capitolo analizza la relazione tra produttività di 
impresa, razionamento creditizio ed economie di localizzazione di breve termine. Nello 
specifico, analizza gli effetti diretti di razionamento creditizio ed economie di localizzazione 
sulla produttività di impresa, così come il potenziale effetto di moderazione (positivo) che le 
economie di localizzazione possono avere sulla relazione (negativa) tra razionamento creditizio e 
produttività, promuovendo fenomeni di "inter-firm trade credit". L'analisi empirica utilizza dati 
di fonte AIDA (Bureau Van Dijk) relativi ad un campione di 12.524 imprese osservate nel corso 
del periodo 1999-2007. L'analisi è condotto in tre fasi. In primo luogo, la Produttività Totale dei 
Fattore è stimata a livella di impresa utilizzando l'approccio proposto da WOOLDRIDGE ("On 
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Estimating Firm-Level Production Functions Using Proxy Variables to Control for 
Unobservables", Economics Letters, 2009, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 112-114). Successivamente, una 
serie di funzioni di investimento dinamiche sono stimate al fine di analizzare se le imprese del 
campione siano oggetto di razionamento creditizio, e di testare il potenziale effetto di 
moderazione delle economie di localizzazione di breve termine sulla relazione tra investimenti e 
cash flow di impresa. Infine, sono stimati una serie di modelli per variabili strumentali al fine di 
analizzare se la produttività di impresa sia influenzata negativamente dal razionamento creditizio 
(definito come effetto marginale del cash flow sugli investimenti), e se le economie di 
localizzazione di breve termine abbiano sia un effetto positivo diretto sulla produttività, sia un 
effetto positivo indiretto tale da ridurre gli effetti negativi legati al razionamento creditizio. I 
risultati empirici suggeriscono che le imprese del campione siano oggetto di razionamento 
creditizio, e che le economie di localizzazione abbiano un effetto positivo tale da moderare la 
dipendenza degli investimenti dal cash flow favorendo fenomeni di "inter-firm trade credit". 
Emerge inoltre un effetto negativo del razionamento creditizio sulla produttività di impresa, 
mentre le economie di localizzazione sembrano avere un effetto diretto positivo sulla 
produttività. Allo stesso modo, le economie di localizzazione sembrano avere anche un effetto 
indiretto positivo sulla produttività: infatti, i risultati mostrano che l'effetto negativo del 
razionamento creditizio sulla produttività diminuisce del 4,5% quando l'effetto di moderazione 
delle economie di localizzazione è preso in considerazione. Infine, i risultati mostrano un effetto 
di complementarietà tra economie di localizzazione e struttura bancaria a livello locale. Infatti, 
l'effetto indiretto positivo delle economie di localizzazione risulta crescente al crescere della 
densità di filiali bancarie nel sistema locale di appartenenza dell'impresa. 
Il secondo capitolo è intitolato "Industrial Clusters, Organised Crime and Productivity 
Growth in Italian SMEs", ed è co-autorato con Andrés Rodríguez-Pose (LSE). Questo secondo 
capitolo analizza il ruolo della criminalità organizzata (di tipo mafioso) sulla performance di 
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impresa (definita in termini di crescita della Produttività Totale dei Fattori), considerando anche 
il suo potenziale effetto indiretto (negativo) sulla relazione (positiva) tra esternalità 
agglomerative legate alla co-localizzazione di imprese fornitrici (industrial clustering) e crescita 
della produttività di un campione di piccole e medie imprese manifatturiere italiane. Pertanto, 
sono presi in esame due differenti (e contrastanti) fattori definiti a livello locale: la criminalità 
organizzata e la concentrazione spaziale di imprese connesse da relazioni di mercato. Da una 
parte, imprese che operano in sistemi locali caratterizzati da un'alta densità di imprese 
potenzialmente connesse (orizzontalmente e verticalmente) da relazioni di mercato possono 
beneficiare di esternalità agglomerative sia tangibili (ad esempio, la riduzione dei costi di 
trasporto, la disponibilità di fornitori a livello locale) che intangibili (ad esempio, la riduzione dei 
costi di transazione), che tendono a favorire la crescita di impresa. Dall'altra parte, la presenza di 
organizzazioni criminali tende ad avere conseguenze negative sia per l'ambiente socio-
economico, sia per la performance di impresa, ad esempio a causa dell'imposizione del 
pagamento del pizzo, di azioni lesive delle regole di mercato e dei processi competitivi tra 
imprese. In particolare, la criminalità organizzata opera nel mercato per mezzo di imprese 
"illegali" direttamente controllate, la cui presenza ed attività (ad esempio, l'imposizione 
dell'acquisto di input alle imprese "legali") tendono ad indebolire le relazioni di mercato esistenti 
tra le imprese locali. L'analisi empirica è basata su un campione di piccole e medie imprese 
manifatturiere italiane osservate nel periodo 2008-2011. L'analisi è condotta applicando modelli 
di tipo "sample selection", e la robustezza dei risultati è testata controllando per la potenziale 
endogeneità delle variabili che catturano i fenomeni di criminalità organizzata e agglomerazione 
industriale, così come stimando la Produttività Totale dei Fattori a livello di impresa per mezzo 
di due approcci econometrici differenti. I risultati mostrano un effetto diretto negativo della 
criminalità organizzata sulla crescita della produttività di impresa. AL contrario, la crescita della 
produttività trae beneficio da un'alta densità di imprese circostanti potenzialmente connesse da 
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relazioni di mercato. I risultati suggeriscono inoltre un effetto negativo indiretto della criminalità 
organizzata, la cui presenza nel sistema locale sembra ridurre sensibilmente gli effetti positivi 
dell'agglomerazione di imprese sulla crescita della produttività. Questo risultato sembra 
particolarmente accentuato per le imprese di più piccole dimensioni. Inoltre, il crimine di 
estorsione sembra giocare un ruolo chiave in questo scenario. 
Il terzo capitolo è intitolato "Agglomeration, Heterogeneity and Firm Productivity", ed è 
co-autorato con Giulio Cainelli (Università di Padova). Questo capitolo analizza la relazione tra 
economie di agglomerazione (nello specifico, economie di localizzazione e di diversificazione) e 
crescita della produttività di breve periodo utilizzando un campione di imprese manifatturiere 
italiane. Nello specifico, due aspetti chiave sono presi in considerazione. Il primo riguarda il 
cosiddetto "Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP)", che è trattato costruendo variabili di 
agglomerazione "distance-based" a livello di impresa e assumendo lo spazio come continuo, e 
cioè evitando l'uso di aree geografiche pre-definite come unità spaziali di analisi. Il secondo 
riguarda l'ipotesi di eterogeneità di impresa, che nel contesto dei fenomeni agglomerativi si 
riferisce all'idea che le imprese co-localizzate nello spazio siano unità eterogenee in grado di 
contribuire alla produzione delle esternalità agglomerative in maniera (e con intensità) differente 
in base alle loro specifiche caratteristiche (nello specifico, dimensione e Produttività Totale dei 
Fattori). Assumere eterogeneità di impresa implica assumere che le imprese non solo traggano 
beneficio dalle esternalità agglomerative, ma anche agiscano come loro "generatori". I risultati 
suggeriscono che le esternalità intra-industriali (economie di localizzazione) abbiano un effetto 
positivo sulla crescita della produttività nella breve distanza, mentre un effetto statisticamente 
non significativo per distanze maggiori (oltre i 15 km). Inoltre, questo effetto positivo risulta 
inversamente proporzionale rispetto alla distanza. Al contrario, le esternalità inter-industriali 
(economie di diversificazione) hanno un effetto negativo nella breve distanza (entro i 5 km), 
mentre un effetto positivo nella lunga distanza (oltre i 15 km). Pertanto, sembra emergere un 
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effetto di sostituzione tra economie di localizzazione e di diversificazione a distanze differenti. I 
risultano mostrano inoltre l'importanza di considerare l'eterogeneità di impresa (in termini di 
dimensione e produttività) nel processo di generazione delle esternalità intra-industriali: infatti, 
quando si tiene conto delle caratteristiche specifiche delle imprese co-localizzate, emerge un 
effetto positivo delle economie di localizzazione che risulta crescente al crescere della distanza. 
Emerge quindi un'attenuazione dell'effetto di sostituzione tra esternalità intra- e inter-industriali, 
che sembrano avere effetti opposti nella breve distanza (entro i 15 km), mentre entrambe 
sembrano avere un effetto positivo sulla crescita della produttività nella lunga distanza (oltre i 15 
km). Inoltre, le economie di diversificazione sembrano avere un effetto maggiore sulla crescita 
della produttività di breve termine rispetto alle economie di localizzazione. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Productivity, Credit Constraints and the Role of Short-Run 
Localization Economies: Micro-Evidence from Italy* 
 
 
Roberto Ganau 
(University of Padova and Queen Mary, University of London) 
 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates whether Italian manufacturing firms' productivity is affected 
by credit constraints, and whether short-run localization economies foster  productivity both 
directly and indirectly, moderating the negative effects of credit rationing via inter-firm credit 
relationships. Results suggest a negative effect of credit rationing on firms' productivity, while a 
positive relationship exists between short-run localization economies and productivity. It 
emerges that location in an industrially concentrated area reduces firms' investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity, and that it positively moderates the negative effect of credit rationing on productivity. 
Moreover, the positive moderation effect seems to be increasing in the density of the local 
banking system. 
 
 
Keywords: Total Factor Productivity; Credit rationing; Localization economies 
JEL classification: C23; D24; G32; R12 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The determinants of firms' productivity have been widely investigated (SYVERSON, 
2011) and some contributions have also considered, besides traditional factors, the role of 
financial variables (CARREIRA and SILVA, 2010) and agglomeration economies 
(ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004). On the one hand, contributions studying the effects of 
credit rationing on firms' productivity underline a negative credit constraints-productivity 
relationship. Firms facing difficulties in obtaining credit from banks and institutional markets 
have to rely on internally generated resources, thus being limited in their investment decisions 
with negative effects on productivity (CHEN and GUARIGLIA, 2013). On the other hand, the 
literature on agglomeration economies emphasizes how positive externalities arising from the 
local economic environment foster firms' productivity. Firms in agglomerated areas benefit from 
spillover effects in terms of external-scale economies, the reduction of transaction costs, 
knowledge transmission and, in particular, localization externalities seem to play a key role in 
enhancing firms' productivity (BEAUDRY and SCHIFFAUEROVA, 2009). 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of firms' productivity by linking 
the abovementioned research streams. It investigates whether Italian manufacturing firms' 
productivity is sensitive to credit constraints, whether it is fostered by short-run localization 
externalities, and whether location in industrially concentrated areas downsizes the negative 
effect of credit constraints on productivity. In fact, the geographic concentration of industries 
may positively moderate the credit constraints-productivity relationship promoting inter-firm 
trade credit as an alternative source of funds, which has been found particularly relevant in 
specialized productive clusters (DEI OTTATI, 1994). 
The analysis employs a sample of 11,953 Italian manufacturing firms observed over the 
period 1999-2007. Results suggest a negative credit constraints-productivity relationship, while a 
positive relationship exists between localization externalities and productivity. Geographic 
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concentration positively moderates firms' investment-to-cash flow sensitivity, and reduces the 
negative credit constraints-productivity relationship. Finally, the moderation effect of 
localization externalities is increasing in the density of bank branches. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the related literature. The 
third section describes the dataset and methodology. The fourth section presents the results. The 
fifth section concludes. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1. Credit constraints and productivity 
Many theoretical contributions underline the importance of financial markets in promoting 
economic growth through the provision of resources necessary to finance productivity-enhancing 
technological innovations (KING and LEVINE, 1993). Along these lines, several contributions 
focused on the relationship between finance and firms' investment decisions. The rationale is that 
financial markets may finance firms to undertake new investment projects, and they may 
facilitate efficient resources allocation and capital accumulation (AGHION et al., 2010). 
However, under the assumptions of imperfect financial markets and asymmetric information, 
firms may face difficulties in raising credit from banks and institutional markets. Consequently, 
credit-constrained firms have to rely on internal funds, and they cannot allocate efficiently their 
resources to undertake productivity-enhancing investments (AYYAGARI et al., 2007). 
Evidence shows negative effects of credit rationing on firms' investments (FAZZARI et 
al., 1988; LOVE, 2003; GUARIGLIA, 2008), and since investments represent key sources of 
productivity, a relationship between financial factors and firms' productivity is likely to emerge 
(GATTI and LOVE, 2008; CHEN and GUARIGLIA, 2013). Suppose a firm faces two possible 
scenarios: either it can get the resources needed to finance new productivity-enhancing 
investments from financial institutions, or financial markets' imperfections are such that a firm 
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cannot raise external funds to finance investments. In the first case, firms will undertake new 
projects independently of cash flow availability. In the second case, firms willing to make new 
investments have to rely on internal resources with the consequence that decisions on new 
investments are subject to cash flow availability. It follows that credit-constrained firms can 
enhance their productivity only if they have internally the resources required to undertake 
productivity-enhancing investments. Hence, the more firms are credit constrained, the more their 
investment decisions depend on cash flow availability and, consequently, the higher it turns to be 
the sensitivity of productivity to credit rationing. 
For the Italian case, ALBARETO and FINALDI RUSSO (2012) underline that the share of 
manufacturing firms (with at least 50 employees) asking for credit but not receiving it increased 
by more than 3% over the period 1999-2003, while it decreased from about 6.5% to about 2% 
over the period 2003-07. Similarly, the total factor productivity (TFP) in the manufacturing 
industry decreased by 3.51% over the period 1999-2003, while it decreased by 0.90% over 
period 2003-07. This evidence suggests a relationship between external funds' availability and 
manufacturing firms' productivity during the period investigated in this paper. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is specified: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms are credit constrained, and their productivity is negatively affected by 
credit rationing. 
 
2.2. Localization economies and productivity 
The literature on agglomeration economies, which can be defined as local and spatially 
bounded sources of positive externalities arising from the geographic proximity of economic 
actors (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004), builds on the idea that agglomeration induces 
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tangible and intangible benefits for local economic agents, which translate in productivity growth 
both at firm and local levels (PUGA, 2010). 
Localization externalities arising from the spatial concentration of firms operating in the 
same industry received much attention. GLAESER et al. (1992) formalized their role in the 
Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model (MARSHALL, 1920; ARROW, 1962; ROMER, 1986), 
which claims that firms within the same industry and located in a spatially bounded area benefit 
from intra-industry knowledge and technological spillovers facilitated by the transmission of 
information: the sharing of a common competence base allows effective learning of new or 
transmitted knowledge, which requires cognitive proximity among actors (NOOTEBOOM, 
2000). Localization economies may also produce advantages concerning the reduction of 
transportation costs, the emerging of external-scale economies, and the availability of highly 
specialized workers and inputs' suppliers, all representing sources of higher productivity for 
firms (DURANTON and PUGA, 2004; MARTIN et al., 2011). The general result of firm-level 
studies on the agglomeration-productivity relationship is that localization economies tend to 
foster firms' productivity (see BEAUDRY and SCHIFFAUEROVA, 2009, for a review of 
empirical works). 
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, it analyses whether 
localization economies directly affect firms' productivity. Specifically, short-run economies are 
analysed since the empirical investigation considers yearly levels of firms' productivity. Short-
run agglomeration economies tend to capture labour and input markets-related externalities, 
while knowledge-based spillovers may require a longer time interval to materialize (MARTIN et 
al., 2011). Therefore, the analysis focuses on the supply-side advantages of agglomeration 
economies, i.e. those related to the sharing of intermediate inputs' suppliers, the matching 
between buyers and suppliers, and the sharing of a pool of specialized workers (PUGA, 2010). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Sort-run localization economies foster firms' productivity. 
 
Second, this paper investigates whether localization economies have also an indirect 
positive effect on productivity by relating the analysis of agglomeration economies to that of 
credit constraints. Being part of a highly agglomerated area may allow firms (partially) to 
overcome the negative effects of credit rationing thanks to inter-firm relationships, which 
materialize on both the productive and the financial sides. Production linkages may entail inter-
firm credit relationships (CAINELLI et al., 2012), which represent an alternative, non-
institutional channel through which firms can alleviate financial constraints (MENICHINI, 2011; 
FERRANDO and MULIER, 2013). 
Inter-firm credit realizes in a circular way: firms can obtain credit from suppliers through 
better contracts or delayed payments and, vice versa, they can extend credit to customers 
(FERRANDO and MULIER, 2013). Inter-firm credit has been found to be particularly relevant 
in productive clusters, e.g. Italian industrial districts: evidence shows that geographic proximity, 
reciprocity, and repeated transactions between suppliers and customers increase reputation and 
trust and reduce asymmetric information problems, thus favouring inter-firm credit relationships 
(DEI OTTATI, 1994; UGHETTO, 2009; SCALERA and ZAZZARO, 2011). 
Geographic concentration of firms within an industry is an industrial district-type source of 
external economies, and localization externalities diffuse across firms often related by 
production linkages. Therefore, geographic concentration may alleviate firms' credit constraints 
promoting inter-firm trade credit (via production linkages, mainly based on input sharing) among 
firms in the local system, thus favouring a reduction of the negative effects of credit rationing on 
productivity. Hence, the following hypothesis is specified: 
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Hypothesis 3: Geographic concentration alleviates firms' credit constraints, thus reducing the 
negative effects of credit rationing on productivity. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. The dataset 
The analysis employs balance sheet data drawn from the AIDA databank (Bureau Van 
Dijk). The dataset was constructed by considering manufacturing firms with positive values of 
turnover and value added over seven consecutive years during the period 1998-2007, and 
reporting a value added-to-turnover ratio ≥ 0 and ≤ 1. Firms in the first and last percentiles of 
the sales growth distribution have been removed to avoid outlying observations, as well as firms 
with inconsistent data in terms of value added, total labour costs, tangible assets, production 
costs, net income and annual depreciation. This first cleaning procedure left an unbalanced panel 
of 12,524 firms observed over the period 1999-2007, which was used to estimate firm's 
productivity. The final dataset, resulting in an unbalanced panel of 11,953 firms observed over 
the period 1999-2007, was obtained by removing firms without information on their year of set 
up, their location at the provincial level (NUTS-3 level of the European Union territorial 
classification - Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques), and employment. Appendix 
A describes the structure of the sample and discusses potential drawbacks. 
 
3.2. Econometric methodology 
The analysis is conducted in three steps. First, firms' TFP is estimated by employing the 
approach proposed by WOOLDRIDGE (2009). Second, dynamic investment equations are 
estimated to investigate whether firms are credit constrained, and to test the potential moderation 
effect of geographic concentration on the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Third, an 
instrumental-variable approach is employed to test whether productivity is negatively affected by 
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credit constraints (the marginal effect of cash flow on investments), and whether geographic 
concentration positively affects productivity both directly and indirectly, downsizing the 
(potential) negative effect of credit rationing. 
 
3.2.1. Productivity estimation 
Firms' TFP is estimated as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function that, taking 
logarithms, can be specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (1) 
 
where 𝛽0 represents the mean efficiency level across firms and over time; 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑖𝑡 
represent, respectively, value added, capital input and labour input of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is an 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) component representing productivity shocks not 
affecting a firm's decision process; and: 
 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
represents firm-level productivity, assuming that 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is a state variable-transmitted component 
affecting a firm's decision process (VAN BEVEREN, 2012). The estimated productivity is then 
obtained by solving for 𝜔𝑖𝑡: 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (2) 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) or fixed effects (FE) estimation of equation (1) lead to biased 
productivity estimates due to the "simultaneity bias", which concerns some form of endogeneity 
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in the inputs due to the correlation between the level of inputs chosen by the firm and 
unobservable productivity shocks. This problem emerges since firms can choose the level of 
inputs on the base of prior beliefs on productivity levels, which, however, cannot be observed by 
the econometrician (SYVERSON, 2011). 
Building on the two-step semi-parametric approach proposed by LEVINSOHN and 
PETRIN (2003), which uses intermediate inputs (𝑚𝑖𝑡) as proxy variable to control for 
unobserved productivity, thus solving the simultaneity problem between input choices and 
productivity shocks, WOOLDRIDGE (2009) proposes to estimate 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑙 using a more 
efficient one-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, thus correcting possible 
collinearity between labour and intermediate inputs characterizing LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's 
(2003) approach (ACKERBERG et al., 2006).
1
 WOOLDRIDGE (2009) suggests estimating 
simultaneously two equations with the same dependent variable and the same set of input 
variables, while different sets of instruments are specified so that the coefficients of the input 
variables in the first equation are identified by exploiting information in the second equation. 
Given a production function (1), and assuming absence of correlation of 𝜂𝑖𝑡 with current and past 
values of capital, labour and intermediate inputs, and restriction of the dynamics of the 
unobserved productivity component (𝜔𝑖𝑡), 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑙 can be identified by estimating the 
following two equations: 
 
{
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                        
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑗[𝑔(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1)] + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡
                                                               (3) 
 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑡 denotes productivity innovations and is correlated with 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡, while it is 
uncorrelated with 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and past values of 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡; 𝑔(∙) may be specified as a low-degree 
polynomial of order up to three; and 𝑗(∙) (i.e. the productivity process) may be defined as a 
random walk with drift, such that: 
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𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡  
 
Then, equation (1) can be re-specified as follows (GALUŠČÁK and LĺZAL, 2011): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝜏) + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                           (4) 
 
and can be estimated through an instrumental-variable approach using polynomials in 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 and 
𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 of order up to three approximating for 𝑔(∙); and 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 and polynomials 
containing 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 of order up to three as instruments for 𝑙𝑖𝑡 (PETRIN and 
LEVINSOHN, 2012). Appendix B describes the variables entering the production function and 
presents results of the TFP estimation. 
 
3.2.2. Credit constraints and localization economies 
The following dynamic investment equation is estimated to evaluate whether firms are 
affected by credit constraints, and whether geographic concentration reduces the investment-to-
cash flow sensitivity (BOND and VAN REENEN, 2007): 
 
(
𝐼
𝐾𝑏
)
𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
𝐼
𝐾𝑏
)
𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 (
𝐶𝐹
𝐾𝑏
)
𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡
+ 𝛽3∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡 
                      +𝛽6 (
𝐶𝐹
𝐾𝑏
)
𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡
× 𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 
𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑔 + 𝑣𝑟 + 𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡                                                                                                            (5) 
 
where (𝐼 𝐾𝑏⁄ )𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 is the logarithm of the ratio between firm investments in real terms (𝐼𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡) and 
capital stock at the beginning of the period (𝐾𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡) of the 𝑖th firm operating in the two-digit 
industrial sector 𝑔 and located in province 𝑝 at time 𝑡. The right-hand side of equation (5) 
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includes the first-order time-lagged dependent variable; the cash flow variable (𝐶𝐹 𝐾𝑏⁄ )𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 to 
capture the effect of credit constraints; the term: 
 
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 = 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 − 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡−1  
 
to capture the short-run response of investments to demand shocks (where 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 is the 
logarithm of deflated sales); the term 𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 to capture localization economies; the term 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡 
to capture urbanization economies; and the interaction term between (𝐶𝐹 𝐾𝑏⁄ )𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 and 𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 to 
capture the potential moderation effect of geographic concentration on the investment-to-cash 
flow sensitivity. The variables 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 and 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 capture firms' productivity, size 
and age. The composite error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡, is defined as the sum of five components: 𝑣𝑖 captures 
firm-specific effects; 𝑣𝑡 represents time fixed effects defined by a set of year dummies; 𝑣𝑔 
captures industry-specific effects defined by a set of two-digit industrial sector dummies; 𝑣𝑟 
represents geographic fixed effects at the NUTS-2 level capturing structural differences across 
Italian regions; 𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 denotes the error term. 
The cash flow variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡) 
and capital stock at the beginning of the period. Cash flow is generally used in the financial 
literature to proxy for internal resources availability and to capture the sensitivity of a firm's 
performance measure to credit constraints (CARREIRA and SILVA, 2010). Since credit 
constrained firms have to rely on internal resources to finance new investments, additional cash 
flow allows them to optimize real investments. Hence, a positive coefficient of the cash flow 
variable means that firms are facing difficulties in raising external capitals, and the higher is the 
marginal effect of cash flow on investments, the more firms are affected by credit rationing.
2
 
Localization externalities are captured by an index of geographic concentration of 
industries measured as follows (CAINELLI et al., 2015): 
30 
 
𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 = ln(𝑁𝑔𝑝𝑡 𝐴𝑝)⁄                                                                                                                                  (6) 
 
where 𝑁𝑔𝑝𝑡 denotes the number of firms operating in the industrial sector 𝑔 and located in 
province 𝑝 at time 𝑡; and 𝐴𝑝 is the area of province 𝑝 (km
2
). The variable capturing urbanization 
externalities is defined as follows (MELO and GRAHAM, 2009): 
 
𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡 = ln(𝑁𝑝𝑡 𝐴𝑝)⁄                                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
where 𝑁𝑝𝑡 denotes the total number of firms located in province 𝑝 at time 𝑡. The use of density 
measures to proxy for agglomeration economies has two main advantages: it is robust to 
differences in land area sizes, and it captures well the benefits arising from the spatial 
concentration of economic activities (CICCONE and HALL, 1996).
3
 
The interaction term between the variables for cash flow and geographic concentration 
aims at capturing a (potential) moderation effect of the agglomeration on the investment-to-cash 
flow sensitivity. Firms operating in agglomerated areas and characterized by robust and long-
lasting relationships with neighbour firms (suppliers and customers) can benefit from positive 
externalities which materialize in delayed or long-term payments and better contracts. Hence, 
increasing trust among entrepreneurs allows inter-firm credit, which may downsize firms' 
dependence on internal resources, thus alleviating credit constraints. A negative coefficient of 
the interaction term means a positive moderation effect of geographic concentration, i.e. that 
dependence on internal resources decreases as the level of geographic concentration increases. 
Firm productivity is the residual of the estimated equation (4), firm size is defined as the 
logarithm of the total number of employees, while firm age is defined as the logarithm of the 
difference between the year of observation and the year of firm set up. 
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3.2.3. Productivity, credit constraints and localization economies 
Equation (8) is specified to analyse the effect of credit constraints and the direct (and 
indirect) effect of geographic concentration on productivity: 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 
                    +𝛽7𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽10∆𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡        (8) 
 
where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 is the estimated productivity from equation (4). The terms 𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡 and 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡 
capture the direct effect of localization and urbanization economies. Short-run localization 
externalities are expected to foster firms' productivity favouring the emerging of external-scale 
economies, the reduction of transportation costs, and the availability of specialized inputs' 
suppliers and workers (MARTIN et al., 2011). The urbanization variable allows to control for 
scale economies arising from the concentration of all economic activities (ROSENTHAL and 
STRANGE, 2004). Location in large urban areas may benefit firms, increasing the probability to 
access to specialized business services as well as to public facilities, infrastructures, 
transportation systems, and knowledge produced by private and public actors (JACOBS, 1969; 
MELO et al., 2009; PUGA, 2010). 
The term 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 denotes credit constraints. It is computed as the marginal effect of cash 
flow on investments from equation (5), and it allows one to test for both the direct credit 
constraints-productivity relationship and the indirect effect of geographic concentration on 
productivity. If 𝛽3 < 0 in equation (8), then productivity is negatively affected by credit 
rationing. Moreover, by letting 𝛽3
1 and 𝛽3
2 be the estimated coefficients of the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 variable in 
equation (8) when the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 variable is obtained estimating equation (5), respectively, without 
and with the inclusion of the interaction term between cash flow and geographic concentration, 
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then 𝛽3
2 < 𝛽3
1 means that geographic concentration has an indirect positive effect since it reduces 
the negative effect of credit rationing on productivity. 
The terms 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡, 𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡, 𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 and 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 represent firm-
specific time-varying control variables, where 𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 is the logarithm of deflated wages and 
𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 captures the degree of services outsourcing. The variables 𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑡 and ∆𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑡 
denote, respectively, the logarithm of deflated value added in province 𝑝 at time 𝑡 and its growth 
between periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1, and they are included to capture the dynamics of the performance 
of the province where firms operate. The terms 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 capture, respectively, firm and time 
fixed effects, while 𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 is an error term. 
 
3.2.4. Robustness exercise 
The investment equation (5) is modified to control for the role of the local banking system 
including a measure of operational proximity (𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑡) defined as follows (ALESSANDRINI et al., 
2009): 
 
𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑡 = ln [(
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑡
) ∗ 10000]                                                                                                                     (9)  
 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑡 denotes the number of bank branches located in province 𝑝 at time 𝑡; and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑡 
denotes the population living in the corresponding province.
 4
 This variable allows one to control 
for the effect of the concentration of the banking system on firms' investment decisions. On the 
one hand, little physical distance between borrower and lending office allows the bank to 
supplement "hard" information with "soft" information collected at the local level, which 
facilitate screening and monitoring activities, and relationship lending. Moreover, firms may 
easily get access to financial resources as the number of bank branches in the local area increases 
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due to higher competition in the local credit market. On the other hand, little physical distance 
may have negative effects on investment decisions if local banks charge higher interest rates to 
the closest borrowers due to information rents or transportation costs (ALESSANDRINI et al., 
2009). Finally, a three-way interaction term is included in the investment equation to capture the 
joint effect of localization externalities and banks' density on the investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity. Appendix C reports descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix and the definition of 
the main variables. 
 
3.2.5. Estimation issues 
The estimation of equations (5) and (8) leads to two main econometric issues: unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
The two-step system GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator is employed to estimate equation (5) 
because, in the context of dynamic panel data, a simple instrumental-variable estimator produces 
a biased coefficient of the time-lagged dependent variable (WOOLDRIDGE, 2002). The SYS-
GMM estimator combines a system of first-differenced variables (removing unobserved 
heterogeneity) instrumented with lagged levels, and a system of variables in level instrumented 
with lags of their own first differences (ARELLANO and BOVER, 1995; BLUNDELL and 
BOND, 1998). The variables capturing firm age and industry, geographic, and time fixed effects 
are treated as exogenous and are used as instruments for themselves only in levels. The time-
lagged dependent variable and the variables for cash flow, productivity, size and operational 
proximity are instrumented using their values lagged 3-6 in both levels and first differences, 
while the sales growth variable is instrumented using its values lagged 3-6 only in levels. The 
geographic concentration and urbanization variables are instrumented using their 1971 values, 
plus the logarithm of a population density measure (population in the province/km
2
) dated 1921. 
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The static nature of equation (8) allows one to employ instrumental-variable FE estimators 
to deal with unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. In particular, reverse causality between 
firms' productivity and agglomeration economies is likely to emerge: on the one hand, 
agglomeration economies may foster firms' productivity; on the other hand, firms' location 
choices could be influenced by high levels of productivity with the consequence that firms could 
migrate towards the most productive areas, thus reinforcing the agglomeration itself 
(ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004; GRAHAM et al., 2010). Since the FE estimator prevents 
the use of time-invariant instruments (e.g. long lags of the agglomeration variables), 
agglomeration variables are instrumented using the difference between their values at time 𝑡 − 1 
and in 1971: 
 
∆𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝐶𝑔𝑝1971  
∆𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝1971  
 
and the difference between population density at time 𝑡 − 1 and in 1921: 
 
∆𝑃𝐷𝑝𝑡−1 = ln(𝑃𝐷𝑝𝑡−1) − ln (𝑃𝐷𝑝1921)  
 
Besides the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimator, the GMM estimator with optimal 
weighting matrix is employed because it is more efficient in case of heteroskedastic errors 
(CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2005). 
The validity of the estimation methodology is assessed through ARELLANO and BOND's 
(1991) test of serial correlation for dynamic panel data, HANSEN's (1982) J-statistic of over-
identifying restrictions, first-stage F-statistics to test instruments' relevance in the TFP equation, 
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and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) rank statistic to test the 
null hypothesis of under-identification of the matrix of reduced-form coefficients.
5
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 reports results of the investment and TFP equations estimated without controlling 
for (Model 1) and controlling for (Model 2) the moderation effect of geographic concentration. 
Diagnostic tests for the investment equations support the estimation strategy: ARELLANO and 
BOND's (1991) test highlights the absence of third-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, and the null hypothesis of instruments' exogeneity is never rejected since 
p-values of HANSEN's (1982) J-statistic are never significant. Similarly, diagnostic tests support 
the instrumental-variable estimation of the TFP equations: p-values of HANSEN's (1982) J-
statistic are never significant; first-stage F-statistics on excluded instruments referring to the 
agglomeration variables have p-values equal to zero in all cases, thus suggesting a good 
predictive power of the chosen instruments; KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) rank statistic 
always rejects the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced-form coefficients is under-
identified, thus maintaining the instruments' relevance. Moreover, the mean variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is lower than the conservative cut-off value of 10 in all specifications, thus 
suggesting absence of multicollinearity problems (NETER et al., 1985). 
Results of the investment equations show positive and significant coefficients of cash flow, 
meaning that firms are affected by credit rationing. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between cash flow and geographic concentration is negative and statistically significant, thus 
suggesting that localization externalities positively moderate the investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity favouring inter-firm trade credit. 
Results suggest time persistence of the investment dynamics, while there is no evidence of 
short-run adjustment in the investment decisions due to demand shocks. The TFP and age 
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variables show negative and significant coefficients, while the size variable has positive and 
significant coefficients. The coefficients of the agglomeration variables are negative but non-
significant in the main terms. 
Results of the TFP equations show a positive and significant direct effect of localization 
externalities on firms' productivity, while the coefficients of the urbanization variable are never 
significant. This last result may depend on the short-run nature of the analysis, since urbanization 
economies tend to materialize in the long-run due to the fact that inter-industry spillovers may 
require longer time to develop in absence of a common competence base among actors 
(MARTIN et al., 2011). These results are robust to the estimation of the TFP equation in a 
reduced form, i.e. without controlling for firm-level and further local-level variables (see 
Appendix D for robustness results). 
The credit constraints variable (i.e. the marginal effect of cash flow on investments 
obtained estimating the investment equation) shows negative and significant coefficients, thus 
suggesting a negative effect of credit rationing on productivity. However, the comparison of the 
coefficients of the credit constraints variable from Models (1) and (2) suggests a positive indirect 
effect of geographic concentration on the credit constraints-productivity relationship. 
Coefficients from Model (1) (where the investment equation is estimated without including the 
interaction term between cash flow and geographic concentration) are higher than the 
corresponding coefficients from Model (2) (where the investment equation is estimated 
accounting for the moderation effect of geographic concentration): geographic concentration 
seems to reduce the negative credit constraints-productivity relationship by about 4.5%. 
A positive and significant relationship between firms' productivity and both size and wage 
also emerges, while the coefficients of the other control variables are never significant. 
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Table 2 reports results of the robustness exercise testing for the role of the local banking 
system. Diagnostic tests confirm the validity of the adopted estimation methodology for all 
specifications and, overall, previous results are confirmed. 
Results of the investment equations show positive and significant coefficients of the cash 
flow variable, which provide evidence of credit rationing. The time-lagged dependent variable 
and the variable for firm size show positive and significant coefficients, while the TFP and age 
variables show negative and significant coefficients. The coefficients of the geographic 
concentration and operational proximity variables are not significant. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between cash flow and geographic concentration is negative and significant, 
thus confirming a positive moderation effect of geographic concentration on the investment-to-
cash flow sensitivity. 
The investment equation in Model (3) is estimated including a three-way interaction term 
between cash flow, geographic concentration and operational proximity. The estimated 
coefficient is negative and significant, even though it is slightly lower than the coefficient of the 
two-way interaction term estimated in Model (2). Fig. 1 provides a better understanding of this 
result. Fig. 1(a) plots the marginal effect of cash flow on investments at the minimum and 
maximum levels of geographic concentration when the operational proximity variable is kept at 
its minimum level, while the operational proximity variable is kept at its maximum level in Fig. 
1(b). The comparison of the two panels suggests that the positive moderation effect of 
geographic concentration on the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity is increasing in the density 
of bank branches. This suggests a sort of complementary effect between geographic 
concentration and operational proximity. As the local density of bank branches increases, 
location in a highly agglomerated area favours inter-firm credit, for instance because firms can 
easily access to "soft" information on (potential or new) business partners collected by their own 
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local bank, or because higher competition in the local credit market allows firms to sign better 
contracts thanks to easier access to credit. 
Results of the TFP equations highlight a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between localization externalities and productivity, while coefficients of the urbanization 
variable are never significant. Results confirm a positive and significant relationship between 
productivity and both size and wage, while coefficients of the other control variables are never 
significant. The coefficients of the credit constraints variable are negative and significant in all 
models. The estimated coefficient from Model (1) is slightly higher than the estimated 
coefficient from Model (2), thus suggesting little gain in terms of reduction of the negative credit 
constraints-productivity relationship favoured by geographic concentration when operational 
proximity enters the investment equation. However, the estimated credit constraints coefficient 
from Model (3) is highly lower than the estimated coefficient from Model (1). This last result 
confirms the previous finding of a complementary effect between geographic concentration and 
operational proximity: localization externalities positively moderate the negative credit 
constraints-productivity relationship, and this positive moderation effect increases as the density 
of bank branches increases in the local system. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has put forth insights into the determinants of firms' productivity linking the 
literature on credit constraints to that on agglomeration economies. It has analysed whether 
Italian manufacturing firms' productivity is affected by credit rationing, while fostered by short-
run localization externalities. Moreover, it has investigated whether localization economies 
moderate firms' investment-to-cash flow sensitivity promoting inter-firm trade credit, thus 
reducing the negative effect of credit rationing on productivity. 
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The analysis was conducted in three steps on a sample of 11,953 firms observed over the 
period 1999-2007. First, firms' TFP was estimated using the approach proposed by 
WOOLDRDIGE (2009). Second, a two-step system GMM estimator was employed to 
investigate whether Italian manufacturing firms are credit constrained, and whether localization 
economies positively moderate the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Third, instrumental-
variable FE estimators were employed to analyse the credit constraints-productivity relationship, 
as well as the direct and indirect effect of localization economies on productivity. 
Results suggest that firms are affected by credit constraints, and that geographic 
concentration positively moderates the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity promoting inter-firm 
trade credit. A positive relationship emerges between productivity and localization externalities, 
while urbanization externalities seem to have a negligible effect on productivity. Results suggest 
a negative relationship between credit constraints and productivity, while there is a positive 
indirect effect of geographic concentration on TFP: the negative effect of credit constraints on 
productivity decreases when the positive moderation effect of geographic concentration on the 
investment-to-cash flow sensitivity is accounted for, and this positive indirect effect of 
geographic concentration increases as the density of bank branches increases. 
The fact that Italian manufacturing firms suffer from credit rationing may depend on the 
severity of the Italian banking system. This could also explain the relevance of inter-firm credit 
for firms that are unable to provide banks with the required warranties to obtain the credit 
necessary to finance new projects. Therefore, the importance of promoting inter-firm 
relationships and the formation of industrial conglomerates emerges, in particular in those areas 
where the financial system is less developed. 
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NOTES 
1. The "omitted price bias", resulting from possible correlation between input choices and 
variation in the firm-level prices, characterizes both LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) and 
WOOLDRDGE's (2009) methodologies. Since firm-level prices are, in general, not observed, 
industry-level price indexes are used to deflate firms' balance sheet data. However, if firms 
have different market power, firm- and industry-level prices may differ and the use of 
industry-based deflators can lead to biased productivity estimates (VAN BEVEREN, 2012). 
2. KAPLAN and ZINGALES (1997) and CHEN and CHEN (2012) provide evidence that 
investment-to-cash flow sensitivity does not represent a good measure of financing 
constraints. However, ALESSANDRINI et al. (2009, p. 292) provide evidence on a sample of 
Italian manufacturing firms that "rationed firms report a greater elasticity of investment with 
respect to cash flow than non-rationed ones". Therefore, firms' investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity can be considered a good proxy for credit constraints at least in the context of 
Italian firms. 
3. The use of the Italian provinces to analyse agglomeration economies may lead to the 
modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) since they are defined according to administrative 
criteria rather than to economic ones as the local labour markets (ARBIA, 1989). However, 
data on Italian local labour markets are not available for the entire period analysed. Moreover, 
since provinces have policy powers concerning territorial planning, they may represent an 
appropriate territorial level to characterize firms' business environment (CAINELLI et al., 
2015). 
4. The variables 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑝𝑡 and 𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑡 are not included together in the robustness exercise due to 
high correlation, i.e. 0.83. 
5. Investment equations are estimated using the "xtabond2" Stata routine (ROODMAN, 2009), 
while TFP equations are estimated using the "xtivreg2" Stata routine (SCHAFFER, 2010). 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Results of investment and total factor productivity (TFP) equations 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent variable (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt 
Estimation method SYS-GMM FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM SYS-GMM FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
(I Kb⁄ )igpt−1  0.416*** ... ... ... 0.422*** ... ... ... 
 (0.035)    (0.036)    
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt  0.289*** ... ... ... 0.193*** ... ... ... 
 (0.044)    (0.071)    
∆SALESigpt  0.072 ... ... ... 0.070 ... ... ... 
 (0.046)    (0.044)    
GCgpt  -0.002 0.218* 0.572** 0.545** -0.076** 0.214* 0.570** 0.543** 
 (0.021) (0.119) (0.230) (0.230) (0.036) (0.121) (0.232) (0.231) 
URBpt  -0.008 -0.568 0.657 0.468 -0.005 -0.560 0.701 0.513 
 (0.024) (0.417) (1.708) (1.705) (0.022) (0.420) (1.715) (1.711) 
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt × GCgpt  ... ... ... ... -0.050** ... ... ... 
     (0.020)    
CCigpt  ... -0.164*** -0.164** -0.167** ... -0.119*** -0.119* -0.122** 
  (0.048) (0.076) (0.076)  (0.043) (0.062) (0.062) 
TFPigpt  -0.151** ... ... ... -0.142** ... ... ... 
 (0.067)    (0.067)    
SIZEigpt  0.188*** 0.091** 0.093** 0.094** 0.182*** 0.088* 0.090** 0.090** 
 (0.056) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) 
AGEigpt  -0.072*** -0.010 -0.023 -0.019 -0.071*** -0.006 -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.025) (0.140) (0.109) (0.109) (0.025) (0.140) (0.110) (0.109) 
WAGEigpt  ... 0.082* 0.085** 0.086** ... 0.081* 0.084** 0.086** 
  (0.048) (0.043) (0.043)  (0.048) (0.043) (0.043) 
VERTICALigpt  ... -0.168 -0.156 -0.161 ... -0.150 -0.138 -0.143 
  (0.138) (0.117) (0.116)  (0.136) (0.116) (0.116) 
SALESigpt  ... 0.005 0.005 0.005 ... 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
VAigpt  ... 0.489 -0.199 -0.075 ... 0.482 -0.221 -0.098 
  (0.576) (0.900) (0.897)  (0.576) (0.903) (0.901) 
∆VAigpt  ... -0.584 -0.322 -0.388 ... -0.600 -0.331 -0.398 
  (0.512) (0.639) (0.637)  (0.516) (0.641) (0.639) 
Number of observations 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 
Number of firms 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 
Number of instruments 191 ... ... ... 192 ... ... ... 
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Table 1 - Continued 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.645 ... ... ... 0.641 ... ... ... 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.237 ... 0.154 0.154 0.276 ... 0.155 0.155 
𝑅2  ... 0.009 ... ... ... 0.006 ... ... 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic 
(p-value) 
... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on GCgpt (p-value) ... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on URBpt (p-value) ... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.17 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.75 1.58 1.58 1.58 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are clustered at province-industrial sector level (1291 units). Investment 
equations are estimated using a two-step system GMM estimator, with WINDMEIJER's (2005) correction; they include a constant term, industrial 
sector, NUTS-2 and year dummies. The dummy and age variables are used as instruments for themselves only in levels. The GCgpt and URBpt 
variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented using their 1971 values, plus the log of a population density measure (population in the 
province/km2) dated 1921. The other variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented using their values lagged 3-6 both in levels and first 
differences (the sales growth variable uses instruments only in levels). TFP equations include year dummies; first-stage F-statistics of excluded 
instruments for GCgpt and URBpt equal, respectively, 18.9 and 33.3 in all instrumental-variable specifications. The GCgpt and URBpt variables are 
instrumented using the one-year lag of their growth between 1971 and current periods of observation, plus the one-year lag of the growth of population 
density between 1921 and current periods of observation. CCigpt is the measure of credit constraints from the investment equations. The Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM-statistic refers to KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) under-identification test of the instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.10; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table 2. Robustness exercise controlling for operational proximity 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt 
Estimation method 
SYS-
GMM 
FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
SYS-
GMM 
FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
SYS-
GMM 
FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
(I Kb⁄ )igpt−1  0.417*** ... ... ... 0.415*** ... ... ... 0.418*** ... ... ... 
 (0.035)    (0.035)    (0.035)    
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt  0.295*** ... ... ... 0.257*** ... ... ... 0.247*** ... ... ... 
 (0.043)    (0.064)    (0.065)    
∆SALESigpt  0.046 ... ... ... 0.053 ... ... ... 0.048 ... ... ... 
 (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.041)    
GCgpt  -0.011 0.219* 0.574** 0.547** -0.057** 0.214* 0.569** 0.543** -0.106** 0.214* 0.570** 0.543** 
 (0.014) (0.119) (0.231) (0.230) (0.024) (0.120) (0.231) (0.230) (0.049) (0.120) (0.230) (0.230) 
URBpt  ... -0.565 0.652 0.465 ... -0.559 0.688 0.498 ... -0.563 0.661 0.476 
  (0.419) (1.711) (1.708)  (0.420) (1.713) (1.710)  (0.420) (1.713) (1.709) 
OPpt  0.003 ... ... ... 0.002 ... ... ... 0.045* ... ... ... 
 (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.023)    
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt × GCgpt  ... ... ... ... -0.032* ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
     (0.017)        
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt × GCgpt × OPpt  ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -0.013* ... ... ... 
         (0.007)    
CCigpt  ... -0.138** -0.138* -0.139* ... -0.137** -0.137* -0.138* ... -0.120** -0.120* -0.123* 
  (0.055) (0.075) (0.075)  (0.059) (0.077) (0.076)  (0.053) (0.068) (0.068) 
TFPigpt  -0.142** ... ... ... -0.128* ... ... ... -0.133* ... ... ... 
 (0.068)    (0.069)    (0.074)    
SIZEigpt  0.215*** 0.091** 0.093** 0.093** 0.207*** 0.091** 0.093** 0.093** 0.214*** 0.090** 0.092** 0.092** 
 (0.050) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) 
AGEigpt  -0.081*** -0.009 -0.023 -0.018 -0.076*** -0.008 -0.022 -0.018 -0.081*** -0.007 -0.021 -0.017 
 (0.023) (0.141) (0.110) (0.109) (0.023) (0.141) (0.110) (0.109) (0.023) (0.141) (0.110) (0.109) 
WAGEigpt  ... 0.082* 0.085** 0.086** ... 0.082* 0.085** 0.086** ... 0.081* 0.084** 0.086** 
  (0.048) (0.043) (0.043)  (0.048) (0.043) (0.043)  (0.048) (0.043) (0.043) 
VERTICALigpt  ... -0.158 -0.146 -0.150 ... -0.154 -0.142 -0.147 ... -0.151 -0.138 -0.143 
  (0.139) (0.117) (0.116)  (0.138) (0.117) (0.116)  (0.138) (0.116) (0.116) 
SALESigpt  ... 0.003 0.004 0.003 ... 0.004 0.004 0.004 ... 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
VAigpt  ... 0.484 -0.201 -0.079 ... 0.480 -0.217 -0.093 ... 0.480 -0.209 -0.088 
  (0.576) (0.901) (0.898)  (0.576) (0.903) (0.900)  (0.574) (0.902) (0.899) 
∆VAigpt  ... -0.587 -0.326 -0.393 ... -0.596 -0.330 -0.398 ... -0.595 -0.333 -0.400 
  (0.513) (0.640) (0.638)  (0.514) (0.641) (0.638)  (0.514) (0.641) (0.639) 
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Table 2 - Continued 
Number of observations 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 
Number of firms 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 
Number of instruments 193 ... ... ... 194 ... ... ... 194 ... ... ... 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.501 ... ... ... 0.561 ... ... ... 0.522 ... ... ... 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.165 ... 0.154 0.154 0.156 ... 0.153 0.153 0.165 ... 0.159 0.159 
𝑅2  ... 0.007 ... ... ... 0.006 ... ... ... 0.006 ... ... 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM-statistic (p-value) 
.... .... 0.000 0.000 .... .... 0.000 0.000 .... .... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on GCgpt 
(p-value) 
... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on URBpt 
(p-value) 
... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.15 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.74 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.51 1.58 1.58 1.58 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are clustered at province-industrial sector level (1291 units). Investment equations are estimated using a two-step system 
GMM estimator, with WINDMEIJER's (2005) correction; they include a constant term, industrial sector, NUTS-2 and year dummies. The dummy and age variables are used as instruments for 
themselves only in levels. The GCgpt and URBpt variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented using their 1971 values, plus the log of a population density measure (population in the 
province/km2) dated 1921. The other variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented using their values lagged 3-6 both in levels and first differences (the sales growth variable uses 
instruments only in levels). TFP equations include year dummies; first-stage F-statistics of excluded instruments for GCgpt and URBpt equal, respectively, 18.9 and 33.3 in all instrumental-
variable specifications. The GCgpt and URBpt variables are instrumented using the one-year lag of their growth between 1971 and current periods of observation, plus the one-year lag of the 
growth of population density between 1921 and current periods of observation. CCigpt is the measure of credit constraints from the investment equations. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic 
refers to KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) under-identification test of the instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.10; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Fig. 1. Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity: three-way interaction 
 
Notes: Solid lines refer to Model (1), while dotted lines refer to Model (3) in Table 2. (a) Marginal effect of cash flow when the 
operational proximity variable is kept at its minimum level, while it is kept at its maximum level in (b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
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APPENDIX A - Sample Description 
Table A1 shows the sample distribution in terms of size and geographic area of location. 
Small sized firms represent more than 60% of the sample, while large firms constitute less than 4% 
of it. About half of the sample firms is located in the North West of Italy, while less than 9% of the 
firms is located in a southern region or in an island. 
 
Table A1. Sample distribution by size and geographic area 
NUTS-1 Areas 
Small Medium Large Total Firms 
(<50)  (50-249)  (>249)  
 a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % 
North West 3,395 28.40 1,929 16.14 262 2.19 5,586 46.73 
North East 2,160 18.07 1,308 10.94 123 1.03 3,591 30.04 
Centre 1,159 9.70 536 4.48 56 0.47 1,751 14.65 
South & Islands 708 5.92 291 2.43 26 0.22 1,025 8.58 
Total Firms 7,422 62.09 4,064 34.00 467 3.91 11,953 100.00 
Notes: Percentage values are expressed on the final sample of 11,953 firms. The number of employees defining the 
size classes is reported in parentheses. North West includes Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta Liguria and Lombardia; North 
East includes Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Emilia-Romagna; Centre includes Toscana, 
Umbria, Marche and Lazio; South includes Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata and Calabria; Islands are 
Sicilia and Sardegna. 
 
Table A2 compares the size distribution of the sample and that of the Italian manufacturing 
industry (drawn from the 2001 Italian Industry Census conducted by ISTAT) to evaluate the 
statistical representativeness of the sample. Small sized firms are significantly underrepresented in 
the sample, although this is not unusual for samples drawn from commercial archives such as the 
AIDA databank, which consider only limited companies and exclude partnerships - which are 
instead included in the Industry Census. Therefore, the main empirical limitation of this study is 
that it considers the "best" small sized firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
Table A2. A comparison between the sample and the 2001 Italian Industry Census 
 Small Medium Large Total Firms 
 (<50) (50-249)  (>249)  
 a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % 
Sample 6,297 60.96 3,617 35.01 416 4.03 10,330 100.00 
Industry Census 530,487 97.72 10,872 2.00 1,517 0.28 542,876 100.00 
Notes: Reference year is 2001. Percentage values are expressed on raw totals. The number of employees defining the 
size classes is reported in parentheses. 
 
Table A3 reports the temporal distribution of the sample, while Table A4 summarises its 
industrial distribution: all manufacturing sectors are represented in the sample, except for the two-
digit sector "33 - Repair and installation of machinery and equipment". 
 
Table A3. Temporal distribution of the sample 
Year No. Firms % 
1999 8,286 9.88 
2000 9,402 11.21 
2001 10,330 12.32 
2002 10,632 12.68 
2003 10,388 12.39 
2004 10,325 12.31 
2005 9,576 11.42 
2006 8,695 10.37 
2007 6,236 7.44 
Total Sample 83,870 100.00 
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Table A4. Sample distribution according to the Ateco 2007 Industry Classification 
Category Sector 
No. Firms 
a. v. % 
DA 
10 - Manufacture of food products 925 7.74 
11 - Manufacture of beverages 190 1.59 
12 - Manufacture of tobacco products 5 0.04 
DB 
13 - Manufacture of textiles 754 6.31 
14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 519 4.34 
DC 15 - Manufacture of leather and related products 422 3.53 
DD 
16 - Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
286 2.39 
DE 
17 - Manufacture of paper and paper products 312 2.61 
18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 294 2.46 
DF 19 - Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 59 0.49 
DG 
20 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 583 4.88 
21 - Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 131 1.10 
DH 22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 793 6.63 
DI 23 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 620 5.19 
DJ 
24 - Manufacture of basic metals 436 3.65 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1,918 16.05 
DL 
26 - Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 426 3.56 
27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment 536 4.48 
DK 28 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C. 1,577 13.19 
DM 
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 232 1.94 
30 - Manufacture of other transport equipment 114 0.95 
DN 
31 - Manufacture of furniture 522 4.37 
32 - Other manufacturing 299 2.50 
33 - Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0 0.00 
 Total Sample 11,953 100.00 
Notes: Percentage values are expressed on the cleaned total sample. The Ateco 2007 classification of economic 
activities adopted by Istat is the national version of the European nomenclature Nace Rev. 2 adopted with Regulation 
(EC) no.1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20th December 2006. 
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APPENDIX B - Productivity Estimation 
Deflated balance sheet data on value added, total labour costs, intermediate inputs, and fixed 
capital are used to estimate 14 industry-specific production functions. Specifically, value added 
(𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡) is deflated with the corresponding two-digit production price index, and it is used as output 
in the production functions. Total labour costs (𝐿𝑖𝑡) are deflated with the corresponding two-digit 
wage index, and they are used as labour input. The capital input (𝐾𝑖𝑡) is defined as the real fixed 
capital stock at the end of the period computed using the Perpetual Inventory Method with a 
constant depreciation rate equal to 0.085; the capital at the end of the period for future years is 
defined as 𝐾𝑡 = 𝐼𝐾𝑡 + (𝐾𝑡−1 − 0.085𝐾𝑡−1). Intermediate inputs (𝑀𝑖𝑡) are defined, at current prices, 
as value of production minus value added, and they are deflated with an intermediate consumptions 
index. Deflators are calculated using ISTAT data and the reference year for depreciation is 1998. 
All strictly positive terms enter the production functions in logarithmic form. 
Table B1 reports some descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables used to 
estimate firms' productivity. 
 
Table B1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the production function's variables 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. vaigpt kigpt ligpt migpt 
vaigpt  
overall 13.020 1.964 1.792 23.378 
1    between  1.154 8.859 18.760 
within  1.594 1.588 19.365 
kigpt  
overall 14.455 1.447 6.813 22.242 
0.407 1   between  1.407 8.251 21.441 
within  0.396 7.686 16.996 
ligpt  
overall 13.857 1.139 3.892 23.020 
0.492 0.744 1  between  1.112 9.073 19.972 
within  0.283 5.600 19.464 
migpt  
overall 15.349 1.202 6.871 23.576 
0.421 0.663 0.742 1 between  1.171 11.119 21.718 
within  0.307 8.413 20.752 
Notes: All variables are defined in natural logarithm. vaigpt denotes value added; kigpt denotes the capital input; 
ligpt denotes the labour input; migpt denotes intermediate inputs. Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
refer to a sample of 12,524 firms, i.e. 104,800 observations over the period 1999-2007. 
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Table B2 reports results of the 14 estimated industry-specific production functions. 
 
Table B2. TFP estimation: capital elasticity and labour elasticity 
Industrial Category kigpt ligpt No. Obs. 
DA 0.199 (0.077) [0.010] 0.590 (0.032) [0.000] 8,638 
DB 0.301 (0.066) [0.000] 0.525 (0.032) [0.000] 10,153 
DC 0.117 (0.107) [0.276] 0.643 (0.048) [0.000] 3,268 
DD 0.150 (0.154) [0.332] 0.562 (0.074) [0.000] 2,205 
DE 0.168 (0.093) [0.070] 0.640 (0.048) [0.000] 4,697 
DF -0.019 (0.324) [0.953] 0.346 (0.160) [0.030] 463 
DG 0.111 (0.089) [0.211] 0.557 (0.041) [0.000] 5,493 
DH 0.124 (0.089) [0.163] 0.601 (0.044) [0.000] 6,065 
DI 0.297 (0.103) [0.004] 0.605 (0.043) [0.000] 4,642 
DJ 0.232 (0.049) [0.000] 0.641 (0.025) [0.000] 17,953 
DK 0.088 (0.059) [0.135] 0.613 (0.032) [0.000] 12,256 
DL 0.176 (0.073) [0.017] 0.685 (0.038) [0.000] 7,398 
DM 0.108 (0.122) [0.373] 0.383 (0.066) [0.000] 2,707 
DN 0.258 (0.087) [0.003] 0.597 (0.042) [0.000] 6,327 
Notes: kigpt denotes the capital input, while ligpt denotes the labour input. TFP is estimated on a sample of 
12,524 firms, i.e. 104,800 observations over the period 1999-2007. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses, and they are clustered at the firm level. P-values are shown in brackets. 
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APPENDIX C - Variables' Description 
Tables C1 and C2 report, respectively, some descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of 
the main explanatory variables. Table C3 provides a synthetic description of the main variables. 
 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics of dependent and main explanatory variables 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
(I/Kb) igpt  overall -2.080 1.321 -15.698 7.580 
 between  0.812 -9.435 0.947 
 within  1.082 -12.702 6.273 
TFPigpt  overall 2.005 2.194 -10.644 12.371 
 between  1.550 -3.101 10.423 
 within  1.558 -9.531 6.687 
(CF/Kb)igpt  overall -1.423 1.061 -11.394 6.284 
 between  0.873 -6.829 5.883 
 within  0.649 -10.171 4.402 
AGEigpt  overall 3.020 0.592 0 4.771 
 between  0.589 0.795 4.754 
 within  0.148 1.694 3.774 
SIZEigpt  overall 3.661 1.065 0 9.804 
 between  1.033 0.099 9.716 
 within  0.314 -1.850 7.647 
SALESigpt  overall 14.358 2.012 0 22.240 
 between  1.206 9.483 21.283 
 within  1.634 -0.943 19.148 
WAGEigpt  overall 10.234 0.331 3.609 17.478 
 between  0.197 8.804 12.001 
 within  0.271 5.038 15.838 
VERTICALigpt  overall -0.410 0.208 -2.789 0.125 
 between  0.185 -2.391 0.073 
 within  0.104 -1.845 0.329 
GCgpt  overall -1.444 1.608 -8.909 2.663 
 between  1.610 -8.165 2.626 
 within  0.079 -2.909 -0.625 
URBpt  overall 3.364 0.889 0.735 5.236 
 between  0.894 1.261 5.235 
 within  0.065 2.086 4.755 
OPpt  overall 2.838 1.087 0.023 6.719 
 between  1.089 0.084 6.692 
 within  0.078 2.433 3.219 
VApt  overall 10.878 0.259 9.047 12.052 
 between  0.248 9.104 12.013 
 within  0.068 10.680 11.091 
Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to the final sample of 11,953 firms, i.e. 83,870 observations 
over the period 1999-2007. 
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Table C2. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
(I/Kb)igpt  [1] 1            
TFPigpt  [2] 0.03 1           
(CF/Kb)igpt  [3] 0.42 0.12 1          
AGEigpt  [4] -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 1         
SIZEigpt  [5] 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.21 1        
SALESigpt  [6] 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.38 1       
WAGEigpt  [7] 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.09 -0.04 0.11 1      
VERTICALigpt  [8] 0.14 0.06 0.18 -0.13 -0.19 0.11 -0.06 1     
GCgpt  [9] -0.01 -0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 1    
URBpt  [10] 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.55 1   
OPpt  [11] 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.53 0.83 1  
VApt  [12] -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.19 0.01 1 
Notes: The correlation matrix refers to the final sample of 11,953 firms, i.e. 83,870 observations over the period 1999-2007. 
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Table C3. Construction of main variables 
Variable Acronym Definition Data 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
TFPigpt 
Residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function estimated using the methodology proposed by WOOLDRIDGE 
(2009) 
AIDA databank 
Real Investments (I Kb⁄ )igpt 
Scaled investments measure computed as the ratio between investments expressed in real terms and capital stock 
at the beginning of the period 
AIDA databank 
Nominal 
Investments 
ICigpt 
Investments at current prices defined as 𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡., where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 denotes tangible 
assets, and 𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡 denotes allowances. 
AIDA databank 
Capital stock at the 
beginning of the 
period 
Kbigpt 
The capital stock at the beginning of the period 𝑡 is the difference between capital stock at the end of the period 𝑡 
(𝐾𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡) and capital expenditure in the period 𝑡. 
AIDA databank 
Cash Flow (CF/Kb)igpt 
Scaled cash flow measure computed as the ratio between cash flow (defined as net income plus annual 
depreciation) and capital stock at the beginning of the period 
AIDA databank 
Geographic 
Concentration 
GCgpt 
Proxy for localization externalities computed as the ratio between number of firms in industrial sector 𝑔 =
10, … ,32 located in province 𝑝 = 1, … , 103 and area of the corresponding province in square kilometres 
Movimprese database 
(Italian Chamber of 
Commerce) and ISTAT 
Urban Density URBpt 
Proxy for urbanisation externalities computed as the ratio between total number of firms located in province 
𝑝 = 1, … ,103 and area of the corresponding province in square kilometres 
Movimprese database 
(Italian Chamber of 
Commerce) and ISTAT 
Operation 
Proximity 
OPpt Number of bank branches located in province 𝑝 = 1, … ,103 per 10,000 inhabitants Bank of Italy and ISTAT 
Province Value 
Added 
VApt Deflated value added of province 𝑝 = 1, … ,103 ISTAT 
Age AGEigpt Age of a firm defined as difference between the year of observation and the year of set up AIDA databank 
Size SIZEigpt Firm's number of employees AIDA databank 
Sales SALESigpt Firm's deflated sales AIDA databank 
Wage WAGEigpt Firm's deflated wages AIDA databank 
Vertical 
Disintegration 
VERTICALigpt 
Proxy for a firm's services outsourcing computed as the ratio between deflated costs to buy services and deflated 
total costs of production 
AIDA databank 
 
 
60 
 
APPENDIX D - Further Results 
Table D1 reports results of the dynamic investment equation estimated including the two-way 
interaction term between the cash flow variable and the variables for, respectively, urbanisation 
economies and operational proximity. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms are not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table D1. Investment equation with two-way interactions 
Dependent variable (I Kb⁄ )igpt (I Kb⁄ )igpt 
Estimation method SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
(I Kb⁄ )igpt−1  0.394*** 0.392*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) 
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt  0.497* 0.297*** 
 (0.259) (0.104) 
∆SALESigpt  0.083* 0.044 
 (0.047) (0.042) 
GCgpt  0.001 -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.014) 
URBpt  -0.078 ... 
 (0.107)  
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt × URBpt  -0.040 ... 
 (0.073)  
OPpt  ... 0.039 
  (0.051) 
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt × OPpt  ... 0.021 
  (0.032) 
TFPigpt  -0.135** -0.140** 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
SIZEigpt  0.162*** 0.207*** 
 (0.057) (0.050) 
AGEigpt  -0.053** -0.074*** 
 (0.026) (0.023) 
Number of Observations 70,711 70,711 
Number of Firms 11,953 11,953 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.802 0.584 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.185 0.130 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are 
clustered at province-industrial sector level (1,291 units). Investment equations 
are estimated using a two-step System GMM estimator, with WINDMEIJER's 
(2005) correction; they include a constant term, industrial sector, NUTS-2 and 
year dummies. The dummy and age variables are used as instruments for 
themselves only in levels. The GCgpt and URBpt variables are treated as 
endogenous and instrumented using their 1971 values, plus the log of a 
population density measure (population in the province per square kilometres) 
dated 1921. The other variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented 
using their values lagged 3 to 6 both in levels and first differences (the sales 
growth variable uses instruments only in levels). 
      *𝑝 < 0.10; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table D2 reports results of the TFP equations estimated in a reduced form, i.e. without 
including firm- and local-level controls, as well as the credit constraints variable (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑡). The very 
low 𝑅2 of the fixed effects (FE) specifications are not an unusual result in the context of 
agglomeration variables' regression. MARTIN P., MAYER T. and MAYNERIS F. (2011, Spatial 
concentration and plant-level productivity in France, Journal of Urban Economics 69, 182-195) and 
EHRL P. (2013, Agglomeration economies with consistent productivity estimates, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics 43, 751-763), among others, provide similar results. 
 
Table D2. TFP equations without marginal effects 
Dependent variable TFPigpt 
Specification (1) (2) 
Estimation method FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
GCgpt  0.231** 0.555** 0.530** 0.227** 0.587** 0.562** 
 (0.096) (0.224) (0.224) (0.109) (0.232) (0.231) 
URBpt  -0.482 0.447 0.240 -0.556* 0.619 0.460 
 (0.297) (1.683) (1.678) (0.321) (1.720) (1.717) 
SIZEigpt  ... ... ... 0.080** 0.082** 0.082** 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
AGEigpt  ... ... ... 0.004 -0.010 -0.006 
    (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
WAGEigpt  ... ... ... 0.079* 0.082* 0.084* 
    (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
VERTICALigpt  ... ... ... -0.114 -0.102 -0.106 
    (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) 
SALESigpt  ... ... ... 0.002 0.002 0.002 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
VAigpt  ... ... ... 0.460 -0.212 -0.106 
    (0.447) (0.903) (0.901) 
∆VAigpt  ... ... ... -0.609 -0.354 -0.417 
    (0.538) (0.645) (0.642) 
Number of Observations 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 
Number of Firms 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 
𝑅2  0.0004 ... ... 0.001 ... ... 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) ... 0.182 0.182 ... 0.168 0.168 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on GCgpt (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on URBpt (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 ... 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.61 1.61 1.61 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are clustered at province-industrial sector level (1,291 units). All 
specifications include a set of year dummies. First-stage F statistics of excluded instruments for GCgpt and URBpt equal, 
respectively, to 17 and 31.7 in specifications (2) and (3), while they equal to, respectively, 18.9 and 33.3 in specifications (5) and 
(6). The GCgpt and URBpt variables are instrumented using the one-year lag of their growth between 1971 and current periods of 
observation, plus the one-year lag of the growth of population density between 1921 and current periods of observation. The 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic refers to the KLEIBERGEN-PAAP's (2006) under-identification test of instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.10; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table D3 reports results of reduced-form TFP equations corresponding to the specifications 
reported in Table 1 in the main text. 
 
Table D3. Reduced-form TFP equations 
Dependent variable TFPigpt 
Specification (1) (2) 
Estimation method FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
GCgpt  0.225* 0.538** 0.511** 0.220* 0.537** 0.510** 
 (0.120) (0.224) (0.223) (0.121) (0.224) (0.224) 
URBpt  -0.491 0.475 0.232 -0.484 0.520 0.279 
 (0.390) (1.673) (1.667) (0.392) (1.678) (1.673) 
CCigpt [Model (1)] -0.163*** -0.163** -0.166** ... ... ... 
 (0.047) (0.076) (0.075)    
CCigpt [Model (2)] ... ... ... -0.118*** -0.118* -0.121** 
    (0.043) (0.062) (0.062) 
Number of Observations 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 
Number of Firms 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 11,953 
𝑅2  0.008 ... ... 0.006 ... ... 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) ... 0.164 0.164 ... 0.166 0.166 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on GCgpt (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on URBpt (p-value) ... 0.000 0.000 ... 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are clustered at province-industrial sector level (1,291 
units). All specifications include a set of year dummies. First-stage F statistics of excluded instruments for GCgpt and URBpt 
equal, respectively, to 16.9 and 31.7 in all instrumental-variable specifications. The GCgpt and URBpt variables are instrumented 
using the one-year lag of their growth between 1971 and current periods of observation, plus the one-year lag of the growth of 
population density between 1921 and current periods of observation. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic refers to the 
KLEIBERGEN-PAAP's (2006) under-identification test of instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.10; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
 
Figure D1 refers to the results of the dynamic investment equations reported in Table 1 in the 
main text, and it plots the marginal effects of cash flow on investments. The investment-to-cash 
flow sensitivity turns to be decreasing in the level of geographic concentration, and the slope of the 
clash flow variable computed without accounting for a moderation effect is steeper than the slope 
computed when the geographic concentration variable is kept at its maximum level. This suggests 
that localization externalities positively moderate the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity by 
favouring inter-firm trade credit. 
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Figure D1. Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity 
 
Notes: The solid line refers to Model (1), while the dotted lines refer to Model (2) in Table 1 in the paper. 
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Figure D2 refers to the results of Models (1) and (2) reported in Table 2 in the main text. The 
plot clearly shows that the marginal effect of cash flow on investments decreases as the level of 
geographic concentration in the local system increases. 
 
Figure D2. Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity: controlling for operational proximity 
 
Notes: The solid line refers to Model (1), while the dotted lines refer to Model (2) in Table 2 in the paper. 
 
Table D4 reports results of a robustness exercise which replicates the main model (which 
results are reported in Table 1 in the main text) using firms' TFP estimated through the semi-
parametric approach proposed by LEVINSOHN J. and PETRIN A. (2003, Estimating production 
functions using inputs to control for unobservables, Review of Economic Studies 70, 317-341). 
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Table D4. Investment and TFP equations using LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent variable (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt (I Kb⁄ )igpt TFPigpt 
Estimation method SYS-GMM FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM SYS-GMM FE FE-TSLS FE-GMM 
(I Kb⁄ )igpt−1  0.416*** ... ... ... 0.421*** ... ... ... 
 (0.035)    (0.035)    
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt  0.287*** ... ... ... 0.196*** ... ... ... 
 (0.044)    (0.071)    
∆SALESigpt  0.073* ... ... ... 0.071 ... ... ... 
 (0.044)    (0.044)    
GCgpt  -0.001 0.203* 0.537** 0.508** -0.074** 0.198 0.536** 0.505** 
 (0.021) (0.121) (0.237) (0.236) (0.037) (0.123) (0.238) (0.237) 
URBpt  -0.009 -0.552 0.639 0.444 -0.006 -0.543 0.682 0.487 
 (0.024) (0.420) (1.708) (1.704) (0.022) (0.423) (1.713) (1.709) 
(CF Kb⁄ )igpt × GCgpt  ... ... ... ... -0.049** ... ... ... 
     (0.020)    
CCigpt  ... -0.155*** -0.155** -0.158** ... -0.118*** -0.118* -0.121* 
  (0.048) (0.075) (0.074)  (0.045) (0.063) (0.063) 
TFPigpt  -0.152** ... ... ... -0.144** ... ... ... 
 (0.066)    (0.066)    
SIZEigpt  0.186*** 0.088** 0.090** 0.090** 0.179*** 0.085* 0.087** 0.088** 
 (0.056) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) 
AGEigpt  -0.071*** -0.002 -0.014 -0.009 -0.069*** 0.002 -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.025) (0.141) (0.109) (0.109) (0.025) (0.140) (0.110) (0.109) 
WAGEigpt  ... 0.078* 0.081* 0.083* ... 0.078* 0.081* 0.082* 
  (0.047) (0.043) (0.043)  (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) 
VERTICALigpt  ... -0.170 -0.158 -0.162 ... -0.154 -0.142 -0.147 
  (0.138) (0.117) (0.117)  (0.137) (0.117) (0.116) 
SALESigpt  ... 0.005 0.005 0.005 ... 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
VAigpt  ... 0.494 -0.169 -0.042 ... 0.488 -0.191 -0.063 
  (0.576) (0.903) (0.900)  (0.575) (0.906) (0.903) 
∆VAigpt  ... -0.601 -0.348 -0.416 ... -0.616 -0.356 -0.425 
  (0.513) (0.641) (0.638)  (0.516) (0.643) (0.640) 
Number of Observations 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 70,711 
Number of Firms 1,1953 1,1953 1,1953 1,1953 1,1953 1,1953 1,1953 1,1953 
Number of Instruments 191 ... ... ... 192 ... ... ... 
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Table D4 - Continued 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 ... ... ... 0.000 ... ... ... 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.652 ... ... ... 0.656 ... ... ... 
Hansen J-statistic. (p-value) 0.210 ... 0.162 0.162 0.240 ... 0.163 0.163 
𝑅2  ... 0.008 ... ... ... 0.006 ... ... 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic 
(p-value) 
... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on GCgpt (p-value) ... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic on URBpt (p-value) ... ... 0.000 0.000 ... ... 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.17 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.76 1.58 1.58 1.58 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are clustered at province-industrial sector level (1,291 units). Investment 
equations are estimated using a two-step System GMM estimator, with WINDMEIJER's (2005) correction; they include a constant term, industrial 
sector, NUTS-2 and year dummies. The dummy and age variables are used as instruments for themselves only in levels. The GCgpt and URBpt 
variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented using their 1971 values, plus a population density measure (population in the province per square 
kilometres) dated 1921. The other variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented using their values lagged 3 to 6 both in levels and first 
differences (the sales growth variable uses instruments only in levels). TFP equations include year dummies; first-stage F statistics of excluded 
instruments for GCgpt and URBpt equal, respectively, to 18.9 and 33.3 in all instrumental-variable specifications. The GCgpt and URBpt variables are 
instrumented using the one-year lag of their growth between 1971 and current periods of observation, plus the one-year lag of the growth of population 
density between 1921 and current periods of observation. CCigpt is the measure of credit constraints from the investment equations. The Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM-statistic refers to the KLEIBERGEN-PAAP's (2006) under-identification test of the instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.10; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Abstract: This paper examines whether the presence of organised crime (mafia-type criminality) 
affects a firm's performance (defined in terms of Total Factor Productivity growth) both directly 
and indirectly by downsizing the positive externalities arising from the geographic concentration 
of (intra- and inter-industry) market-related firms. The empirical analysis uses the economic 
performance of a large sample of Italian manufacturing small and medium sized firms over the 
period 2008-2011. The results suggest a negative direct relationship between organised crime 
and firms' productivity growth. Any positive effect derived from industrial clustering is 
thoroughly debilitated by a strong presence of local organised crime, and the negative 
moderation effect of organised crime on productivity growth is greater for smaller than for larger 
firms. In particular, extortions have a very strong incidence in weakening a firm's performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
How the local environment where Italian firms operate affects their economic performance 
and behaviour has been the object of great scrutiny. Research has focused on issues such as local 
institutional quality (LASAGNI et al., 2015), financial development (MORETTI, 2014), the 
presence of innovative milieu (BELUSSI et al., 2010), or industrial agglomeration (CAINELLI 
et al., 2015), among others. Most of this literature tends to point towards the idea that, as firms 
interact with local actors (e.g. neighbouring firms, banks, local institutions, research centres), 
their capacity to get and assimilate knowledge, their competitiveness, and their economic 
performance is positively or negatively affected by the socio-economic context of where they are 
located. Firms operating in different environments are likely to gain (or suffer) from both 
tangible (e.g. the local availability of inputs and intermediate goods, the reduction of 
transportation costs) and intangible (e.g. the reduction of transaction costs favoured by repeated 
interactions and increasing trust among local actors) agglomeration externalities which reduce 
the costs of the economic activity, thus fostering their efficiency and growth (MARTIN et al., 
2011). 
This paper builds on this idea, and while providing additional insights on the role played 
by the context where a firm operates on its performance - defined in terms of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP, henceforth) growth -, it particularly focuses on what is widely regarded as an 
important negative externality: organised crime in Italy. 
Organised crime (namely, mafia-type criminality) represents an Italian symbol. Italy is 
often identified as a country with pervasive organised crime. From its locations of origin - 
Western Sicily, Campania, Calabria, and Apulia - mafia-type activities have spread to many 
other parts of the country. The presence of criminality is likely to affect the economic activity 
and therefore the performance of individual firms. Criminal organisations reduce the level of 
legality and security of the places they operate (LA SPINA and LO FORTE, 2006), undermining 
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both the socio-economic environment where a firm operates and its performance. Organised 
crime makes the business environment less secure and dynamic and increases uncertainty, 
reducing trust and reciprocity among agents. Criminal organisations operate in the market 
through controlled "illicit" firms, altering competition and market rules. It can be said that 
organised crime acts as a tax on the local economic system (DETOTTO and OTRANTO, 2010): 
it increases the costs and reduces the returns of the economic activity, thus downsizing firms' 
efficiency (ALBANESE and MARINELLI, 2013). Yet, despite its expansion beyond its place of 
origin, the presence of organised crime across Italy remains extremely uneven. Areas of the 
country completely ravaged by crime coexist, often in close proximity, with regions where 
organised criminality is almost absent. 
This paper empirically investigates the extent to which a firm's productivity benefits in 
terms of agglomeration and industrial clustering are erased by the presence of organised crime in 
the firm's region. The hypothesis driving the research is that organised crime will undermine a 
firm's growth potential by reducing trust and reciprocity in the local system and weakening the 
traditional market-based linkages among firms, thus increasing transaction costs and diluting any 
positive externalities arising from the location in a highly agglomerated area. 
The empirical analysis covers a large sample of Italian manufacturing small and medium 
sized firms over the period 2008-2011. The identification strategy is based on a sample-selection 
model which allows accounting for firm exit over the three-year growth period considered, and 
the robustness of the results is tested controlling for the potential endogeneity of the variables 
capturing organised crime and industrial clustering, as well as by estimating the firm's TFP 
through two different approaches. Overall, empirical results support the theoretical hypotheses: 
while agglomeration and clustering foster firms' productivity growth, organised crime has a 
direct negative effect on it, as well as a harmful indirect impact offsetting the benefits of 
agglomeration. The indirect effect is mainly driven by the presence of extortion. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on organised 
crime and agglomeration and the theoretical predictions derived from it. Section 3 describes the 
data and introduces the econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. CLUSTERING, ORGANISED CRIME AND PRODUCTIVITY 
2.1. Industrial clustering and productivity 
Agglomeration and industrial clustering are generally regarded as beneficial for the 
development and growth of firms. From the pioneering work of MARSHALL (1890), it has been 
often posited that firms operating in spatially-bounded high-density areas may benefit from 
tangible and intangible externalities which spread across local actors, favouring the economic 
performance of both the local system and of individual agents within it (GLAESER et al., 1992; 
ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004; PUGA, 2010). 
Benefits of agglomeration are realised through two fundamental types of externalities: 
localisation and diversification economies. Localisation economies date back to MARSHALL 
(1890) and refer to the spatial concentration of firms operating in the same industry (GLAESER 
et al., 1992). The presence of firms sharing a common competence base facilitates intra-industry 
transmission of knowledge and technological spillovers (NOOTEBOOM, 2000), as well as 
benefits from reduced transport costs, external-scale economies, and the availability of 
specialised workers and suppliers (DURANTON and PUGA, 2004; MARTIN et al., 2011). 
Diversification economies arise from the geographic concentration of firms operating in different 
industries (JACOBS, 1969). They favour the cross-fertilisation of existing ideas and technologies 
in a diversified local economic environment, as well as tangible positive externalities related to 
the availability of specialised business services providers, and the presence of intermediate 
goods' suppliers operating at different stages of the production chain (CAINELLI et al., 2015). 
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There is no shortage of cross-country literature on the agglomeration-productivity 
relationship at the firm-level (e.g. HENDERSON, 2003; CINGANO and SCHIVARDI, 2004; 
CAINELLI and LUPI, 2010; LEE et al., 2010; MARTIN et al., 2011; CAINELLI et al., 2015; 
GANAU, 2015). This literature distinguishes between static (short-run) and dynamic (long-run) 
effects of localisation and diversification economies. The static component of the agglomeration 
phenomenon concerns tangible and intangible externalities arising from market-based 
relationships (e.g. availability of specialised inputs' suppliers, reduced transport and transaction 
costs). The dynamic component involves intangible externalities derived from knowledge and 
information flows and technological spillovers (MARTIN et al., 2011; GANAU, 2015). 
In this paper we explicitly consider tangible and intangible market-based externalities, by 
building on the distinction between localisation and diversification economies. We synthesise 
intra- and inter-industry market-based externalities by means of a concept of industrial clustering 
which refers to the geographic concentration of horizontally and vertically market-related firms. 
Akin to PORTER's (1990) notion of cluster, the concept of industrial clustering captures the 
spatial agglomeration of firms operating at different stages of the production chain, allowing to 
simultaneously account for static localisation- and diversification-type externalities. Industrial 
clustering thus encompasses tangible - related to the availability of intra- and inter-industry 
inputs' suppliers, as well as to the reduction of transport costs (CAINELLI et al., 2015) - and 
intangible effects - related to the reduction of transaction costs, resulting from face-to-face 
interactions, repeated and long-lasting market relationships, and increasing trust among business 
partners (MISTRI and SOLARI, 2003; CAINELLI, 2008). The combination of tangible and 
intangible effects will spur firm-level growth by reducing the costs of the economic activity, 
either through lowering the costs of local inputs and intermediate goods or through reduced 
transaction costs resulting from long-lasting production linkages among local firms. Therefore, 
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existing literature tends to underline that the geographic concentration of (intra- and inter-
industry) market-related firms is expected to raise firm-level productivity. 
 
2.2. Organised crime and productivity 
The effect of organised crime on productivity has featured in economic literature since, at 
least, the work of SCHELLING (1971). Organised crime is widely regarded to have both direct 
and indirect negative effects on the economic activity. First, the presence of criminal 
organisations weakens legality and security (LA SPINA and LO FORTE, 2006; DANIELE and 
MARANI, 2011). Such a situation makes the business environment less secure and dynamic, 
increases uncertainty, increases the risk of new investment opportunities, and reduces trust and 
reciprocity among economic agents. In these circumstances the formation and development of 
economic networks is jeopardised, as firms are less willing to establish solid and long-lasting 
production linkages. Second, organised crime increases the costs and reduces the returns of the 
economic activity (BUONANNO et al.,2009; POWELL et al., 2010), thus acting like a tax on 
the economic system (DETOTTO and OTRANTO, 2010). Organised crime influences the 
allocation of public resources, alters market rules, and reduces competition among firms, e.g. in 
terms of inputs' procurement, distribution channels, as well as public contracts (NETTI, 1999; 
FELLI and TRIA, 2000). Finally, firms may be also coerced by criminal organisations, for 
instance, into acquiring inputs from suppliers controlled by the criminal organisation 
(ALBANESE and MARINELLI, 2013) or into directly paying the organisation itself in order to 
be able to operate and stay in market. Overall, these conditions damage economic performance 
and are translated into reduced investments, higher costs, and lower efficiency (DANIELE, 
2009; DETOTTO and OTRANTO, 2010). 
Only a limited number of contributions have empirically analysed the economic effects of 
organised crime. Some works have focused on its macroeconomic implications in terms of 
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labour productivity (e.g. FELLI and TRIA 2000; CENTORRINO and OFRIA, 2008), GDP 
growth (e.g. TULLIO and QUARELLA, 1999; PINOTTI, 2012), employment rates (e.g. PERI, 
2004), inward foreign direct investments (e.g. DANIELE and MARANI, 2011), and public 
transfers (BARONE and NARCISO, 2013). The microeconomic effects of organised crime and, 
specifically, the effects on an average firm economic activity have, by contrast, drawn much less 
attention. Among these limited contributions, NETTI (1999), OFRIA (2000) and ALBANESE 
and MARINELLI (2013) can be highlighted. ALBANESE and MARINELLI (2013) explicitly 
focus on the effect of organised crime on the productivity of Italian firms. They find that 
organised crime reduces firm-level productivity regardless of firm size and sector. This negative 
effect is robust to the potential endogeneity of the organised crime variable, even though their 
instrumental-variable (IV) estimations refer only to a sub-sample of firms from selected 
Southern regions, i.e. those historically affected by criminal (mafia-type) organisations. 
Based on the theoretical relationship between organised crime and economic performance, 
as well as on previous empirical evidence, the presence of mafia-type activity is expected to 
negatively affect  productivity growth at firm level. Organised crime increases the costs of 
economic exchanges by increasing uncertainty, operating a monopolistic control over the local 
market, altering the rules of competition among firms, as well as imposing protection rackets to 
local business actors. In addition to these negative direct effects, organised crime is further likely 
to cancel out any potential positive relationships between industrial clustering and firm-level 
productivity growth. Criminal organisations tend to operate in the market through firms they 
control which may impose the acquisition of inputs or business services to other local firms, 
altering normal production linkages along the supply chain. The presence of criminal 
organisations also reduces trust and reciprocity in the local system, increasing transaction costs 
among local actors. Therefore, organised crime is likely to break established local-level market 
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relationships among firms and prevent the emergence of new ones, thus downsizing the positive 
externalities arising from the spatial concentration of market-related firms. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. The dataset 
The empirical analysis employs balance sheet data drawn from the AIDA databank (Bureau 
Van Dijk). The dataset has been constructed considering only small and medium sized firms 
(SME, henceforth), i.e. firms with less than 250 employees, in the manufacturing industry with a 
positive turnover and value added over at least three consecutive years during the period 2007-
2011. In addition, firms included in the analysis have to report a value added-to-turnover ratio 
≥ 0 and ≤ 1.2 Firms with missing or inconsistent data in terms of value added, total labour cost, 
tangible assets, and intermediate inputs have been removed from the dataset. This leaves an 
unbalanced panel including 41,484 firms (for a total of 179,233 observations over the period 
2007-2011) which is used to estimate firms' TFP. This sample is further cleaned removing firms 
with missing information on location at province level (NUTS-3 level of the European Union 
territorial classification - Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) and the year of set 
up. The final panel thus covers 36,737 firms for the period 2008-2011. The 36,737 firms are used 
to analyse the effects of industrial clustering and organised crime on productivity growth. Tables 
A1 and A2 in the Appendix display the sample distribution taking into account, respectively, 
industry and geographic location.
3
 
 
3.2. Econometric modelling 
In order to investigate whether and how (i) industrial clustering fosters TFP growth at the 
level of the firm and whether and how (ii) organised crime affects TFP growth both directly and 
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indirectly, moderating the expected (positive) causal relationship between industrial clustering 
and growth, we specify the following empirical productivity growth equation: 
 
∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 + 𝛽4𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 
                      +𝛽5𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑔
2008 +𝛽6𝑂𝐶𝑝
2008 + 𝛽7(𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑔
2008) × (𝑂𝐶𝑝
2008) + 𝛽8𝑀𝐷𝑝
2008 
                      +𝛽9𝑆&𝐼 + 𝜸𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑔                                                                                                              (1) 
 
where ∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔
2011 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008  denotes the productivity growth of firm 𝑖, in the two-
digit industry 𝑔, located in province 𝑝 = 1,… ,103, over the three-year period 2008-2011; and 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008  and 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔
2011  denote the natural logarithms of a firm's TFP in 2008 and 2011, 
respectively. The TFP of a firm is estimated as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function specified as follows in logarithmic form: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (2) 
 
where 𝛽0 represents the mean efficiency level across firms and over time; 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes the value 
added of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡; the terms 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑖𝑡 denote, respectively, capital and labour inputs; and 
𝜂𝑖𝑡 is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) component which represents productivity 
shocks not affecting a firm's decision process. The firm-level productivity can be specified as 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where 𝜔𝑖𝑡  is a state variable-transmitted component indicating that part of 
productivity (i.e. technology) known by the firm and influencing its decision process (OLLEY 
and PAKES, 1996). Consequently, the estimated productivity can be computed solving for 𝜔𝑖𝑡 as 
follows (VAN BEVEREN, 2012): 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡                                                                                                      (3) 
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Firm-level TFP is firstly estimated through the two-step semi-parametric approach 
proposed by LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003). This approach allows the possibility of 
correcting for the "simultaneity bias", which concerns some form of endogeneity in the inputs 
due to the correlation between the level of inputs chosen by the firm, based on its prior beliefs on 
productivity levels, and unobservable productivity shocks (SYVERSON, 2011; VAN 
BEVEREN, 2012). LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) use intermediate inputs (𝑚𝑖𝑡) to proxy for 
unobserved productivity, solving the simultaneity problem between input choices and 
productivity shocks. By specifying 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡) in the second-stage estimation, and under 
the assumptions of monotonicity and intermediate inputs strictly increasing in productivity, 
equation (2) can be re-specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                                         (4) 
 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑡  expresses the unobserved productivity as a function of observables, and the term 
𝑠𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡) = 𝑚𝑡
−1(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡) denotes the inversion of the intermediate inputs function. 
Although the "simultaneity bias" can be corrected using LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's 
(2003) approach, potential collinearity of the labour coefficient is likely to emerge in the first-
stage estimation (VAN BEVEREN, 2012). This collinearity may be the consequence of choosing 
labour and intermediate inputs simultaneously. In this case, both factors are assumed to be 
allocated in a similar way by the firm, as a function of productivity and capital input and, 
therefore, depend on the same state variables, i.e. 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡(𝜔𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) and 𝑙𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝜔𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡). As 
shown by ACKERBERG et al. (2006), the labour coefficient results not identified in the first-
stage estimation because it is not possible to estimate the non-parametric function of productivity 
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and capital input with the labour variable's coefficient simultaneously, as the labour input is a 
function of productivity and capital input. 
According to WOOLDRIDGE (2009), the estimator proposed by LEVINSOHN and 
PETRIN (2003) can be implemented using a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach 
where 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑙 are estimated in one step, hence addressing the possible collinearity between the 
labour and intermediate inputs. This approach consists in the simultaneous estimation of two 
equations with the same dependent variable and the same set of input variables, while different 
sets of instruments are specified so that the coefficients of the input variables in the first equation 
are identified exploiting information in the second equation. Given a production function (2), and 
assuming absence of correlation of 𝜂𝑖𝑡  with current and past values of capital, labour and 
intermediate inputs, as well as restriction of the dynamics of the unobserved productivity 
component 𝜔𝑖𝑡, WOOLDRIDGE (2009) proposes to identify 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑙 estimating the following 
two equations: 
 
{
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                          
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + ℎ[𝑓(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1)] + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡
                                                              (5) 
 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑡  denotes productivity innovations and correlates with 𝑙𝑖𝑡  and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , while it is 
uncorrelated with 𝑘𝑖𝑡, and all past values of 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, and 𝑚𝑖𝑡. The function 𝑓(∙) can be specified 
as a low-degree polynomial of order up to three, while the function ℎ(∙) (i.e. the productivity 
process) can be defined as a random walk with drift, such that 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡. Equation 
(2) can thus be re-specified as follows (GALUŠČÁK and LĺZAL, 2011): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝜏) + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                           (6) 
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and can be estimated through an IV approach using polynomials in 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 of order up 
to three approximating for 𝑓(∙), and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 and polynomials containing 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 
and 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 of order up to three as instruments for 𝑙𝑖𝑡 (PETRIN and LEVINSOHN, 2012). Twenty-
one production functions are estimated at the two-digit industry level using both estimators.
4
 
Table A3 in the Appendix reports some descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the 
variables entering the production function, while Table A4 reports the estimated elasticities of 
the capital and labour inputs. 
The key explanatory variables entering the productivity growth equation are those 
capturing organised crime and industrial clustering. The variable capturing organised crime 
( 𝑂𝐶𝑝
2008 ) is defined considering three main types of crime: (i) mafia-type association 
(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝
2008); (ii) mafia-murders (𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝
2008); and (iii) extortions (𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝
2008). The 
variable is operationalised as follows: 
 
𝑂𝐶𝑝
2008 = ln [(
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝
2008 + 𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝
2008 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝
2008
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝
2008 ) ∗ 100,000]                        (7) 
 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝
2008 denotes the population living in province 𝑝. Data on criminality are drawn from 
the Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics) online databank Territorial Information System 
on Justice, and the province is used as the geographic unit of analysis. No finer geographical 
scale can be used, as crime geographic data are only provided at the level of the 103 Italian 
provinces for the period of analysis. Data on population are provided by the Istat online database 
on demographics. Fig. A1 in the Appendix displays the quartile map of the organised crime 
variable. As expected there is a concentration of reported organised crime in the South of Italy 
(the Mezzogiorno) and, particularly, in the regions of Apulia, Calabria, Campania, and Sicily. 
However, part of the Mezzogiorno, such as Sardinia, has a low incidence of organised crime, 
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while mafia-type activities are strong in some Northern and Central Italian provinces, such as 
Novara, Bologna, Forlì-Cesena, Rimini, Pistoia, or Viterbo (see Fig. A1). 
The variable capturing industrial clustering is defined considering input-output 
relationships among industries and, specifically, it is constructed to account for both horizontal 
(i.e. intra-industry) and vertical (i.e. inter-industry) market relationships as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑔
2008 = ln
[
 
 
 (𝑁𝑝𝑔
2008 ∙ 𝑤𝑔𝑔
2008) + ∑ (𝑁𝑝𝑗
2008 ∙ 𝑤𝑔𝑗
2008)𝐽𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑔
𝐴𝑝
]
 
 
 
                                                                     (8) 
 
where 𝑁𝑝𝑔
2008 denotes the number of active firms operating in the two-digit industry 𝑔 in province 
𝑝; 𝑁𝑝𝑗
2008 represents the number of active firms in the two-digit industry 𝑗, with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑔; 𝑤𝑔𝑔
2008 and 
𝑤𝑔𝑗
2008 are the weights capturing the share of inputs that firms in industry 𝑔 may acquire from, 
respectively, the same industry and other industries; 𝐴𝑝 denotes the area of the corresponding 
province 𝑝 . Data on the number of active firms are drawn from the Movimprese database, 
provided by the Italian Chamber of Commerce. The weighting components are derived from the 
2008 use table of the Italian input-output matrix provided by Istat.
5
 
A cluster can be defined as a geographic concentration of related firms (as well as 
organisations and institutions) in a given territory (PORTER, 1990; DELGADO et al., 2015). 
The industrial clustering variable defined in equation (8) represents both a measure of 
geographic concentration of the economic activity and a proxy of the intensity of the input-
output relationships among firms. The value of the variable increases, the greater the density of 
market-interconnected firms. From an agglomeration literature perspective, this variable captures 
the effects of both localisation and (vertically-)related diversification economies (FRENKEN et 
al., 2007; CAINELLI et al., 2015). 
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Equation (1) also includes the interaction term between the industrial clustering and 
organised crime variables. The introduction of the interaction is aimed at evaluating whether 
organised crime plays an indirect negative effect on a firm's productivity growth by limiting the 
(potential) positive effects of industrial clustering through the reduction of trust among economic 
actors, the increase of transaction costs, as well as the alteration of competition/cooperation 
mechanisms across firms at the local level. 
The right-hand side of the productivity growth equation includes a set of firm-level control 
variables. All variables are included in the equation (1) in logarithmic form: the beginning-of-the 
period TFP (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008); a measure of firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008) defined as the difference between the 
year 2008 and the year the firm was set up; a measure of size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008) defined by the number 
of employees; the average wage (𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008) defined as the ratio between deflated wages and 
number of employees. Equation (1) includes also a metropolitan dummy variable (𝑀𝐷𝑝
2008), 
which equals one if a province has a population equal to or greater than one million inhabitants 
(20.64% of the sample's firms belong to a metropolitan area). The metropolitan dummy aims to 
control for the effect of urbanisation economies arising from the location in highly urbanised 
areas. Metropolitan areas generate additional externalities, such as the presence of public 
facilities, infrastructure, transportation systems, and knowledge produced by both private and 
public actors (JACOBS, 1969; MELO et al., 2009; PUGA, 2010). An additional dummy variable 
is included to capture the location of a firm in the South of Italy and the two main islands (𝑆&𝐼). 
The introduction of this variable is intended to take into account structural differences between 
the Italian Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy (Northern and Central areas) in terms of socio-
economic conditions, industrial development, and infrastructure endowment. Finally, equation 
(1) includes a set of industry dummy variables (𝜸𝑔) to capture industry fixed effects. 
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3.2.1. Identification strategy 
As the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equation (1) may be affected by 
sample selection - the productivity growth is observed only for the sub-sample of firms surviving 
over the growth period (e.g. SLEUTJES et al., 2012) -, we therefore resort to a two-step sample-
selection model à la HECKMAN (1979). This model is estimated to account for firm exit over 
the period 2008-2011. Specifically, a first-stage reduced-form selection equation is estimated by 
Maximum Likelihood specifying a dummy (𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑝𝑔) as dependent variable. The dummy 
equals one if the firm observed in 2008 is still accounted for in 2011, and zero otherwise. The 
selection equation is identified by including on its right-hand side all the explanatory variables 
specified in equation (1), plus an exclusion restriction (𝐸𝑋𝐼𝑇𝑝), capturing the average exit rate in 
province 𝑝 over the period 1998-2007. The idea behind the exclusion restriction is that a high 
(past) level of firms' mortality in the local system captures high turbulence of the local business 
environment, which is likely to be associated with a low firm survival rate, without being 
necessarily associated with the economic performance of surviving firms.
6
 
The selection equation is estimated on the whole sample of firms through a Probit model. 
Then, the inverse Mills ratio (𝜆) is computed from the estimated selection equation and is 
included as additional regressor in the productivity growth equation to correct for sample 
selection bias. The augmented equation (1) is thus estimated via OLS on the sub-sample of firms 
surviving over the growth period 2008-2011 (WOOLDRIDGE, 2010). 
A second critical issue which may affect the OLS estimation of equation (1) - after 
correction for the sample selection bias - concerns the potential endogeneity of the variables for 
industrial clustering (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004; GRAHAM et al., 2010; MARTIN et 
al., 2011) and organised crime (ALBANESE and MARINELLI, 2013). Endogeneity can occur 
in the context of equation (1) for several reasons: (i) shocks occurring at province level may 
affect the productivity growth of firms, as well as the local industrial structure and the level of 
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criminality; (ii) variables misspecification may occur because measuring industrial relationships 
among firms and the criminal activity are not easy; (iii) reverse causality is likely to occur if the 
most productive firms self-select into the most agglomerated areas, or they move towards more 
secure business environments. 
Therefore, equation (1) is estimated applying an IV estimator to check the robustness of 
the results. Specifically, a two-stage least squares (TSLS) approach is adopted specifying a set of 
three instruments: a variable capturing industrial clustering in 1996 (𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑔
1996 ); a measure of 
population density in 1971 (𝑃𝐷𝑝
1971), defined as the population living in province 𝑝 in 1971 per 
square kilometre; and a proxy for the efficiency of the legal system in 2001 (𝐶𝑅𝑝
2001), defined as 
the ratio between the number of condemned individuals and the number of individuals reported 
for crime. These instruments are considered valid, as they are likely to be correlated with both 
the potentially endogenous variables without affecting a firm's productivity growth (GREENE, 
2003). There are several reasons for this. First, the literature on agglomeration economies 
proposes lagged values of agglomeration and population density as valid instruments for current 
agglomeration measures (e.g. CICCONE and HALL 1996; MELO and GRAHAM, 2009; 
CAINELLI et al., 2015). Second, a more efficient legal system may facilitate the clustering of 
firms and more efficient market relations. Third, previous contributions also suggest that current 
levels of (organised) crime are positively associated with high levels of industrialisation (DEL 
MONTE and PENNACCHIO, 2012) and urbanisation, while negatively associated with the 
efficiency of the legal system (BUONANNO et al., 2009).
7
 
The issues of sample selection and endogenous regressors have been addressed 
simultaneously following WOOLDRIDGE (2010, pp. 809-813). Specifically, the right-hand side 
of the first-stage reduced-form selection equation is specified including all the exogenous 
variables entering the second-stage equation, plus the set of instruments identified for the 
endogenous variables instead of the endogenous variables themselves. Consequently, the 
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structural (i.e. the productivity growth) equation is estimated via TSLS including the inverse 
Mills ratio derived from the selection equation as additional regressor. 
The endogeneity of the variables for industrial clustering and organised crime is tested 
through the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in its regression-based form (WOOLDRIDGE, 2010, pp. 
129-134). The null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected in all specifications. The relevance of the 
instruments is tested through the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) version of KLEIBERGEN and 
PAAP's (2006) rank statistic. The results of the test reject the null hypothesis that the matrix of 
reduced-form coefficients is under-identified, suggesting that the chosen instruments are 
relevant. The exogeneity of the whole set of instruments is tested through HANSEN's (1982) J-
statistic, which fails to reject the null hypothesis of instruments' exogeneity in all cases. The 
mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to detect multicollinearity problems. It is lower than 
the conservative cut-off value of 10 for multiple regression models in all the estimated 
specifications, underlining the absence of potential multicollinearity problems (NETER et al., 
1985). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 reports results of the OLS estimation of equation (1), corrected for sample 
selection. The coefficients of the exclusion restriction included in the selection equation and the 
parameter 𝜆 (i.e. the inverse Mills ratio computed from the selection equation) are statistically 
significant. This indicates the need to correct for sample selection and the validity of the adopted 
strategy. Specifically, the negative coefficients of the exclusion restriction identifying the first-
stage selection equations suggest that a firm's probability of surviving is negatively affected by 
its location in local systems characterised by a high level of firm mortality in the previous period. 
The results of Specification (1) - estimated without including the interaction term between 
the variables for industrial clustering and organised crime - point to, as hypothesised, a negative 
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effect of organised crime on firm-level productivity growth. They also highlight the presence of 
a positive link between industrial clustering and productivity growth. In this respect, the results 
confirm previous findings on both the relationship between organised crime and firm 
productivity (e.g. ALBANESE and MARINELLI, 2013) and on the relationship between 
industrial clustering and productivity (CAINELLI et al., 2015). 
Specification (2) complements Specification (1) by identifying a negative indirect effect of 
organised crime on the relationship between industrial clustering and productivity growth. The 
coefficients of the interaction term are negative and statistically significant, implying that any 
positive effects arising from the geographic concentration of (intra- and inter-industry) market-
related firms decrease as the incidence of local organised crime increases. Following 
WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach to TFP estimation, the results reveal that a 1% increase in the 
level of industrial clustering is associated with a 2.36% increase of productivity growth, when 
the value of organised crime is in the 25
th
 percentile of its distribution; with a 1.95% increase of 
productivity growth, when the value of organised crime is in the 50
th
 percentile of its 
distribution; and with a 1.72% increase of productivity growth, when the value of organised 
crime is in the 75
th
 percentile of its distribution. Fig. 1 allows to discern the moderation effect of 
organised crime on the industrial clustering-productivity growth relationship: the marginal effect 
of industrial clustering on productivity growth clearly decreases as the level of organised crime 
increases. 
The results of the analysis thus confirm the theoretical predictions. On the one hand, firms 
located in local systems characterised by a high density of market-related firms (i.e. surrounded 
by a high number of potential suppliers) benefit from agglomeration externalities related to the 
local availability of suppliers, the reduction of transport costs, as well as the reduction of 
transaction costs associated with increasing trust among local business partners. On the other 
hand, organised crime reduces trust among individuals, alters competition in the market, and 
85 
undermines the established local industrial structure, causing a weakening of existing market 
relationships among local firms. Organised crime therefore leads to an increase in the costs of 
the economic activity and to a significant reduction of the advantages related to economics of 
agglomeration, leading to a clear decrease in firm-level efficiency. 
Regarding the controls, the beginning-of-the period TFP variable has negative coefficients, 
as does the age variable. The variables for firm-size and average wage have positive and 
significant coefficients. The dummies capturing the metropolitan and Mezzogiorno effects both 
have negative and significant coefficients. This hints, in contrast to expectations, to a negative 
effect of urbanisation economies. They also indicate that firm-level  productivity growth suffers 
in the least industrialised and developed area of Italy. 
The robustness of the results is tested by controlling for the potential endogeneity of the 
variables capturing industrial clustering and organised crime. Re-location processes of the most 
productive firms towards the most agglomerated areas, or towards areas characterised by lower 
levels of criminality, may cause biases in the estimated coefficients due to reverse causality. 
Table 2 reports the second-stage results of the TSLS estimation of equation (1) aimed at 
controlling for the potential endogeneity. Similarly to the exogenous analysis, the coefficients of 
the exclusion restriction and the parameter 𝜆 are statistically significant. Diagnostic tests for the 
IV approach are reported at the bottom of Table 2. The null hypothesis of exogeneity is never 
rejected and the under- and over-identification tests support the chosen instrumentation strategy. 
Overall, the findings reported above are confirmed when controlling for endogeneity. 
There is a negative direct effect of organised crime on productivity growth and a positive one of 
industrial clustering. The results also confirm an indirect negative effect of organised crime on 
the positive relationship between industrial clustering and productivity growth. The dimensions 
of this effect are quite high: a 1% increase in the level of industrial clustering is associated with a 
5.38% increase of productivity growth, when the value of organised crime is in the 25
th
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percentile of its distribution; with a 2.75% increase of productivity growth, when the value of 
organised crime is in the 50
th
 percentile of its distribution; and with a 1.29% increase of 
productivity growth, when the value of organised crime is in the 75
th
 percentile of its 
distribution. Once endogeneity is controlled for, the negative indirect effect of organised crime 
increases, making the positive marginal effect of industrial clustering on productivity growth 
negative for high levels of organised crime. This pattern is reproduced in Fig. 2. The presence of 
criminal organisations alters the local industrial structure and the established market 
relationships among firms, meaning that the positive agglomeration externalities stemming from 
the geographic concentration of suppliers disappear in areas characterised with a high incidence 
of organised crime. Negative agglomeration externalities may arise due to the presence of 
protection rackets, high extortion, and "illicit" firms in the local productive cluster, which leads 
to increasing costs (e.g. higher acquisition costs, higher transaction costs, as well as the 
imposition of taxes to stay in the market) for "legal" firms. 
The coefficients of the control variables display the same signs and significance levels than 
in the previous exercise. The coefficients of the variable capturing urbanisation effects are 
positive and statistically different from zero when the interaction term between industrial 
clustering and organised crime is accounted for. This last result is in line with previous 
contributions reporting a positive urbanisation effect on firm-level productivity (e.g. DI 
GIACINTO et al., 2014). The Mezzogiorno variable shows positive but non-significant 
coefficients. 
A second robustness exercise is conducted accounting only for extortion crime. The 
rationale for this exercise is twofold. First, it is the only type of crime accounted for in the 
organised crime variable which is present in all 103 Italian provinces, while the mafia-
association and mafia-murder crimes are recorded only in a limited number of provinces (Fig. 
A2 in the Appendix maps the spatial distribution of the three types of crime considered in the 
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analysis). Second, extortion is the archetypical crime associated to criminal organisations and 
has a strict economic nature: it allows criminal organisations to obtain huge amounts of money 
(e.g. through protection racketeering) as well as to control the local area where they operate and 
its economic activities. By contrast, mafia-association crime is more general since it may 
concern various illegal activities, such as the rigging of public tenders, the corruption of public 
officers, and the infiltration of public institutions by members of the criminal organisation. 
Therefore, it is more likely to influence the overall institutional conditions rather than directly 
affect firms' daily activity in an immediate way. Similarly, mafia-murders do not necessarily 
have a short-term direct economic effect, as very often the victims of these crimes are members 
of the crime syndicate fighting over the control of territory. 
Equation (1) is thus modified substituting the organised crime variable with a variable 
capturing the density of extortions: 
 
𝐸𝐶𝑝
2008 = ln [(
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝
2008
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝
2008 ) ∗ 100,000]                                                                                          (9) 
 
where the term 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝
2008 denotes the number of extortion crimes recorded in province p in 
2008; the term 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝
2008 captures the population living in the corresponding province. 
Table 3 reports the second-stage results of the TSLS estimation of equation (1), modified 
to account for the extortion crime only. Diagnostic tests support the estimation and 
instrumentation strategies adopted. Once again, the results confirm the previous findings: 
industrial clustering has a positive effect on firm-level productivity growth, while the effect of 
extortions is negative and significant. Extortions also reduce the benefits of industrial clustering 
on productivity growth. The effect is again considerable: a 1% increase in the level of industrial 
clustering is associated with a 3.32% increase of productivity growth, when the extortion 
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variable is in the 25
th
 percentile of its distribution; with a 3% increase of productivity growth, 
when the extortion variable is in the 50
th
 percentile of its distribution; and with a 2.84% increase 
of productivity growth, when the extortion variable is in the 75
th
 percentile of its distribution. 
These results imply that the presence of criminal organisations in the local system and a high 
incidence of extortions have a strong negative influence on the way local firms interact and set 
up inter-firm transactions. 
Fig. 3 compares the marginal effects of industrial clustering on firms' TFP growth at 
different percentiles of the organised crime and extortion variables. The negative moderation 
effect of the criminal activity is only marginally lower when only the extortion crime is 
accounted for, relative to the previous analysis when mafia-murders and mafia-associations were 
considered. However, this pattern changes for high levels of criminality. The results indicate that 
the negative moderation effect played by criminal organisations is driven by extortions from 
about the 50
th
 percentile: the short-dash dotted line, which captures the difference in the marginal 
effects of industrial clustering on firms' TFP growth between organised crime and extortion 
crime, is positively sloped. 
Finally, equation (1) is modified to test whether the negative moderation effect of 
organised crime on the industrial clustering-productivity growth relationship differs for firms of 
different sizes. Firms have been split into two categories according to their beginning-of-the 
period size. A dummy variable (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008) has been constructed accordingly. The first 
category includes firms reporting a level of employment lower than the average size of a firm in 
the sample in 2008 (i.e. 25 employees), while the second category includes firms reporting a 
level of employment greater than or equal to the average firms' size: 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 < 25
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑔
2008 ≥ 25
                                                                                  (10) 
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The right-hand side of equation (1) now includes the dummy variable capturing the two 
size classes (instead of the size variable previously considered) and its three-way interaction with 
the variables for industrial clustering and organised crime. The idea is that the effects of 
organised crime are likely to be greater for smaller firms because they have less available 
resources and less market power with respect to larger firms. Smaller firms may have difficulties 
in competing in the market dominated by criminal organisations, which operate imposing 
protection rackets and the acquisition of inputs from controlled "illicit" firms. Moreover, violent 
actions towards employers and firms' assets in order to gain the control of the local market may 
act as a greater deterrent for smaller firms, simply by virtue of their size. 
Table 4 reports the second-stage results of the TSLS estimation of the augmented version 
of equation (1). The diagnostic tests - presented at the bottom of Table 4 - support the estimation 
and instrumentation strategies adopted. The coefficients of the firm-level controls display the 
same signs and significance levels than in the previous analysis. The dummy variables capturing 
urbanisation externalities and the Mezzogiorno effect show positive but non-significant 
coefficients. The coefficients of the three-way interaction term are negative and statistically 
significant. A clearer interpretation of this last result emerges from Fig. 4. First, the slope of the 
industrial clustering variable referring to smaller firms (i.e. those with a below average size 
relative to the sample in 2008) is steeper than the slope referring to larger firms (i.e. those above 
the average size). This evidence suggests, as expected, that the indirect negative effect of 
organised crime is higher for smaller than for larger firms. Second, the marginal effect of 
industrial clustering on productivity growth becomes negative at a lower level of organised crime 
for smaller firms. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has contributed to the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between the local environment where firms operate and their economic 
performance. Specifically, it has focused on whether and to which extent organised crime 
(mafia-type criminality) affects a firm's performance (defined in terms of Total Factor 
Productivity growth) both directly and indirectly by downsizing any positive externalities arising 
from the geographic concentration of (intra- and inter-industry) market-related firms. 
The analysis is conducted using a large sample of Italian manufacturing SMEs observed 
over the period 2008-2011, on which a two-step sample-selection model has been estimated to 
control for a potential selection bias of the surviving firms. The robustness of the results has been 
tested through an IV approach to control for the endogeneity of the variables capturing organised 
crime and industrial clustering. Two different approaches have been also employed to estimate 
firm-level TFP. 
The empirical results demonstrate the presence of a negative (direct) effect of organised 
crime on firm-level productivity growth. The negative influence of organised crime is also 
indirect, as mafia-type associations, murders, and extortions create local conditions that 
undermine the positive effect of industrial clustering on productivity growth. Moreover, this 
negative moderation effect is more detrimental for smaller than for medium-size and larger 
firms. The positive impact of industrial clustering decreases as the level of organised crime at the 
local level increases, to the extent that it becomes negative in those areas with particularly high 
levels of criminality. 
These results can be interpreted considering two interrelated consequences of the criminal 
activity. On the one hand, criminal organisations gain from the economic control of specific 
productions and, therefore, may influence their dynamics. On the other hand, the presence of 
criminal organisations also reduces trust and reciprocity among individuals, increasing 
91 
transaction costs, thus contributing to make the local business environment less competitive. 
This produces negative effects on local market-based relationships among firms: market 
transactions become more expensive, in particular if the criminal organisation imposes, as is 
normally the case, protection rackets and other illegal payments to the local firms. Hence, high 
levels of organised crime destabilise traditional competition/cooperation relationships existing 
among firms within a locality and smaller firms and businesses are the biggest victims. These 
aspects contribute to determine the negative (indirect) effect which can be ascribed to the 
presence of criminal organisations: they influence firms' performance increasing the costs of the 
economic activity, as well as altering the mechanisms which determine the positive effect of 
industrial agglomeration on firm-level growth. 
The results underline the importance of the local context on firm-level performance, 
beyond the traditional firm-specific characteristics. In particular, they highlight the importance of 
accounting for several dimensions charactering the local environment where firms operate, as 
well as how these local-level factors interact with one another in order to determine the 
economic behaviour of firms. From a theoretical and an empirical point of view, the results of 
the analysis open new questions concerning the dynamics of the relationship between 
agglomeration forces and the performance of firms. They hint at the fact that the local context - 
and at how different factors external to the firm combine in the local environment - alters the 
way in which firms behave, innovate, perform, and benefit from spatial agglomeration. From a 
policy perspective, the results point to the need of targeting industrial policies not only at the 
level of the firm but addressing local bottlenecks that may limit the capacity of firms to be 
created, operate, and thrive in particular areas of Italy or elsewhere in the world. Organised 
crime is one of these bottlenecks and tackling it would represent a significant boost to 
productivity and, consequently, to the economic dynamism of firms, cities, and territories. 
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NOTES 
1. The literature has focused on different dimensions of the cluster phenomenon. For instance, 
FESER and BERGMAN (2000) and FESER (2005) analyse the input-output component of 
industrial clusters, while FELDMAN and AUDRETSCH (1999) and KOO (2005) focus on 
knowledge-based clusters. DELGADO et al. (2015) propose a measure of inter-industry 
linkages which is based on the co-location pattern of employment and establishments, input-
output linkages and shared jobs, and which allows for the comparison of clustering 
phenomena across regions. 
2. The analysis focuses only on manufacturing industries because the balance sheet data 
available for services firms are less complete and reliable than those available for 
manufacturing firms. The analysis focuses on firms' TFP (growth), which is estimated using 
balance sheet data. 
3. Firms are ascribed to different sectors and subsectors following the Ateco 1991 classification 
of economic activities. All two-digit manufacturing industries are considered, except for the 
industries "16 - Tobacco" and "37 - Recycling", due to the absence of firms after the cleaning 
procedure. 
4. Deflated balance sheet data on value added, total labour cost, intermediate inputs and tangible 
assets are used to estimate the industry-specific production functions. Value added (𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡) is 
deflated with the corresponding two-digit production price index and is used as output in the 
production functions; total labour cost (𝐿𝑖𝑡) is deflated with the corresponding two-digit wage 
index and is used as labour input; total tangible assets ( 𝐾𝑖𝑡 ) are deflated with the 
corresponding two-digit capital deflator and are used as capital input; intermediate inputs 
(𝑀𝑖𝑡) are defined (at current prices) as the sum of services, raw materials and consumptions. 
They are deflated with an intermediate consumptions index. Deflators are calculated using 
Istat data and the reference year for depreciation is 2006. 
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5. The weighting scheme has been defined excluding public services (e.g. defence, public 
administration, public infrastructures, etc.), domestic services, education, restaurants and 
leisure activities, construction, real estate, and commercial activities. These two-digit 
industries have not been considered because their supplied inputs are not directly employed in 
the production processes by manufacturing firms. In particular, commercial firms have been 
excluded because they act as intermediaries and they are not specific with regard to the inputs 
sold (CAINELLI et al., 2015). In any case, the industrial clustering variable has been 
constructed also using an alternative weighting scheme, which excludes only public services, 
education, and domestic services industries. The results are robust to this alternative approach 
and can be supplied upon request. 
6. First-step selection equations have been identified using an alternative exclusion restriction, 
i.e. a dummy variable for mid-high and high technology firms. The rationale of this exclusion 
restriction is that firms operating in mid-high and high technology sectors are less likely to be 
influenced by general economic downturns or involved in the international outsourcing 
processes of the production phases with respect to firms operating in traditional 
manufacturing sectors. Hence, mid-high and high technology firms are expected to face a 
lower probability of exiting the market. Results using this alternative exclusion restriction are 
in line with the main findings. 
7. Two alternative sets of instruments have been tested for the industrial clustering and 
organised crime variables. Historical variables capturing past dominations in Italian provinces 
(from DI LIBERTO and SIDERI, 2015) have been tested to capture the effect of historical 
institutional settings. This is because past institutions may have influenced current levels of 
industrialisation and criminality. A set of dummy variables capturing the agricultural structure 
(mezzadria, latifondo, small and large property) characterising current provinces in the pre-
unitary period (before 1871) have been tested to capture the effect of different agricultural and 
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property structures which could have been likely to influence the development of criminal 
organisations and the process of industrialisation. However, both sets of instruments are 
uncorrelated with the (potentially) endogenous variables. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. TFP growth equation: OLS results 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) 
TFPipg
2008  -0.290*** -0.293*** -0.291*** -0.294*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SIZEipg
2008  0.200*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.163*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
ICpg
2008  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
OCp
2008  -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
ICpg
2008 × OCp
2008  ... -0.015** ... -0.015** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
MDp
2008  -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
S&I -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.102*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
λ  1.378*** 1.349*** 1.358*** 1.329*** 
 (0.151) (0.147) (0.151) (0.148) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 29,170 29,170 29,170 29,170 
Censored Observations 7,567 7,567 7,567 7,567 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
F-statistic 83.90*** 81.63*** 83.19*** 80.93*** 
Mean VIF 4.29 4.04 4.30 4.06 
Selection Equation     
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 36,737 36,737 
Exclusion restriction (std. error) -0.039* (0.021) -0.049** (0.022) -0.039* (0.021) -0.048** (0.022) 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-
industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main variables forming the interaction term are mean-
centred in Specification (2). LP denotes LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, while W denotes 
WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach to firms' TFP estimation. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage 
selection equations (see Table A7 in the Appendix). The exclusion restriction in the selection equation captures the 
average exit rate of firms over the period 1998-2007 at the province level. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table 2. TFP growth equation: TSLS results 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) 
TFPipg
2008  -0.286*** -0.291*** -0.288*** -0.293*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SIZEipg
2008  0.199*** 0.193*** 0.195*** 0.189*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.156*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 0.148*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
ICpg
2008  0.028*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
OCp
2008  -0.283** -0.321*** -0.268** -0.312*** 
 (0.115) (0.092) (0.115) (0.093) 
ICpg
2008 × OCp
2008  ... -0.098*** ... -0.096*** 
  (0.032)  (0.032) 
MDp
2008  0.011 0.056* 0.009 0.054* 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
S&I 0.051 0.076 0.043 0.072 
 (0.075) (0.056) (0.076) (0.057) 
λ  1.401*** 1.334*** 1.377*** 1.309*** 
 (0.162) (0.159) (0.161) (0.158) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 29,170 29,170 29,170 29,170 
Censored Observations 7,567 7,567 7,567 7,567 
F-statistic 78.48*** 73.78*** 77.74*** 72.89*** 
Mean VIF 4.16 3.43 4.17 3.44 
Exogeneity test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.288 0.601 0.356 0.644 
Selection Equation     
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 36,737 36,737 
Exclusion restriction (std. error) -0.036* (0.021) -0.038* (0.023) -0.036* (0.021) -0.037* (0.023) 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-
industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main variables forming the interaction term are mean-centred 
in Specification (2). LP denotes LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, while W denotes WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) 
approach to firms' TFP estimation. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations (see Table A8 in 
the Appendix). The exclusion restriction in the selection equation captures the average exit rate of firms over the period 
1998-2007 at the province level. The Kleibergen-Papp rk LM-statistic refers to KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) under-
identification test. The variables for industrial clustering and organised crime are instrumented using the measure of 
industrial clustering in 1996 (ICpg
1996), a measure of population density in 1971 (PDp
1971), and the ratio of condemned 
individuals over people reported for crimes dated 2001 (CRp
2001), while their interaction term is instrumented using the 
interactions among the instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table 3. TFP growth equation: TSLS results accounting for extortions only 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) 
TFPipg
2008  -0.288**** -0.294**** -0.289**** -0.295**** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.044**** -0.043**** -0.043**** -0.043**** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
SIZEipg
2008  0.198**** 0.191**** 0.194**** 0.187**** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.154**** 0.147**** 0.152**** 0.145**** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
ICpg
2008  0.029*** 0.032**** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
EXTp
2008  -0.322** -0.370**** -0.305** -0.359**** 
 (0.142) (0.105) (0.142) (0.106) 
ICpg
2008 × EXTp
2008  ... -0.116*** ... -0.113*** 
  (0.035)  (0.035) 
MDp
2008  0.019 0.069** 0.016 0.067* 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034) 
S&I 0.064 0.093 0.056 0.088 
 (0.089) (0.061) (0.089) (0.062) 
λ  1.388**** 1.305**** 1.365**** 1.281**** 
 (0.166) (0.161) (0.165) (0.160) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 29,170 29,170 29,170 29,170 
Censored Observations 7,567 7,567 7,567 7,567 
F-statistic 77.44*** 73.23*** 76.72*** 72.38*** 
Mean VIF 4.16 3.42 4.17 3.43 
Exogeneity test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.331 0.554 0.396 0.593 
Selection Equation     
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 36,737 36,737 
Exclusion restriction (std. error) -0.036* (0.021) -0.038* (0.023) -0.036* (0.021) -0.037* (0.023) 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-
industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main variables forming the interaction term are mean-centred 
in Specification (2). LP denotes LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, while W denotes WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) 
approach to firms' TFP estimation. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations (see Table A8 in 
the Appendix). The exclusion restriction in the selection equation captures the average exit rate of firms over the period 
1998-2007 at the province level. The Kleibergen-Papp rk LM-statistic refers to KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) under-
identification test. The variables for industrial clustering and extortion crime are instrumented using the measure of 
industrial clustering in 1996 (ICpg
1996), a measure of population density in 1971 (PDp
1971), and the ratio of condemned 
individuals over people reported for crimes dated 2001 (CRp
2001), while their interaction term is instrumented using the 
interactions among the instruments. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table 4. TFP growth equation: TSLS results accounting for size effects 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) 
TFPipg
2008  -0.132*** -0.137*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
SIZE_CLASSipg
2008  0.649*** 0.645*** 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.143*** 0.144*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
ICpg
2008  0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
OCp
2008  -0.465*** -0.458*** 
 (0.123) (0.126) 
ICpg
2008 × OCp
2008 × SIZE_CLASSipg
2008  -0.121*** -0.121*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
MDp
2008  0.031 0.030 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
S&I 0.093 0.090 
 (0.078) (0.080) 
λ  2.298*** 2.281*** 
 (0.279) (0.281) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 29,170 29,170 
Censored Observations 7,567 7,567 
F-statistic 68.60*** 67.78*** 
Mean VIF 5.07 5.10 
Exogeneity test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.689 0.715 
Selection Equation   
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 
Exclusion restriction (std. error) -0.047** (0.022) -0.046** (0.022) 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered 
at the province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main (continuous) variables 
forming the interaction term are mean-centred. LP denotes LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, 
while W denotes WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach to firms' TFP estimation. λ denotes the inverse Mills 
ratio from the first-stage selection equations (see Table A9 in the Appendix). The exclusion restriction in 
the selection equation captures the average exit rate of firms over the period 1998-2007 at the province 
level. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic refers to KLEIBERGEN and PAAP's (2006) under-
identification test. The variables for industrial clustering and organised crime are instrumented using the 
measure of industrial clustering in 1996 (ICpg
1996), a measure of population density in 1971 (PDp
1971), and 
the ratio of condemned individuals over people reported for crimes dated 2001 (CRp
2001 ), while the 
interaction term among the size classes, industrial clustering and organised crime variables is instrumented 
using the interactions among the instruments and the size classes variable. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Fig. 1. Marginal effects of industrial clustering: exogenous model 
 
Notes: TFP is estimated using WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach. 
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Fig. 2. Marginal effect of industrial clustering: endogenous model 
 
Notes: TFP is estimated using WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach. 
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Fig. 3. Comparison between marginal effects: organised crime vs. extortions 
 
Notes: TFP is estimated using WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach. 
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Fig. 4. Marginal effect of industrial clustering by size classes 
 
Notes: TFP is estimated using WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Sample distribution by industry 
Category Two-digit Industry 
Number of Firms 
a. v. % 
DA 
15 - Food and beverages 3,417 9.30 
16 - Tobacco 0 0.00 
DB 
17 - Textiles 1,951 5.31 
18 - Clothing 1,208 3.29 
DC 19 - Leather 1,246 3.39 
DD 20 - Wood 1,185 3.23 
DE 
21 - Paper products 804 2.19 
22 - Printing and publishing 1,344 3.66 
DF 23 - Coke, oil refinery, nuclear fuel 110 0.30 
DG 24 - Chemicals 1,522 4.14 
DH 25 - Rubber and plastics 1,980 5.39 
DI 26 - Non-metals minerals 2,312 6.29 
DJ 
27 - Metals 816 2.22 
28 - Metal products 8,053 21.92 
DK 29 - Non-electric machinery 4,147 11.29 
DL 
30 - Office equipments and computers 275 0.75 
31 - Electric machinery 1,424 3.88 
32 - Electronic material 458 1.25 
33 - Medical apparels and instruments 841 2.29 
DM 
34 - Vehicles 524 1.43 
35 - Other transportation 457 1.24 
DN 
36 - Furniture 2,663 7.25 
37 - Recycling 0 0.00 
 Total sample 36,737 100.00 
Notes: Firms are classified according to the Ateco 1991 classification of economic 
activities adopted by Istat, which corresponds to the NACE Rev. 1 classification. 
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Table A2. Sample distribution by geographic area 
Geographic Area 
Number of Firms 
a. v. % 
North West 13,825 37.63 
North East 11,180 30.43 
Centre 6,428 17.50 
South and Islands 5,304 14.44 
Total Sample 36,737 100.00 
Notes: North West includes Liguria, Lombardy, Piedmont and Aosta 
Valley; North East includes Emilia Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
Trentino-Alto Adige and Veneto; Centre includes Lazio, Marche, Tuscany 
and Umbria; South includes Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise and Apulia; Islands are Sicily and Sardinia. 
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Table A3. Statistics and correlation matrix of the variables entering the production function 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. vaigpt kigpt ligpt migpt 
vaigpt  
overall 6.388 1.467 -0.166 14.165 
1    between  1.428 0.593 13.795 
within  0.306 1.035 9.933 
kigpt  
overall 6.009 2.110 -6.705 14.895 
0.721 1   between  2.064 -3.646 14.676 
within  0.445 -1.475 11.761 
ligpt  
overall 5.892 1.438 -0.249 13.593 
0.952 0.695 1  between  1.417 0.770 13.532 
within  0.218 0.116 9.252 
migpt  
overall 7.211 1.711 -0.176 16.549 
0.856 0.671 0.819 1 between  1.683 0.804 16.493 
within  0.261 1.780 11.486 
Notes: All variables are log-transformed. vaigpt denotes value added; kigpt denotes the capital input; ligpt denotes 
the labour input; migpt denotes intermediate inputs. Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix refer to a 
sample of 41,484 firms, i.e. 179,233 observations over the period 2007-2011. 
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Table A4. Estimated inputs' elasticities of the production functions 
LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) 
Industry kigpt ligpt No. Obs. 
15 0.077 (0.010) [0.000] 0.663 (0.011) [0.000] 16,876 
17 0.039 (0.011) [0.000] 0.728 (0.012) [0.000] 9,470 
18 0.069 (0.013) [0.000] 0.715 (0.016) [0.000] 5,853 
19 0.058 (0.013) [0.000] 0.735 (0.014) [0.000] 6,120 
20 0.031 (0.013) [0.019] 0.702 (0.014) [0.000] 5,720 
21 0.050 (0.021) [0.015] 0.717 (0.024) [0.000] 3,945 
22 0.036 (0.013) [0.004] 0.723 (0.017) [0.000] 6,289 
23 0.056 (0.084) [0.444] 0.703 (0.048) [0.000] 567 
24 0.051 (0.013) [0.000] 0.734 (0.014) [0.000] 7,700 
25 0.079 (0.014) [0.000] 0.705 (0.013) [0.000] 9,541 
26 0.068 (0.011) [0.000] 0.681 (0.014) [0.000] 11,159 
27 0.063 (0.023) [0.005] 0.725 (0.018) [0.000] 4,197 
28 0.059 (0.005) [0.000] 0.747 (0.005) [0.000] 38,821 
29 0.066 (0.008) [0.000] 0.708 (0.010) [0.000] 20,486 
30 0.063 (0.018) [0.000] 0.793 (0.026) [0.000] 1,301 
31 0.058 (0.011) [0.000] 0.703 (0.016) [0.000] 6,909 
32 0.037 (0.021) [0.079] 0.745 (0.026) [0.000] 2,319 
33 0.077 (0.016) [0.000] 0.715 (0.016) [0.000] 4,122 
34 0.027 (0.021) [0.205] 0.746 (0.020) [0.000] 2,809 
35 0.066 (0.024) [0.006] 0.725 (0.021) [0.000] 2,300 
36 0.059 (0.008) [0.000] 0.703 (0.011) [0.000] 12,729 
WOOLDRIDGE (2009) 
Industry kigpt ligpt No. Obs. 
15 0.075 (0.010) [0.000] 0.666 (0.012) [0.000] 12,965 
17 0.041 (0.011) [0.000] 0.723 (0.013) [0.000] 7,302 
18 0.069 (0.013) [0.000] 0.724 (0.017) [0.000] 4,461 
19 0.056 (0.013) [0.000] 0.735 (0.015) [0.000] 4,686 
20 0.030 (0.012) [0.014] 0.720 (0.015) [0.000] 4,362 
21 0.053 (0.021) [0.010] 0.710 (0.024) [0.000] 3,054 
22 0.038 (0.011) [0.000] 0.735 (0.019) [0.000] 4,793 
23 0.036 (0.065) [0.580] 0.704 (0.057) [0.000] 441 
24 0.053 (0.013) [0.000] 0.752 (0.015) [0.000] 5,973 
25 0.083 (0.013) [0.000] 0.695 (0.013) [0.000] 7,364 
26 0.068 (0.011) [0.000] 0.690 (0.014) [0.000] 8,563 
27 0.062 (0.020) [0.002] 0.730 (0.020) [0.000] 3,263 
28 0.058 (0.005) [0.000] 0.752 (0.006) [0.000] 29,765 
29 0.066 (0.008) [0.000] 0.730 (0.010) [0.000] 15,828 
30 0.057 (0.018) [0.001] 0.804 (0.027) [0.000] 993 
31 0.057 (0.011) [0.000] 0.716 (0.017) [0.000] 5,313 
32 0.040 (0.020) [0.062] 0.753 (0.027) [0.000] 1,783 
33 0.075 (0.017) [0.000] 0.732 (0.019) [0.000] 3,162 
34 0.026 (0.021) [0.209] 0.762 (0.021) [0.000] 2,179 
35 0.064 (0.025) [0.010] 0.741 (0.026) [0.000] 1,750 
36 0.059 (0.009) [0.000] 0.707 (0.012) [0.000] 9,749 
Notes: kigpt denotes the capital input, while ligpt denotes the labour input. TFP is estimated on a sample of 
41,484 firms, i.e. 179,233 observations over the period 2007-2011. Standard errors are shown in parentheses: 
they are bootstrapped in LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, while they are clustered at the firm 
level in WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach. P-values are shown in brackets. 
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics of the dependent and main explanatory variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
∆TFPipg (LP) 29,170 -0.034 0.407 -6.125 5.555 
∆TFPipg (W) 29,170 -0.035 0.407 -6.119 5.559 
TFPipg
2008 (LP) 36,737 1.809 0.495 -4.252 5.404 
TFPipg
2008 (W) 36,737 1.768 0.489 -4.356 5.342 
AGEipg
2008  36,737 2.610 0.915 0 4.875 
SIZEipg
2008  36,737 2.504 1.196 0 5.517 
WAGEipg
2008  36,737 3.211 0.443 -1.749 7.994 
ICpg
2008  36,737 -0.883 1.139 -6.153 1.861 
OCp
2008  36,737 2.888 0.414 1.870 4.104 
MDp
2008  36,737 0.206 0.405 0 1 
Notes: LP denotes LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, while W denotes 
WOOLDRIDGE's (2009) approach to firms' TFP estimation. ∆  denotes the log difference 
between time T and (T − t). 
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Table A6. Correlation matrix of the main explanatory variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
TFPipg
2008 (LP) [1] 1        
TFPipg
2008 (W) [2] 0.995 1       
AGEipg
2008  [3] 0.205 0.201 1      
SIZEipg
2008  [4] 0.458 0.444 0.305 1     
WAGEipg
2008  [5] 0.228 0.210 0.276 0.090 1    
ICpg
2008  [6] 0.071 0.075 0.078 -0.016 0.125 1   
OCp
2008  [7] -0.061 -0.058 -0.066 -0.077 -0.108 0.150 1  
MDp
2008  [8] -0.003 -0.010 0.038 -0.021 0.106 0.546 0.287 1 
Notes: LP denotes LEVINSOHN and PETRIN's (2003) approach, while W denotes WOOLDRIDGE's 
(2009) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 
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Table A7. Selection equation: exogenous model 
Dependent variable SURVIVALipg 
TFP estimation approach LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) WOOLDRIDGE (2009) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) 
TFPipg
2008  0.238*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZEipg
2008  0.212*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.124*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ICpg
2008  0.028** 0.029** 0.028** 0.029** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
OCp
2008  -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.066*** -0.082*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
ICpg
2008 × OCp
2008  ... -0.053*** ... -0.053*** 
  (0.018)  (0.019) 
MDp
2008  -0.075** -0.052 -0.074** -0.052 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
S&I -0.078** -0.063* -0.077** -0.063* 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Exclusion restriction -0.039* -0.049** -0.039* -0.048** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 36,737 36,737 
Wald 𝜒2 1,939.03*** 1,949.71*** 1,941.29*** 1,950.52*** 
Log Likelihood -17,714.48 -17,709.63 -17,713.78 -17,708.00 
Mean VIF 1.72 1.71 1.72 1.71 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-
industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main variables forming the interaction term are mean-
centred in Specification (2). The exclusion restriction in the selection equation captures the average exit rate of firms over 
the period 1998-2007 at the province level. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table A8. Selection equation: endogenous model 
Dependent variable SURVIVALipg 
TFP estimation approach LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) WOOLDRIDGE (2009) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) 
TFPipg
2008  0.238*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
SIZEipg
2008  0.213*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.126*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ICpg
1996  0.027 0.018 0.029 0.020 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) 
PDp
1971  -0.015 -0.006 -0.018 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) 
CRp
2001  0.044 0.059* 0.044 0.060* 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) 
ICpg
1996 × PDp
1971  ... -0.019** ... -0.019** 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
ICpg
1996 × CRp
2001  ... -0.128* ... -0.126* 
  (0.072)  (0.072) 
PDp
1971 × CRp
2001  ... 0.242*** ... 0.240*** 
  (0.077)  (0.077) 
MDp
2008  -0.077** -0.054 -0.076** -0.053 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) 
S&I -0.112*** -0.081*** -0.111*** -0.080** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Exclusion restriction -0.036* -0.038* -0.036* -0.037* 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 36,737 36,737 
Wald 𝜒2 1,931.69*** 1,910.32*** 1,934.42*** 1,912.45*** 
Log Likelihood -17,718.18 -17,706.91 -17,717.41 -17,706.23 
Mean VIF 2.40 2.86 2.40 2.85 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-
industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main variables forming the interaction terms are mean-centred 
in Specification (2). The exclusion restriction in the selection equation captures the average exit rate of firms over the period 
1998-2007 at the province level. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table A9. Selection equation: endogenous model accounting for size effects 
Dependent variable SURVIVALipg 
TFP estimation approach LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) WOOLDRIDGE (2009) 
TFPipg
2008  0.268*** 0.267*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
AGEipg
2008  -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZE_CLASSipg
2008  0.641*** 0.645*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
WAGEipg
2008  0.085*** 0.087*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
ICpg
1996  0.029 0.031 
 (0.033) (0.034) 
PDp
1971  -0.021 -0.024 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
CRp
2001  0.054* 0.055* 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
ICpg
1996 × PDp
1971 × SIZE_CLASSipg
2008  -0.037** -0.037** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
ICpg
1996 × CRp
2001 × SIZE_CLASSipg
2008  -0.276* -0.273* 
 (0.142) (0.142) 
PDp
1971 × CRp
2001 × SIZE_CLASSipg
2008  0.413*** 0.410*** 
 (0.157) (0.157) 
MDp
2008  -0.071* -0.069* 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
S&I -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) 
Exclusion restriction -0.047** -0.046** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 36,737 36,737 
Wald 𝜒2 1,857.22 1,859.78 
Log Likelihood -17,679.73 -17,680.99 
Mean VIF 2.71 2.71 
Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the 
province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. The main (continuous) variables forming the 
interaction terms are mean-centred. The exclusion restriction in the selection equation captures the average exit rate 
of firms over the period 1998-2007 at the province level. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Fig. A1: Spatial distribution of the organised crime variable (quartile map) 
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Fig. A2: Spatial distribution of the types of crime 
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Chapter 3 
 
Agglomeration, Heterogeneity and Firm Productivity* 
 
Giulio Cainelli 
(University of Padova) 
 
Roberto Ganau 
(University of Padova and Queen Mary, University of London) 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates two issues related to the link between agglomeration 
economies and firms' short-run productivity growth. First, the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem is 
examined using distance-based agglomeration measures constructed over a continuous space. 
Second, the hypothesis of firm heterogeneity among spatially agglomerated firms acting as the 
source of local externalities is tested. Results underline spatial nonlinearities of the 
agglomeration forces, which would have been difficult to identify using pre-defined geographic 
units. We find that intra-industry externalities have positive effects over short distances, while 
inter-industry externalities have positive effects at a longer distance on productivity growth. 
Intra-industry externalities seem to decrease with increasing distance, although this decreasing-
with-distance pattern changes if firm heterogeneity (in terms of size and productivity) is taken 
into account. Firm heterogeneity seems to matter for generating intra-industry externalities: 
bigger and more productive firms belonging to the same industry produce more externalities 
resulting in an increasing-with-distance pattern of intra-industry forces. 
 
Keywords: Agglomeration; Heterogeneity; Total Factor Productivity; Italy 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The spatial agglomeration of economic activities is a remarkable feature of the economic 
geography of many countries, regions and local systems (PORTER, 1990). Silicon Valley 
(SAXENIAN, 1994), carpet manufacturing industry in Dalton, Georgia, (KRUGMAN, 1991) 
and the industrial districts in Italy (BECATTINI, 1990; CAINELLI, 2008) are well-known 
examples of a general and complex phenomenon. 
Since MARSHALL's (1920) seminal contribution, investigations of the determinants and 
main features of geographically agglomerated areas have proliferated in the fields of economics 
and business studies, and have identified three different mechanisms which may induce firms to 
co-localise: the availability of skilled labour (labour market pooling), access to specialised 
suppliers (shared inputs) and the spread of inter-firm knowledge spillovers (GLAESER et al., 
1992; HENDERSON et al., 1995). The theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that firms 
located in an agglomerated area benefit from these local externalities, which contribute to 
reductions in production costs. Several studies have attempted to understand whether 
agglomeration forces (in particular localisation and diversification economies) play a role in 
explaining firms' economic performance, in particular measured as Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP, henceforth). However, starting from the contributions of DE LUCIO et al. (2002) and 
CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004), the empirical results tend to be mixed and not conclusive. 
This literature is characterised by two main issues. The first is the use of exogenously pre-
defined geographic units of analysis to capture agglomeration phenomena. However, Standard 
Metropolitan Areas (SMAs), Local Labour Systems (LLSs) and administrative units (e.g. NUTS-
2 or NUTS-3 regions) do not necessarily coincide with real economic areas, and the 
discretionary choice of the space may introduce statistical biases related to the level of 
aggregation and the geographic scale (ARBIA, 1989). This is generally known as the Modifiable 
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Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) and refers to the arbitrary choice of the spatial partition used to 
analyse geographic-based phenomena (ARBIA, 2001).
1
 
The second issue is firm heterogeneity. Theoretical and empirical studies neglect this issue 
and assume that firms operating in an agglomerated space are homogeneous (ALCACER and 
CHUNG, 2007), i.e. they assume that all the firms located in a given geographic area contribute 
in the same way, and with the same intensity, to the production of the agglomeration externalities 
in the local system. SHAVER and FLYER (2000) underline that the theoretical models proposed 
by ROMER (1986), DAVID and ROSENBLOOM (1990) and RAUCH (1993) make this 
assumption (or assume that firms are "small" relative to the industry output), thus assuming also 
that firms do not have differential effects on externalities. However, firms differ not only in 
terms of the technological endowments and human capital stock but also in terms of their 
capability to produce tangible and intangible externalities. It follows that a firm cannot be seen 
only as a "receiver" of local externalities, it is also a potential "source" of these local effects. For 
instance, ALCACER and CHUNG (2007, p. 761) note that "firms are neither equally equipped 
to receive knowledge nor homogeneously willing to serve as sources of spillovers". 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate. It analyses a large sample of Italian 
manufacturing firms to empirically investigate the relationship between agglomeration 
(localisation- and diversification-type) externalities and firms' short-run productivity growth, 
taking account of these two issues. First, the MAUP issue is tackled using distance-based 
agglomeration measures computed for each firm in the sample over a continuous space. We next 
perform a hierarchical cluster analysis in order to avoid (or at least to limit) an arbitrary ad hoc 
identification of the distance bands (as done, on the contrary, in previous studies, e.g. CAINELLI 
and LUPI, 2010). Second, the hypothesis of firm heterogeneity is explicitly tested considering 
the firms located in the agglomerative space as sources of local externalities. Specifically, the 
role of firm heterogeneity is tested using weighted agglomeration measures constructed to 
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account for the size and (estimated) TFP of neighbour firms within each distance band. This 
allows us to capture the phenomenon of "agglomerative heterogeneity" in terms of firm-specific 
characteristics (such as size and TFP) which proxy for firms' differential effects in the production 
of agglomeration externalities. The idea is that spatial agglomeration forces may depend not only 
on the number of co-localised firms (i.e. critical mass effect) but also on firm-specific 
characteristics since firms may contribute differently to the production of local externalities 
depending on their characteristics. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses the literature related to 
these two issues. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology adopted. Section 4 reports and 
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1. Agglomeration and firm productivity 
The literature on agglomeration economies identifies two main forms of local externalities 
arising from the geographic concentration of economic activities, i.e. localisation externalities 
and diversification externalities. Localisation externalities arise from the spatial concentration of 
firms operating in the same industry, and their relevance dates back to MARSHALL's (1920) 
contribution on the industrial district concept. The key idea is that firms located close to other 
firms operating in the same industry benefit from reduced transportation costs, emergence of 
external-scale economies, availability of specialised workers and suppliers, and diffusion of 
intra-industry knowledge and technological spillovers which reduce economic costs, thus 
fostering efficiency and growth (GLAESER et al., 1992; DURANTON and PUGA, 2004; 
MARTIN et al., 2011). Conversely, diversification externalities arise from the geographic 
concentration of firms operating in different industries. The main advantages derived from 
location in a highly diversified environment are related to availability of inputs from suppliers 
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operating at different stages in the production chain, and cross-fertilisation among existing ideas 
and technologies favoured by the variety in the local economic structure (JACOBS, 1969). 
Empirical analysis of the role played by these types of agglomeration economies on 
productivity and firms' TFP growth has become especially relevant in the last decade (e.g. DE 
LUCIO et al., 2002; HENDERSON, 2003; CINGANO and SCHIVARDI, 2004; CAINELLI and 
LUPI, 2010; MARTIN et al., 2011, CAINELLI et al., 2015a; CAINELLI et al., 2015b). 
However, similar to investigations of the impact of these agglomeration forces on employment 
growth (e.g. GLAESER et al., 1992; HENDERSON et al., 1995; CAINELLI and LEONCINI, 
1999; USAI and PACI, 2003), the empirical results from this research strand are rather puzzling. 
For example, DE LUCIO et al. (2002) find a positive effect of industrial variety and a U-shaped 
effect of localisation externalities on labour productivity at province level in Spain. Their results 
show that low levels of localisation reduce productivity growth while high levels foster it. 
HENDERSON (2003) finds strong positive effects of localisation economies on productivity at 
plant level on US high-tech industries, but not in machinery industries, and he finds little 
evidence of diversification economies. CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004) find a positive 
effect of localisation, but a negligible effect of diversification externalities on TFP growth at the 
LLS level in Italy. The same study finds a negative effect of localisation and a positive effect of 
diversification externalities on employment growth, thus confirming the results of GLAESER et 
al. (1992). MARTIN et al. (2011) find that French firms' productivity benefits from localisation, 
but not from diversification economies. However, the benefits from industrial clustering 
(although highly significant from a statistical point of view) are quite modest in magnitude. 
CAINELLI et al. (2015a) adopt a panel smooth transition regression model to analyse the 
nonlinear effects of agglomeration forces on Italian firms and find that localisation and 
diversification externalities materialise for values of, respectively, intra-industry agglomeration 
and extra-sector diversity above a certain threshold. FAZIO and MALTESE (2015) find that the 
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effect of agglomeration forces on Italian small and medium sized firms' performance varies 
depending on whether the level of or growth of TFP is taken into account: TFP levels are 
influenced mostly by localisation externalities, while TFP growth is higher in the presence of 
diversification (and Porterian/competition) externalities. Finally, CAINELLI et al. (2015b) find 
that the effect of localisation externalities is stronger than the effect of diversification 
externalities (i.e. industry related variety) on Italian manufacturing firms' TFP. 
 
2.2. The MAUP 
Previous contributions capture agglomeration forces using pre-defined geographic units of 
analysis such as SMAs, LLSs and NUTS-2 or NUTS-3 administrative units. These geographic 
units can vary in size and shape, and their boundaries are arbitrary pre-defined independently of 
the criteria adopted for their definition. In other words, standard spatial units of analysis do not 
necessarily coincide with real economic areas, and the discretionary choice of the space may 
introduce statistical biases related to the level of aggregation and geographic scale (ARBIA, 
1989). This issue is known as the MAUP and is related to the arbitrary choice of the spatial 
partition used to analyse geographic-based phenomena (ARBIA, 2001). 
The MAUP helps to explain the varying results in empirical works analysing the 
relationship between agglomeration forces and firms' TFP. These differences may be due to the 
different geographic units considered as well as the different measures of agglomeration 
employed (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2003; BEAUDRY and SCHIFFAUEROVA, 2009; 
BURGER et al., 2010). The geographic scale at which agglomeration phenomena are analysed is 
a critical issue since agglomeration forces may produce different effects at different spatial scales 
(SCOTT, 1982; OLSEN, 2002; VAN OORT, 2004; BURGER et al., 2010). Moreover, their 
effects are likely to attenuate over space (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2008; CAINELLI and 
LUPI, 2010). This is probable when distinguishing between localisation and diversification 
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externalities, as well as between market- and knowledge-based externalities within each type of 
agglomeration force (MARTIN, 1999). 
The literature proposes alternative solutions to mitigate the MAUP in the case of 
geographic-based phenomena. Some contributions suggest controlling for extra-region spillovers 
through the inclusion of spatially-lagged agglomeration variables computed within 
administrative areas or labour market regions (e.g. VAN OORT, 2004, 2007; BURGER et al., 
2010). Others propose a multilevel approach to enable simultaneous modelling at the micro and 
macro levels of analysis (e.g. VAN OORT et al., 2012; SANFILIPPO and SERIC, 2014). 
ARBIA (2001) suggested a new solution using micro-geographic data, thus moving the 
analysis from the meso- to the micro-geographic level. The idea is to consider the firm as the 
spatial unit of analysis and to treat the space as continuous in order to avoid the use of pre-
defined spatial partitions. Along similar lines, some authors propose the use of distance-based 
measures to identify the geographic concentration of economic activities (ARBIA and ESPA, 
1996; DURANTON and OVERMAN, 2005; MARCON and PUECH, 2010). These 
contributions exploit spatial statistics (e.g. probability or cumulative density functions), which 
use pair distances between observations (i.e. individual firms) in order to evaluate at which 
geographic scale a particular industry shows a clustering pattern. This allows industrial 
clustering to be identified in the space regardless of pre-defined geographic partitions. 
CAINELLI and LUPI (2010) and GABRIELE et al. (2013) extended this approach by 
constructing agglomeration measures over a continuous space. The main intuition in these two 
works is to use a continuous approach to the space, rather than arbitrary pre-defined spatial units 
of analysis, so that the sample of firms is treated as a spatial points pattern with each firm 
representing an individual point identified by its geographic coordinates. Distance-based 
agglomeration measures are computed within continuous distance bands identified around each 
firm in the sample to evaluate the space component of the agglomeration phenomenon. 
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CAINELLI and LUPI (2010) analyse a sample of about 23,000 Italian manufacturing firms 
observed over the period 1998-2001, and find that localisation effects are positive within 2 km, 
but decreasing over distance. On the contrary, diversification effects are negative for distances 
up to 10 km, but positive between 10 km and 30 km. GABRIELE et al. (2013) analyse a sample 
of about 8,300 Italian manufacturing firms observed over the period 1996-2004, and find that 
small sized firms' growth is fostered by localisation externalities, while medium and large sized 
firms benefit more from diversification externalities. However, they do not find evidence of 
spatial nonlinearities of agglomeration forces. 
 
2.3. Heterogeneous agglomeration 
Theoretical and empirical economics contributions tend to overlook the possibility of firm 
heterogeneity, i.e. they assume firm homogeneity in the agglomerative space. However, as 
SHAVER and FLYER (2000, p. 1175) underline, "firms not only capture benefits from 
agglomeration economies, but they also contribute to agglomeration economies". In other words, 
the hypothesis of firm homogeneity assumes that all the firms located in a given geographic area 
contribute in the same way, and with the same intensity, to the production of agglomeration 
externalities in the local system. It is not surprising that "firms operating in industrial districts 
have been traditionally modelled as undifferentiated and characterized by low variance in their 
strategies and business models" (MUNARI et al., 2012, p. 430). However, firms differ not only 
across countries and industries but also across regions and local systems within the same country 
(SAXENIAN, 1994; ALMEIDA and KOGUT, 1999). Firms can differ in their ability to identify, 
absorb and utilise new knowledge and information (ALCACER and CHUNG, 2014). According 
to absorptive capacity theory (COHEN and LEVINTHAL, 1990), this is true both when firms act 
as "receivers" of local externalities and when they act as potential "sources" of local 
externalities: firms co-localised in a given geographic area have specific characteristics which 
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may influence the way they contribute to the production of tangible and intangible externalities 
(ALCACER and CHUNG, 2007). For example, firms with more technological endowments may 
generate more externalities (e.g. local knowledge spillovers) than firms with smaller 
technological endowments. Similarly, firms employing workers with higher levels of education 
may generate more local externalities than firms employing less highly educated workers. It 
follows that this form of "firm heterogeneity in technological capabilities" (WANG, 2015) may 
contribute differently to the production of agglomeration externalities. This strand of the 
business studies suggest that the agglomeration phenomenon cannot be seen only as a 
mechanism of "appropriation" of local externalities; it is also a mechanism for their generation. 
The following example helps our understanding of what firm heterogeneity means in this 
context. Consider two geographic areas, 𝐴 and 𝐵, with the same surface (i.e. 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐴 = 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐵), 
and suppose that the same number of firms is located in both these two geographic areas (i.e. 
𝑁𝐴 = 𝑁𝐵). Then, suppose that the two populations of firms differ in some specific 
characteristics, e.g. size and TFP, such that, on average, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? > 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝐵 and 𝑇𝐹𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅𝐴 > 𝑇𝐹𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐵. 
Under the assumption of firm homogeneity, computation of a simple agglomeration index 
capturing the density of firms in a geographic area would lead to 𝑁𝐴 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐴⁄ = 𝑁𝐵 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐵⁄ , even 
though the firms located in area 𝐴 are, on average, bigger and more productive than those located 
in area 𝐵. Therefore, accounting for firm heterogeneity in computing agglomeration indexes may 
better capture the agglomeration phenomenon as a mechanism generating local externalities if it 
is true that firm-specific characteristics influence the way firms contribute to this externality 
generation process. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. The dataset 
Our empirical analysis employs an Italian firm-level balance sheet dataset covering the 
period 2003-2012, which is drawn from the AIDA databank (Bureau Van Dijk). The analysis 
consists of three main steps. First, we estimate TFP at firm-level using the approach proposed by 
WOOLDRIDGE (2009); second, we conduct a hierarchical cluster analysis to identify the 
geographic scale at which agglomeration forces emerge and produce their effects, and then 
compute agglomeration measures; third, we estimate a productivity growth equation to test 
whether and how agglomeration forces influence firm productivity growth in the short-run, and 
to test the hypothesis of firm heterogeneity in the context of agglomeration externalities. 
The analysis is conducted using three different (nested) samples in order to maximise the 
sample size in each step of the empirical exercise. The original sample was cleaned to remove 
firms with missing or inconsistent data on value added, tangible assets, total labour costs and 
intermediate inputs. We excluded firms reporting a value added-to-turnover ratio ≥ 0 and ≤ 1, 
and firms observed for less than seven consecutive years during the period 2003-2012, obtaining 
an unbalanced panel of 69,933 firms observed over the period 2003-2012, which we use to 
estimate firms' TFP. 
Following MARTIN et al. (2011), agglomeration measures are constructed using sample 
rather than census data. We conducted a further cleaning of the sample, removing firms with no 
information on longitude and latitude coordinates (or an exact address). It is necessary to know 
the exact geographic location of each firm in order to compute the agglomeration measures. We 
also excluded firms with missing data for number of employees in order to construct weighted 
agglomeration variables in terms of size (DURANTON and OVERMAN, 2005; GABRIELE et 
al., 2013) and estimated TFP, to test the hypothesis of firm heterogeneity. The year 2009 was 
selected to construct the agglomeration variables since this year has the largest number of valid 
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observations, i.e. firms reporting data on geographic coordinates, number of employees and 
estimated TFP. This second cleaning procedure led to a sample of 41,574 firms observed in the 
year 2009, which we use to construct the agglomeration measures. 
Starting from this last sample, we performed a third cleaning procedure to construct the 
final dataset to be employed in the empirical analysis to examine the relationship between 
agglomeration forces and firms' productivity growth. We excluded firms with missing or 
inconsistent data on net income and annual depreciation for year 2009, and firms with missing 
data for year of establishment, resulting in a final sample of 28,597 firms observed over the 
period 2009-2012. 
 
3.2. The econometric analysis 
3.2.1. TFP estimation 
The first step in the empirical analysis employs an unbalanced panel of 69,933 firms 
observed over the period 2003-2012 to estimate firms' TFP. This is estimated as the residual of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function which can be specified as follows in logarithmic form: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (1) 
 
where 𝛽0 represents the mean efficiency level across firms and over time; 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑖𝑡 denote 
value added, capital input and labour input of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, respectively; 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is an independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) component which represents productivity shocks not affecting 
the firm's decision process. Firm-level productivity can be specified as 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 is a state variable-transmitted component indicating that part of the firm's productivity which 
is known by the firm and which affects its decision process (OLLEY and PAKES, 1996). The 
estimated productivity is then computed solving for 𝜔𝑖𝑡 as follows (VAN BEVEREN, 2012): 
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?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡                                                                                                      (2) 
 
The simple fixed effects (FE) estimation of firms' TFP is likely to produce biased estimates 
of the inputs' elasticities, due mainly to endogeneity of inputs caused by correlation between the 
level of inputs chosen by the firm (based on its prior beliefs on productivity levels) and 
unobservable productivity shocks (SYVERSON, 2011; VAN BEVEREN, 2012). Based on 
OLLEY and PAKES's (1996) contribution, LEVINSOHN and PETRIN (2003) proposed a two-
step semi-parametric approach which uses intermediate inputs (𝑚𝑖𝑡) as a proxy for unobserved 
productivity in order to solve the simultaneity problem between input choices and productivity 
shocks. However, a major limitation of this approach is the collinearity between labour and 
intermediate inputs: identification of the labour input in the first-step estimation requires some 
variation in the data independent of the intermediate input (VAN BEVEREN, 2012). Perfect 
collinearity of the labour input arises in the absence of this variation, such that the labour 
coefficient results not identified in the first-step estimation (ACKERBERG et al., 2006). 
WOOLDRIDGE (2009) proposes to estimate 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑙 within a Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) framework to correct for possible collinearity between the labour and 
intermediate inputs. This approach consists of the simultaneous estimation of two equations with 
the same dependent variable and input variables, but different sets of instruments so that the 
coefficients of the input variables in the first equation are identified exploiting information from 
the second equation. Given a production function (1) and assuming that 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is not correlated with 
current and past values of capital, labour and intermediate inputs, and restriction of the dynamics 
of the unobserved productivity component 𝜔𝑖𝑡, WOOLDRIDGE (2009) proposes the following 
two equations: 
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{
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                          
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑞[𝑔(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1)] + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡
                                                              (3) 
 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑡 denotes productivity innovations and is correlated with 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡, but is uncorrelated 
with 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and past values of 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡. The function 𝑓(∙) can be specified as a low-degree 
polynomial of the order of up to three, while the productivity process 𝑞(∙) can be defined as a 
random walk with drift such that 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡. Then, equation (1) can be re-specified 
as follows (GALUŠČÁK and LĺZAL, 2011): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝜏) + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                           (4) 
 
and can be estimated using an instrumental-variable (IV) approach using polynomials in 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 
and 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 of the order of up to three approximating for 𝑓(∙), and 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 and 
polynomials containing 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 of the order of up to three as instruments for 𝑙𝑖𝑡 
(PETRIN and LEVINSOHN, 2012). 
This approach is employed to estimate twenty-three production functions at the two-digit 
industry level. Value added (𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡) is used as output in the production function and is deflated 
with the corresponding two-digit production price index; total tangible assets (𝐾𝑖𝑡) are used as 
capital input and are deflated with the corresponding two-digit capital deflator; total labour cost 
(𝐿𝑖𝑡) is used as labour input and is deflated with the corresponding two-digit wage index; 
intermediate inputs (𝑀𝑖𝑡) are defined (at current prices) as the sum of services, raw materials and 
consumptions, and are deflated with an intermediate consumption index. The deflators are 
calculated using Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics) data, and the reference year for 
depreciation is 2002. Appendix Table A1 reports some descriptive statistics and the correlation 
matrix of the variables entering the production functions; Appendix Table A2 reports the 
estimated elasticities of the capital and labour inputs. 
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3.2.2. Identifying the geographic scale of the agglomeration forces 
One of the contributions of this paper concerns the identification of the geographic scale at 
which agglomeration forces are likely to emerge and produce their effects. Following 
CAINELLI and LUPI (2010) and GABRIELE et al. (2013), agglomeration measures are 
constructed over a continuous space. The main idea is to use a continuous approach to the space, 
rather than arbitrary pre-defined spatial units of analysis, such that the sample of firms is treated 
as a spatial points pattern in which each firm represents an individual point identified by its 
geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude). Distance-based agglomeration measures are 
computed within continuous and non-overlapping distance bands, identified around each firm in 
the sample, to evaluate the space component of the agglomeration phenomena, i.e. the presence 
of potential geographic nonlinearities of the agglomeration externalities. Then, specific 
characteristics (i.e. size and TFP) of the neighbour firms located within each distance band are 
used to construct weighted agglomeration measures in order to test whether the heterogeneity of 
neighbour firms matters for the generation of agglomeration externalities. 
Fig. 1 depicts the adopted approach. Consider a representative firm 𝑖 located in a given 
area, and suppose to draw a series of circles around it. Then, the agglomeration variables are 
constructed considering the neighbour firms 𝑗 located within each non-overlapping distance band 
defined by an increasing radius 𝑟. 
Identification of the geographic scale of the agglomeration forces and construction of the 
agglomeration variables, are based on a sample of 41,574 firms observed in year 2009. Their 
distribution by industry and NUTS-1 geographic area is reported in Appendix Table A3. 
The first step to identify the distance bands within which the agglomeration phenomena are 
captured is to specify a maximum threshold distance. Following CAINELLI and LUPI (2010), 
this threshold value is set equal to 30 km, i.e. a radius of 30 km represents the maximum distance 
(defined around each firm in the sample) within which agglomeration forces are hypothesised to 
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emerge. There are three main reasons supporting the chosen maximum distance value: first, by 
definition, agglomeration economies are local and spatially bounded forces; second, 30 km is not 
an excessive distance for cross-firm spillover effects to materialise; third, a radius of 30 km gives 
a surface which is close to the average area of the Italian provinces (NUTS-3 regions), which are 
usually adopted as geographic units of analysis in agglomeration studies.
2
 
Setting this maximum distance value allows seven continuous and non-overlapping 
distance bands of increasing radius 𝑟 (𝑑𝑟) to be specified for the following intervals: 0 ≤ 𝑑2 ≤
2, 2 < 𝑑3 ≤ 5, 5 < 𝑑5 ≤ 10, 10 < 𝑑5 ≤ 15, 15 < 𝑑5 ≤ 20, 20 < 𝑑5 ≤ 25 and 25 < 𝑑5 ≤ 30. 
With the exception of the first two bands, which are split around a radius of 2 km following 
CAINELLI and LUPI (2010) who find significant agglomeration externalities within 2 km, these 
preliminary distance bands are constructed based on equidistant intervals of 5 km. 
Then, we compute a density measure counting the number of neighbour firms 𝑗 located 
within each distance band defined around the reference firm 𝑖 (given the Euclidean distance 
between the reference firm 𝑖 and each neighbour 𝑗), for each firm in the sample (without 
accounting for the industry to which the firms belong, i.e. without distinguishing between 
localisation- and diversification-type externalities) as follows: 
 
?̂?𝑥𝑖(𝑑𝑟) =
𝑒(𝑥𝑖) [∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
]
𝐴𝑥𝑖(𝑑𝑟)
                                                                                           (5) 
 
where 𝑑𝑟 denotes the distance band (i.e. the circle) with radius 𝑟; the denominator is the (net) 
area of the circle centred in the reference firm 𝑖, which is denoted by 𝑥𝑖 as a spatial point 
identified by its geographic coordinates; the numerator is the sum of all the neighbour firms 𝑗 
(denoted by 𝑥𝑗 as spatial points) within the distance band 𝑑𝑟 according to their Euclidean 
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distance from 𝑥𝑖 (‖𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗‖); 1(∙) is an indicator function; and 𝑒(𝑥𝑖) denotes RIPLEY's (1977) 
edge correction, which is defined as follows: 
 
𝑒(𝑥𝑖) =
2𝜋𝑟
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ[𝑐(𝑥𝑖, 𝑟) ∩𝑊]
                                                                                                                  (6) 
 
where the numerator defines the circumference of the circle with radius 𝑟; the denominator is the 
length of the overlap between the circle 𝑐 centred in 𝑥𝑖 with radius 𝑟 and the window 𝑊 defining 
the study region (i.e. Italy). This correction term allows one to account for edge effects which 
may influence the agglomeration phenomenon around firms located close to the boundaries of 
the study region. In fact, those firms may be surrounded by fewer neighbour firms with respect 
to other firms located at longer distances from the study region's boundaries. 
The subsequent step consists of a hierarchical cluster analysis to identify the distance 
bands which are closer in terms of density. The idea is to reduce redundancy among the seven 
distance bands previously constructed, thus identifying a reduced number of distance bands 
which may be meaningful to capture spatial agglomeration forces. Although the maximum 
distance value of 30 km and the seven distance bands identified within it were specified 
randomly, the use of a statistical approach to identify the distances at which agglomeration 
phenomena may matter and show geographic nonlinearities, represents a step forward with 
respect to previous contributions with analyses based exclusively on arbitrary distances 
(although avoiding the use of pre-defined geographic partitions). 
Fig. 2 plots the result of the cluster analysis performed using the un-weighted pair-group 
method of average and suggests the presence of three distance clusters : 0 to 5 km (0 ≤ 𝑑5 ≤ 5), 
5 to 15 km (5 < 𝑑10 ≤ 15) and 15 to 30 km (15 < 𝑑15 ≤ 30). 
Comparison of the surfaces of the three distance bands identified (see Table 1) with the 
average surfaces of the usually employed spatial units of analysis for the Italian case (see Table 
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2) suggests that the three distance bands identified provide a relatively good partition of the 
continuous space in order to capture potential geographic nonlinearities of the agglomeration 
forces, which could not be captured using standard (pre-defined) spatial partitions. In fact, the 
(cumulative) areas of the three distance bands encompass the average areas of municipalities, 
local labour markets and provinces. 
 
3.2.3. Agglomeration and firm heterogeneity 
Intra-industry (i.e. localisation-type) and inter-industry (i.e. diversification-type) 
externalities are captured through absolute density measures which are computed within the 
three distance bands previously identified. Specifically, two main types of agglomeration 
variables are constructed: un-weighted and weighted. Un-weighted agglomeration measures 
represent the baseline variables since they are built on the hypothesis of firm homogeneity 
(explicitly or implicitly) assumed in previous contributions. In fact, they are defined considering 
the number of neighbour firms located within a certain distance, without accounting for their 
specific characteristics. In contrast, weighted agglomeration measures are constructed accounting 
for neighbour firms' characteristics, i.e. accounting for their heterogeneity. It follows that 
weighted intra- and inter-industry agglomeration variables allow us to test the hypothesis of firm 
heterogeneity, i.e. whether firm-specific characteristics influence the way firms located within 
the agglomerated area contribute to the production of the agglomeration externalities. Therefore, 
comparison of the estimated coefficients of un-weighted and weighted agglomeration variables 
should allow us to evaluate whether agglomeration externalities are driven by a "critical-mass 
effect" or by specific characteristics of the co-localised firms, i.e. whether externalities depend 
on the number of firms or on their specific characteristics. 
Two firm-specific characteristics are considered as weights: size, defined in terms of 
employment, and (estimated) TFP. Employment-based indexes have been proposed in the 
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literature to proxy for localisation (e.g. specialisation indexes) and diversification (e.g. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes) externalities (e.g. GLAESER et al., 1992; HENDERSON, 2003; 
CINGANO and SCHIVARDI, 2004). These measures are generally constructed considering 
employment of an industry-area pair with respect to the national dimension or total employment 
in an industry or area. Contributions using employment-based agglomeration variables implicitly 
consider the role of firm heterogeneity in the agglomeration context, although they make no 
assumptions about the role of firm-specific characteristics in the generation of agglomeration 
externalities, nor do they compare agglomeration variables constructed with and without 
considering the employment dimension. Also, employment-based variables computed within 
spatial units of different sizes do not allow us to capture the role of firm employment in the 
process of generating agglomeration externalities because this is likely to be influenced by the 
size of the local system: a larger area is likely to host a higher number of firms so the overall 
number of employees in a given area may depend on its surface. However, the use of areas 
characterised by the same surface may facilitate comparison between standard and employment-
based agglomeration variables, under the assumption that firms are homogeneously distributed 
over the space, and also identification of the role ascribable to co-localised firms' employment 
size in the production of agglomeration externalities. Employment-based measures are proposed 
by GABRIELE et al. (2013) in the context of distance-based agglomeration variables. However, 
their analysis neither assumes firm heterogeneity, nor compares the results of un-weighted and 
weighted variables. 
The second weighting component is firm TFP; this paper is the first attempt to account for 
this dimension when constructing agglomeration variables. TFP-weighted agglomeration 
variables are a better proxy to capture the role of firm heterogeneity in the generation of 
agglomeration externalities than size-weighted variables. The firm's TFP is correlated with its 
technological endowment and, consequently, its (potential) ability to produce externalities. On 
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the contrary, size-weighted variables can be only a rough proxy for the human capital 
endowment of co-localised firms if the skill dimension of employment cannot be identified. 
Agglomeration variables are constructed for each firm in the sample and within each 
distance band as follows: 
 
?̂?𝑥𝑖
𝑠(𝑑𝑟) =
𝑒(𝑥𝑖
𝑠) [∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑔‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)𝑤(𝑥𝑗
𝑔)𝑁𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
]
𝐴𝑥𝑖
𝑠(𝑑𝑟)
                                                                          (7) 
 
where 𝑑𝑟 denotes the distance band with radius 𝑟 defined in km, such that 0 ≤ 𝑑5 ≤ 5, 5 <
𝑑10 ≤ 15 and 15 < 𝑑15 ≤ 30; the denominator is the (net) area of the distance band (i.e. the 
circle) centred in the reference firm 𝑖 belonging to the two-digit industry 𝑠 (𝑥𝑖
𝑠); the numerator is 
the sum of all the neighbour firms 𝑗 belonging to the two-digit industry 𝑔 (𝑥𝑗
𝑔
) and located 
within a certain distance band, with 𝑠 = 𝑔 in the intra-industry (i.e. localisation-type) case and 
𝑠 ≠ 𝑔 in the inter-industry (i.e. diversification-type) case; the term ‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑔‖ denotes the 
Euclidean distance between the reference firm 𝑖 and each neighbour firm 𝑗; 1(∙) is an indicator 
function; the term 𝑤(𝑥𝑗
𝑔) denotes the weighting scheme capturing the heterogeneity of the 
neighbour firms within each distance band, such that 𝑤(∙) = 1 in the un-weighted case, 𝑤(∙) =
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗
𝑔
 in the size-weighted case and 𝑤(∙) = 𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑗
𝑔
 in the TFP-weighted case (where 𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑗
𝑔
 denotes 
the TFP of a firm in level); and the term 𝑒(𝑥𝑖
𝑠) denotes RIPLEY's (1977) edge correction, which 
is defined as in equation (6).
3
 
Therefore, two forms of agglomeration externalities are captured through un-weighted and 
size- and TFP-weighted agglomeration variables: intra-industry externalities arising from the 
spatial concentration of firms operating in the same industry as the reference firm (i.e. 
localisation-type forces), and inter-industry externalities arising from the spatial concentration of 
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firms operating in industries different from the industry of the reference firm (i.e. diversification-
type forces). 
 
3.2.4. The growth equation 
The empirical exercise is based on the estimation of a simple productivity growth equation 
specified as follows: 
 
∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼 +∑𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑠
𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
+∑𝛿1𝑑
𝐷
𝑑=1
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑠
𝑑 +∑𝛿2𝑑
𝐷
𝑑=1
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠
𝑑 + 𝜸𝑐 + 𝒗𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠                     (8) 
 
where ∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠
2012 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠
2009 denotes the productivity growth of firm 𝑖 operating in the 
two-digit industry 𝑠 over the period 2009-2012, where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠
2009 and 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠
2012 denote the 
estimated TFP (in logarithmic form) from equation (4); the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑠
𝑘  of log-transformed firm-
specific control variables includes the beginning-of-the period TFP (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠), the number of 
employees at the beginning of the growth period (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑠), the difference between the year 2009 
and the year of a firm's set up (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑠), the ratio between acquired services and total acquired 
inputs in 2009 to proxy for services outsourcing (𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑠) and the cash flow defined 
as net income plus annual depreciation over tangible assets at the beginning of the growth period 
(𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑠); the terms 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑠
𝑑  and 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠
𝑑  capture the log-transformed variables for, 
respectively, intra- and inter-industry agglomeration externalities computed within the three 
distance bands; the term 𝜸𝑐 refers to a set of industrial category dummy variables; the term 𝒗𝑚 
refers to a set of macro-geographic dummy variables defined at the NUTS-1 level; the term 𝜀𝑖𝑠 
denotes the error term. Some descriptive statistics and the correlation matrices among the firm-
level and agglomeration variables are reported in Appendix Tables A4 to A9. Appendix Table 
A10 compares the sample used for the empirical exercise with the population of Italian 
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manufacturing firms. Appendix Table A11 reports the sample distribution by industry, and 
defines the industrial categories included in the productivity growth equation. 
 
3.2.5. The identification strategy 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equation (8) is likely to be affected by 
sample selection since productivity growth is observed only for the sub-sample of firms that 
survived during the growth period (e.g. SLEUTJES et al., 2012). Therefore, we estimate a two-
step sample-selection model à la HECKMAN (1979) to account for firm exit over the period 
2009-2012. A first-stage reduced-form selection equation is estimated by Maximum Likelihood 
specifying the dependent variable as a dummy (𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑠) which equals one if the firm 
observed at the beginning of the growth period (i.e. year 2009) is observed also at the end of the 
growth period (i.e. year 2012), and zero otherwise. The selection equation is identified including 
on its right-hand side the explanatory variables in equation (8) plus an exclusion restriction 
(𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑠) capturing the average entry/exit rate over the period 2006-2008, and defined 
at the two-digit industry level. The idea is that a high value of this variable is likely to be 
associated with a low (current) probability of firm survival, without necessarily being associated 
with the surviving firms' economic performance.
4
 
Having estimated the selection equation on the whole sample of firms based on a Probit 
model, the computed inverse Mills ratio (𝜆) is added to the right-hand side of the productivity 
growth equation to correct for the sample selection bias. Thus, the augmented version of 
equation (8) is estimated via OLS for the sub-sample of firms which survived during the period 
2009-2012 (WOOLDRIDGE, 2010). 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimated productivity growth equation using un-weighted 
and size- and TFP-weighted agglomeration variables (the results of the first-stage selection 
equations are reported in Appendix Table A12). The exclusion restriction identifying the 
selection equations shows negative and statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that a 
firm's survival probability is negatively affected by the level of industry-specific turbulence, 
while the estimated inverse Mills ratio (𝜆) shows positive and significant coefficients. Therefore, 
the results suggest the need to correct for sample selection. 
The results of the un-weighted agglomeration variables (see Table 3, Column 1) support 
the findings in CAINELLI and LUPI (2010). We find a positive effect of intra-industry 
externalities within 15 km which is decreasing in the distance, while the short-distance negative 
effect of inter-industry externalities turns positive at a greater distance. This result highlights a 
sort of substitution effect between localisation- and diversification-type forces: firms' TFP 
growth benefits from industry similarity at short distances, while it seems to benefit from 
industry diversification at a greater distance. 
However, the decreasing-with-distance positive effect of intra-industry externalities 
changes significantly if firm-specific characteristics are taken into account when capturing the 
agglomeration phenomenon (see Table 3, Columns 2 and 3). In fact, the positive effect of intra-
industry externalities turns increasing with distance when firm-specific characteristics are 
accounted for, and this pattern is particularly strong when the size of the neighbour firms is 
considered. This means that positive externalities related to localisation forces tend to be higher 
the bigger and more productive the neighbour firms operating in the same industry. This result 
suggests also that intra-industry externalities do not attenuate over distance. 
It seems that the pattern characterising inter-industry externalities is unrelated to the 
specific characteristics of the neighbour firms: un-weighted and weighted diversification-type 
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forces have a negative effect on the firm's TFP growth at short distances (up to 15 km), but a 
positive effect at larger distances regardless of the weighting scheme considered. 
In addition, the substitution effect characterising intra- and inter-industry externalities 
seems to attenuate at larger distances if neighbour firms' size and TFP are taken into account 
when capturing agglomeration forces. These results suggest that, effectively, co-localised firms 
participate in the process of generating local externalities and, also, that their contribution 
depends on their characteristics: bigger and more productive firms seem to contribute more to 
the production of agglomeration externalities, especially in the context of localisation-type 
externalities. 
These results are depicted in Fig. 3, which plots the estimated coefficients of the un-
weighted and weighted agglomeration variables from Table 3. The plot shows the presence of 
geographic nonlinearities characterising both intra- and inter-industry agglomeration 
externalities. The key message is that firm heterogeneity seems to matter in the context of 
localisation-type agglomeration forces: in fact, the positive but decreasing-with-distance effect of 
intra-industry externalities becomes increasing with distance if neighbour firms' characteristics 
are taken in to account. 
The estimated coefficients of the firm-level control variables have the same signs and 
significance levels in all the specifications reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the beginning-
of-the-period TFP variable are negative, suggesting a 𝛽-convergence effect; a firm's TFP growth 
seems to be positively affected by its initial size, and also by its age and level of services 
outsourced. We find a positive productivity-to-cash flow sensitivity, meaning that the firm's 
productivity growth tends to be affected by credit rationing (i.e. firm growth is pushed by 
internally generated resources). 
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4.1. Robustness checks 
This section presents two econometric exercises performed to test the robustness of the 
main results for the un-weighted agglomeration variables. The first exercise is aimed at verifying 
the validity of the proposed density measures and their comparability with standard 
specialisation and diversification indexes. Specifically, the first exercise replicates the un-
weighted case using specialisation and diversification agglomeration measures as proposed in 
CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004). The variable capturing specialisation externalities is 
defined as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑃𝐸?̂?𝑥𝑖
𝑠(𝑑𝑟) = 𝑒(𝑥𝑖
𝑠) [
∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑠‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
]                                                                                (9) 
 
where all the terms entering the formula are defined as before. The specialisation variable 
captures, for each distance band, the share of neighbour firms 𝑗 operating in the same two-digit 
industry 𝑠 of the reference firm 𝑖 with respect to the total number of neighbour firms 𝑗. The 
variable capturing diversification externalities is defined as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐼?̂?𝑥𝑖
𝑠(𝑑𝑟) = 𝑒(𝑥𝑖
𝑠)∑
{
 
 
 
 ∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑔‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
[∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
] − [∑ 1(‖𝑥𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑠‖ ∈ 𝑑𝑟)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
]
}
 
 
 
 
2
𝐺
𝑔=1
𝑔≠𝑠
            (10) 
 
where all the terms entering the formula are defined as before. The diversification variable is 
computed for each distance band as a Hirschman-Herfindahl index and captures industry variety 
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around the reference firm 𝑖. Appendix Table A13 reports the correlation matrix among the 
specialisation and diversification variables. 
The second robustness exercise replicates the baseline specification for the un-weighted 
case considering only those firms in the estimation sample aged at least ten years, i.e. firms 
located in a specific point in the space at least ten years before the agglomeration phenomena are 
captured. This exercise provides a (rough) test to control for potential endogeneity of the 
agglomeration variables, which is likely to emerge if there is reverse causality between 
agglomeration forces and firms' productivity, i.e. whether firms tend to relocate towards more 
productive areas, thereby reinforcing the agglomeration. 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimated productivity growth equation; Appendix Table 
A14 presents the results of the first-step selection equation. Overall, the results for the 
agglomeration variables computed following CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004) support the 
previous findings (see Table 4, Column 1). They confirm a positive, but decreasing-with-
distance effect of localisation-type externalities at short distances, which becomes negative at 
longer distances, and a negative effect of diversification-type externalities at short distances, 
which becomes positive at longer distances. 
Overall, the results for the sub-sample of firms aged at least ten years (see Table 4, Column 
2) confirm those for the whole sample of firms (see Table 3, Column 1). We find that intra-
industry externalities have a positive and significant decreasing effect moving from the first to 
the second distance band, while the effect of inter-industry externalities seems to be negative 
within 5 km, but positive at longer distances. 
Therefore, the robustness of the proposed density measures is confirmed using more 
"standard" specialisation and diversification indexes, and controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of the agglomeration variables. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The relationship between agglomeration forces and TFP (growth) at firm level has been 
investigated extensively in the last decade, but the results of this empirical literature are mixed 
and rather than conclusive. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, it tackles the MAUP; 
second, it tests the hypothesis of firm heterogeneity in the agglomerative space, accounting for 
the role played by firm-specific characteristics (in terms of size and TFP) in the generation of 
local externalities (so-called agglomerative heterogeneity). 
The empirical findings confirm that intra-industry (i.e. localisation-type) externalities have 
a positive effect at short distances, while inter-industry (i.e. diversification-type) externalities 
have a positive effect only at longer distances (CAINELLI and LUPI, 2010). Our results suggest 
also that firm heterogeneity matters for the generation of agglomeration externalities, at least in 
the context of intra-industry forces. In fact, the positive, but decreasing-with-distance effect of 
localisation-type externalities becomes increasing with distance when specific characteristics of 
the neighbour firms (operating in the same industry as the reference firm) are accounted for. This 
effect turns out to be particularly relevant when considering the size of neighbour firms, rather 
than their TFP. However, TFP-weighted agglomeration variables are considered a better proxy 
for agglomerative heterogeneity with respect to size-weighted agglomeration variables. In fact, a 
firm's TFP level is strictly related to its technological endowments and, therefore, to its ability to 
produce local externalities. Thus, these results support the theoretical intuitions of some business 
studies (ALCACER, 2006; ALCACER and CHUNG, 2007, 2014; WANG, 2015) that firms with 
different characteristics contribute differently to the production of local externalities. 
The results proposed in this paper underline several limitations characterising the empirical 
analysis of spatial agglomeration forces (e.g. the use of pre-defined spatial partitions and the 
assumption of homogeneous firms). However, our study has two main weaknesses which should 
be addressed in further research. First, agglomeration variables are computed using sample rather 
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than census data, with the consequence that only a (selected) sub-sample of the population of 
Italian manufacturing firms is included in the analysis. Second, size and TFP of neighbour firms 
are rough proxies for the firm's capabilities to produce agglomeration externalities. Alternative 
firm-specific characteristics (e.g. R&D and innovativeness, level of education of employees, 
etc.) should be considered to capture the role of firm heterogeneity in generating local 
externalities. 
As MARTIN et al. (2011) suggest, the analysis of agglomeration economies is relevant to 
understand both the mechanisms and effects of these phenomena on firms' economic 
performance, and the potential effects of clustering and industry policies. The results from the 
present study would suggest that the geographic scale might differ depending on whether 
localisation- or diversification-type externalities are considered. Also, the optimal policy should 
combine cluster policies with interventions aimed at promoting diversification processes within 
an area. In this context, many of the core ideas in the Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3) could be 
useful to incentivise and promote firms' economic performance. 
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NOTES 
1. The MAUP has been widely investigated by statisticians and quantitative geographers. See 
GEHLKE and BIEHL (1934), OPENSHAW (1981), ARBIA (1989), AMRHEIN (1995) and 
WONG and AMRHEIN (1996) among others. 
2. GABRIELE et al. (2013) consider a maximum distance of 100 km, which, however, seems 
too large to characterise spatial agglomeration phenomena. 
3. The agglomeration variables in equations (5) and (7) are computed using the R Project for 
Statistical Computing (R DEVELOPMENT CORE TEAM, 2013). Original coding is based 
on the "dbmss" R package developed by MARCON et al. (2012). 
4. A dummy variable for medium-high and high technology firms was tested as an alternative 
exclusion restriction in the first-step selection equation. The idea is that medium-high and 
high technology sectors are less likely to be influenced by general economic downturns and 
also less involved in international outsourcing of the production phases (the most value-
added), compared to traditional low-tech manufacturing sectors. Therefore, firms operating in 
these sectors are expected to have a lower probability of exiting the market, at least as a result 
of a non-industry specific external shock. The results using this alternative exclusion 
restriction are in line with the main findings. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Geographic features of spatial bands considered in the empirical analysis 
Distance Band Radius in km Area in Square km 
0 ≤ 𝑑5 ≤ 5 5 79 
5 < 𝑑10 ≤ 15 10 [15] 628 [707] 
15 < 𝑑15 ≤ 30 15 [30] 2,121 [2,827] 
Notes: Cumulative values are shown in brackets. 
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Table 2: Average area of standard geographic units of investigation 
Geographic Unit Average Area in Square km 
8,177 Municipalities (LAU-2) 37 
611 Local Labour Markets 494 
110 Provinces (NUTS-3) 2,739 
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Table 3. TFP growth equation: un-weighted and weighted agglomeration variables 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPis 
 Un-weighted Size-weighted TFP-weighted 
TFPis  -0.355*** -0.346*** -0.342*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
SIZEis  0.143*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
AGEis  0.025*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
OUTSOURCINGis  0.073*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CASHis  0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
INTRAis
0−5  0.021*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
INTRAis
5−15  0.018*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
INTRAis
15−30  0.005 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
INTERis
0−5  -0.052*** -0.037*** -0.052*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
INTERis
5−15  -0.008 -0.017*** -0.016** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
INTERis
15−30  0.054*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
λ  1.630*** 1.717*** 1.753*** 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.207) 
Number of Observations 22,239 22,239 22,239 
Censored Observations 6,358 6,358 6,358 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.254 0.255 0.255 
𝐹-Statistic 79.45*** 78.17*** 79.85*** 
Mean VIF 7.98 7.62 8.04 
Selection Equation    
Number of Observations 28,597 28,597 28,597 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.056 0.056 0.056 
Log Likelihood -14,307.72 -14,303.20 -14,303.18 
Wald 𝜒2 1,623.96*** 1,617.72*** 1,629.92*** 
Mean VIF 2.80 2.37 2.59 
TURBULENCEs (𝑝-value) -1.321** (0.606) -1.185* (0.610) -1.153* (0.610) 
Notes: All specifications include a constant term, as well as industrial category and NUTS-1 dummy 
variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. 𝜆 denotes the Inverse Mills Ratio parameter from first-step selection equations (see 
Appendix Table A12). 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table 4. TFP growth equation: robustness exercises 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPis 
 CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004) Firms aged at least 10 years 
TFPis  -0.355*** -0.340*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) 
SIZEis  0.144*** 0.146*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
AGEis  0.025*** -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
OUTSOURCINGis  0.073*** 0.070*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
CASHis  0.027*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
SPECis
0−5  0.035*** ... 
 (0.006)  
SPECis
5−15  0.023*** ... 
 (0.007)  
SPECis
15−30  -0.018*** ... 
 (0.007)  
DIVis
0−5  -0.036*** ... 
 (0.006)  
DIVis
5−15  -0.046*** ... 
 (0.012)  
DIVis
15−30  0.127*** ... 
 (0.016)  
INTRAis
0−5  ... 0.027*** 
  (0.005) 
INTRAis
5−15  ... 0.013* 
  (0.007) 
INTRAis
15−30  ... 0.002 
  (0.007) 
INTERis
0−5  ... -0.053*** 
  (0.007) 
INTERis
5−15  ... -0.007 
  (0.009) 
INTERis
15−30  ... 0.060*** 
  (0.010) 
λ  1.641*** 1.802*** 
 (0.211) (0.231) 
Number of Observations 22,239 18,380 
Censored Observations 6,358 4,814 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.254 0.255 
𝐹-Statistic 79.63*** 72.47*** 
Mean VIF 7.74 8.08 
Selection Equation   
Number of Observations 28,597 23,194 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.054 0.051 
Log Likelihood -14,329.40 -11,237.75 
Wald 𝜒2 1,578.72*** 1,188.79*** 
Mean VIF 2.25 2.82 
TURBULENCEs (𝑝-value) -1.426** (0.605) -1.290* (0.718) 
Notes: Specifications include a constant term, as well as industrial category and NUTS-1 dummy variables. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 𝜆 denotes 
the Inverse Mills Ratio parameter from first-step equations (see Appendix Table A14). 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
 
 
 
159 
 
Fig. 1. Sketch of the continuous approach to the analysis of agglomeration forces 
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Fig. 2. Hierarchical cluster analysis on the seven distance bands 
 
Notes: The analysis uses the un-weighted pair-group method of average. The density measures are constructed considering all 
firms falling within the threshold distances, independently of the industrial sector to which they belong. 
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Fig. 3: Coefficients of un-weighted, size- and TFP-weighted agglomeration variables 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in estimating TFP 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. vait kit lit mit 
 overall 6.149 1.402 -0.166 14.165 
1    vait between  1.383 0.188 13.584 
 within  0.419 -1.275 12.494 
 overall 5.666 2.019 -6.913 14.895 
0.688 1   kit between  1.974 -4.298 14.614 
 within  0.645 -5.062 12.383 
 overall 5.666 1.426 -0.249 13.661 
0.935 0.648 1  lit between  1.443 -0.233 13.544 
 within  0.372 -1.776 12.616 
 overall 6.962 1.579 -0.434 16.569 
0.813 0.623 0.759 1 mit between  1.576 -0.376 16.494 
 within  0.372 -0.611 13.675 
Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to a sample of 69,933 firms, i.e. 584,547 observations over the period 2003-2012. 
𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 denote the natural logarithms of, respectively, value added, capital input, labour input, and 
intermediate input. 
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Table A2: TFP estimation: elasticities of capital and labour inputs 
Two-digit Industry kit lit No. Firms No. Obs. 
10 0.085 (0.008) [0.000] 0.657 (0.010) [0.000] 5,113 37,011 
11 0.099 (0.031) [0.001] 0.540 (0.024) [0.000] 849 6,139 
12 0.043 (0.066) [0.509] 0.266 (0.150) [0.077] 19 102 
13 0.072 (0.007) [0.000] 0.696 (0.009) [0.000] 3,338 23,748 
14 0.086 (0.007) [0.000] 0.709 (0.010) [0.000] 3,919 25,292 
15 0.068 (0.008) [0.000] 0.707 (0.010) [0.000] 2,804 19,668 
16 0.037 (0.008) [0.000] 0.666 (0.013) [0.000] 2,273 16,409 
17 0.058 (0.012) [0.000] 0.680 (0.023) [0.000] 1,397 10,783 
18 0.068 (0.007) [0.000] 0.691 (0.012) [0.000] 2,714 19,199 
19 0.110 (0.035) [0.002] 0.637 (0.032) [0.000] 198 1,500 
20 0.085 (0.009) [0.000] 0.650 (0.016) [0.000] 2,156 16,494 
21 0.082 (0.017) [0.000] 0.657 (0.029) [0.000] 346 2,637 
22 0.085 (0.008) [0.000] 0.660 (0.012) [0.000] 3,523 26,831 
23 0.055 (0.007) [0.000] 0.661 (0.010) [0.000] 4,443 32,003 
24 0.062 (0.012) [0.000] 0.697 (0.014) [0.000] 1,382 10,538 
25 0.059 (0.003) [0.000] 0.705 (0.006) [0.000] 14,348 107,229 
26 0.078 (0.008) [0.000] 0.713 (0.012) [0.000] 2,719 19,219 
27 0.061 (0.008) [0.000] 0.707 (0.011) [0.000] 3,042 22,558 
28 0.074 (0.004) [0.000] 0.679 (0.008) [0.000] 7,198 54,322 
29 0.060 (0.012) [0.000] 0.720 (0.016) [0.000] 984 7,265 
30 0.068 (0.015) [0.000] 0.744 (0.016) [0.000] 969 6,297 
31 0.060 (0.007) [0.000] 0.658 (0.016) [0.000] 3,471 24,684 
32 0.070 (0.008) [0.000] 0.685 (0.012) [0.000] 2,728 19,362 
Notes: TFP is estimated on a sample of 69,933 firms observed over the period 2003-2012. TFP is estimated separately 
for twenty-three two-digit industries defined according to the Ateco 2007 classification of the economic activities 
adopted by Istat. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are clustered at the firm level. P-values are shown in 
brackets. 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑖𝑡 denote the natural logarithms of, respectively, the capital input and the labour input.  
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Table A3: Distribution of the sample used to estimate agglomeration measures 
Industry 
North West North East Centre South Islands Total 
a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % 
10 811 25.22 872 27.11 508 15.80 739 22.98 286 8.89 3,216 100.00 
11 140 24.87 176 31.26 63 11.19 118 20.96 66 11.72 563 100.00 
12 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 100.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 100.00 
13 973 51.54 275 14.57 515 27.28 113 5.99 12 0.64 1,888 100.00 
14 467 24.58 548 28.84 492 25.89 371 19.53 22 1.16 1,900 100.00 
15 184 12.36 348 23.37 733 49.23 218 14.64 6 0.40 1,489 100.00 
16 319 24.24 474 36.02 271 20.59 189 14.36 63 4.79 1,316 100.00 
17 330 35.60 236 25.46 234 25.24 95 10.25 32 3.45 927 100.00 
18 611 39.57 386 25.00 355 22.99 151 9.78 41 2.66 1,544 100.00 
19 44 30.99 18 12.68 31 21.83 38 26.76 11 7.75 142 100.00 
20 713 48.21 356 24.07 220 14.87 127 8.59 63 4.26 1,479 100.00 
21 137 51.70 29 10.94 72 27.17 19 7.17 8 3.02 265 100.00 
22 999 45.70 606 27.72 286 13.08 218 9.97 77 3.52 2,186 100.00 
23 626 23.68 767 29.01 568 21.48 447 16.91 236 8.93 2,644 100.00 
24 515 54.90 205 21.86 119 12.69 75 8.00 24 2.56 938 100.00 
25 3,697 43.56 2,625 30.93 1,133 13.35 814 9.59 219 2.58 8,488 100.00 
26 744 45.81 371 22.84 335 20.63 125 7.70 49 3.02 1,624 100.00 
27 822 44.22 594 31.95 278 14.95 134 7.21 31 1.67 1,859 100.00 
28 2,027 45.33 1,978 44.23 172 3.85 196 4.38 99 2.21 4,472 100.00 
29 295 48.28 150 24.55 73 11.95 76 12.44 17 2.78 611 100.00 
30 169 32.69 117 22.63 126 24.37 69 13.35 36 6.96 517 100.00 
31 469 24.29 740 38.32 489 25.32 183 9.48 50 2.59 1,931 100.00 
32 534 34.03 450 28.68 425 27.09 117 7.46 43 2.74 1,569 100.00 
Total 15,626 37.59 12,321 29.64 7,504 18.05 4,632 11.14 1,491 3.59 41,574 100.00 
Notes: Manufacturing industries (10 to 32) are defined at the two-digit level of the Ateco 2007 classification of the economic activities adopted by Istat 
(Italian National Institute of Statistics). Percentage values are expressed on row totals. North West includes Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Liguria and 
Lombardy. North East includes Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige. Centre includes Toscana, Umbria, Marche and 
Lazio. South includes Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria. Islands are Sicily and Sardinia. 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics of firm-level explanatory variables 
 No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
∆TFPis  22,239 0.017 0.491 -5.456 6.638 
TFPis  28,597 1.857 0.613 -4.402 6.715 
SIZEis  28,597 0.004 1.278 -2.499 7.560 
AGEis  28,597 0.001 0.622 -1.283 1.991 
OUTSOURCINGis  28,597 -1.529 0.563 -5.504 -0.012 
CASHis  28,597 3.655 2.723 -6.908 12.377 
Notes: ∆ denotes log difference. Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. 
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Table A5: Correlation matrix: firm-level explanatory variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
TFPis  [1] 1     
SIZEis  [2] 0.490 1    
AGEis  [3] 0.138 0.320 1   
OUTSOURCINGis  [4] -0.024 -0.048 0.014 1  
CASHis  [5] 0.392 0.398 0.194 0.017 1 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. 
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Table A6: Descriptive statistics of the agglomeration variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
INTRAis
0−5 (UW) -15.659 1.219 -17.486 -12.555 
INTRAis
5−15 (UW) -16.518 1.199 -19.565 -13.857 
INTRAis
15−30 (UW) -17.180 1.203 -20.782 -14.490 
INTERis
0−5 (UW) -13.867 1.288 -17.486 -10.709 
INTERis
5−15 (UW) -14.398 1.109 -19.000 -12.158 
INTERis
15−30 (UW) -14.823 0.974 -19.172 -12.924 
INTRAis
0−5 (SW) -12.531 1.562 -17.081 -7.598 
INTRAis
5−15 (SW) -13.266 1.413 -19.160 -9.446 
INTRAis
15−30 (SW) -13.938 1.370 -19.882 -10.782 
INTERis
0−5 (SW) -10.482 1.530 -16.233 -6.754 
INTERis
5−15 (SW) -10.930 1.262 -18.423 -8.425 
INTERis
15−30 (SW) -11.386 1.062 -16.872 -9.233 
INTRAis
0−5 (PW) -13.677 1.251 -18.305 -10.479 
INTRAis
5−15 (PW) -14.529 1.199 -18.622 -11.961 
INTRAis
15−30 (PW) -15.196 1.203 -20.108 -12.646 
INTERis
0−5 (PW) -11.797 1.360 -16.732 -8.444 
INTERis
5−15 (PW) -12.312 1.144 -17.034 -9.996 
INTERis
15−30 (PW) -12.758 0.980 -17.269 -10.718 
SPECis
0−5  -2.022 0.970 -5.432 0.701 
SPECis
5−15  -2.233 0.953 -6.707 1.393 
SPECis
15−30  -2.388 0.928 -6.149 0.911 
DIVis
0−5  2.215 0.562 -1.030 5.411 
DIVis
5−15  2.066 0.341 -1.263 2.680 
DIVis
15−30  2.089 0.324 -0.521 2.652 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. UW denotes un-weighted, 
SW denotes size-weighted, PW denotes TFP-weighted agglomeration variables. 
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Table A7: Correlation matrix: un-weighted agglomeration variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
INTRAis
0−5  [1] 1      
INTRAis
5−15  [2] 0.640 1     
INTRAis
15−30  [3] 0.343 0.706 1    
INTERis
0−5  [4] 0.523 0.343 0.145 1   
INTERis
5−15  [5] 0.348 0.571 0.380 0.741 1  
INTERis
15−30  [6] 0.215 0.444 0.599 0.472 0.754 1 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. 
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Table A8: Correlation matrix: size-weighted agglomeration variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
INTRAis
0−5  [1] 1      
INTRAis
5−15  [2] 0.539 1     
INTRAis
15−30  [3] 0.275 0.618 1    
INTERis
0−5  [4] 0.479 0.337 0.147 1   
INTERis
5−15  [5] 0.337 0.573 0.363 0.694 1  
INTERis
15−30  [6] 0.197 0.442 0.624 0.399 0.679 1 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. 
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Table A9: Correlation matrix: TFP-weighted agglomeration variables. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
INTRAis
0−5  [1] 1      
INTRAis
5−15  [2] 0.591 1     
INTRAis
15−30  [3] 0.291 0.677 1    
INTERis
0−5  [4] 0.528 0.341 0.133 1   
INTERis
5−15  [5] 0.346 0.575 0.360 0.731 1  
INTERis
15−30  [6] 0.197 0.446 0.612 0.420 0.705 1 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. 
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Table A10: Comparison between the sample and the population of manufacturing firms 
  
Small Firms 
(≤ 49) 
Medium Firms 
(50 - 249) 
Large Firms 
(≥ 250) 
All Sizes 
2011 Italian 
Industry Census 
 a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % 
North West 109,879 96.42 3,524 3.09 557 0.49 113,960 100.00 
North East 88,611 96.35 2,946 3.20 407 0.44 91,964 100.00 
Centre 79,137 98.29 1,216 1.51 164 0.20 80,517 100.00 
South 68,275 98.86 721 1.04 67 0.10 69,063 100.00 
Islands 27,742 99.44 143 0.51 12 0.04 27,897 100.00 
Italy 373,644 97.46 8,550 2.23 1,207 0.31 383,401 100.00 
Sample 
 a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % a. v. % 
North West 10,557 84.37 1,734 13.86 222 1.77 12,513 100.00 
North East 7,276 83.24 1,334 15.26 131 1.50 8,741 100.00 
Centre 4,289 88.87 481 9.97 56 1.16 4,826 100.00 
South 1,978 90.61 182 8.34 23 1.05 2,183 100.00 
Islands 311 93.11 23 6.89 0 0.00 334 100.00 
Italy 24,411 85.36 3,754 13.13 432 1.51 28,597 100.00 
Notes: The number of employees defining the size classes is shown in parentheses. Only manufacturing industries between 
10 and 32 of the Ateco 2007 Classification of Economic Activities are considered. Percentage values are expressed on row 
totals. North West includes Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Liguria and Lombardy. North East includes Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige. Centre includes Toscana, Umbria, Marche and Lazio. South includes 
Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria. Islands are Sicily and Sardinia. 
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Table A11: Sample distribution by industrial sector 
Category Industry 
No. of Firms 
a. v. % 
1 
10 - Manufacture of food products 1,836 6.42 
11 - Manufacture of beverages 141 0.49 
12 - Manufacture of tobacco products 0 0 
2 
13 - Manufacture of textiles 1,453 5.08 
14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 1,306 4.57 
3 15 - Manufacture of leather and related products 1,183 4.14 
4 
16 - Manufacture of wood and its products, cork (except furniture), articles of straw, 
plaiting materials 
547 1.91 
5 
17 - Manufacture of paper and paper products 463 1.62 
18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1,023 3.58 
6 19 - Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 21 0.07 
7 
20 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 865 3.02 
21 - Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 126 0.44 
8 22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1,420 4.97 
9 23 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1,517 5.30 
10 
24 - Manufacture of basic metals 504 1.76 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 7,398 25.87 
11 
26 - Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 1,071 3.75 
27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment 1,247 4.36 
12 28 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3,740 13.08 
13 
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 212 0.74 
30 - Manufacture of other transport equipment 142 0.50 
14 
31 - Manufacture of furniture 1,310 4.58 
32 - Other manufacturing 1,072 3.75 
33 - Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0 0 
 Total sample 28,597 100 
Notes: Percentage values are expressed on the cleaned total sample. Industries are defined at the two-digit level 
according to the Ateco 2007 classification of the economic activities. Industrial categories are defined according to 
Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics) classification. 
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Table A12. Selection equation: un-weighted and weighted agglomeration variables 
Dependent Variable SURVIVALis 
 Un-weighted Size-weighted TFP-weighted 
TFPis  0.249*** 0.249*** 0.249*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
SIZEis  0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
AGEis  0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
OUTSOURCINGis  0.098*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
CASHis  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
INTRAis
0−5  0.005 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) 
INTRAis
5−15  0.010 0.009 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) 
INTRAis
15−30  0.026* 0.021* 0.033** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
INTERis
0−5  -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.054*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) 
INTERis
5−15  -0.002 -0.015 -0.010 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.018) 
INTERis
15−30  0.049** 0.051*** 0.034* 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
TURBULENCEs  -1.321** -1.185* -1.153* 
 (0.606) (0.610) (0.610) 
Number of Observations 28,597 28,597 28,597 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.056 0.056 0.056 
Log Likelihood -14,307.72 -14,303.20 -14,303.18 
Wald 𝜒2 1,623.96*** 1,617.72*** 1,629.92*** 
Mean VIF 2.80 2.37 2.59 
Notes: Specifications include a constant term, as well as industrial category and NUTS-1 dummy 
variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
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Table A13: Correlation matrix: variables à la CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
SPECis
0−5  [1] 1      
SPECis
5−15  [2] 0.780 1     
SPECi,s
15−30  [3] 0.570 0.782 1    
DIVis
0−5  [4] 0.109 0.113 0.091 1   
DIVis
5−15  [5] -0.051 -0.053 -0.052 0.407 1  
DIVis
15−30  [6] -0.019 -0.029 0.013 0.250 0.542 1 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of 28,597 firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
Table A14. Selection equation: robustness exercises 
Dependent Variable SURVIVALis 
 CINGANO and SCHIVARDI (2004) Firms aged 10 years or more 
TFPis  0.247*** 0.245*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
SIZE,s  0.058*** 0.053*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
AGEis  0.097*** 0.061*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) 
OUTSOURCINGis  0.096*** 0.087*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
CASHis  0.018*** 0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
SPECis
0−5  0.031** ... 
 (0.015)  
SPECis
5−15  0.010 ... 
 (0.019)  
SPECis
15−30  0.008 ... 
 (0.017)  
DIVis
0−5  -0.035** ... 
 (0.017)  
DIVis
5−15  -0.067** ... 
 (0.031)  
DIVis
15−30  0.132*** ... 
 (0.033)  
INTRAis
0−5  ... 0.011 
  (0.014) 
INTRAis
5−15  ... 0.004 
  (0.018) 
INTRAis
15−30  ... 0.024 
  (0.018) 
INTERis
0−5  ... -0.055*** 
  (0.015) 
INTERis
5−15  ... -0.001 
  (0.023) 
INTERis
15−30  ... 0.053** 
  (0.023) 
TURBULENCEs  -1.426** -1.290* 
 (0.605) (0.718) 
Number of Observations 28,597 23,194 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.054 0.051 
Log Likelihood -14,329.40 -11,237.75 
Wald 𝜒2 1,578.72*** 1,188.79*** 
Mean VIF 2.25 2.82 
Notes: Specifications include a constant term, as well as industrial category and NUTS-1 dummy 
variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses and they are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. 
      *𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
